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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
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1.1 Introduction to the research questions 
The purpose of an audit, the process of providing assurance over and expressing an 
opinion on financial statements, is to enhance the degree of confidence of users in the audited 
financial statements (IAASB, 2009). Users of financial statements will only rely on the 
auditor’s opinion if they believe that the audit is of high quality. Hence, auditing derives its 
value from audit quality and audit quality is fundamental for the functioning of capital markets 
(DeFond & Zhang [2014]). 
There is not one commonly accepted definition of audit quality, which generally 
depends on the viewpoint of the party defining audit quality (Knechel et al. [2013]). 
Furthermore, audit quality can be defined as binary (audit failure or no-failure)1, or as 
continuous (ranging from low to high quality) (DeFond & Zhang [2014]; Francis [2011])2. 
Regardless of the exact definition of audit quality, most definitions acknowledge that audit 
quality is engagement-specific and dependent on the circumstances under which the audit was 
conducted (Francis [2011]). Audit quality is thus shaped by multiple different factors, including 
engagement-specific, audit firm-specific, national and contextual factors (IAASB [2014]). 
These factors determine the auditor’s ability and incentives to supply audit quality, client 
demand for audit quality and shape the auditor-client relationship and audit work (DeFond & 
Zhang [2014]). Auditor ability is determined by audit inputs, the audit process and auditor 
expertise, while auditor incentives for audit quality can be market-based in the form of 
reputation and litigation risk and arise through the risk of regulatory intervention which 
imposes a minimum standard of audit quality. Contextual factors that determine the 
institutional environment, such as regulation and standard-setting, can further affect audit 
inputs, the audit process and auditor incentives, by imposing minimum requirements or 
monitoring auditor work effort. Furthermore, all of these supply and contextual factors not only 
affect audit quality, but also other audit outcomes, such as auditor conservatism and audit fees.  
This dissertation is comprised of three chapters that investigate how audit outcomes are 
affected by engagement-specific and contextual factors that determine auditors’ supply of audit 
quality, in a variety of settings. These settings, which are addressed in the next paragraphs, 
relate to situations that are of current and continued concern to the audit profession, regulators, 
standard-setters and the public. 
 
1 A standard binary definition of audit quality is that audit quality is the market assessed joint probability that an 
auditor both discovers a misstatement and reports the misstatement (DeAngelo [1981]).  
2 For example, DeFond and Zhang [2014] define higher audit quality as providing greater assurance that the 
financial statements reflect the firm’s underlying economics.  
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In the first study (Chapter 2) of this dissertation, I explore how audit inputs and 
incentives in group audit settings affect audit outcomes. I further explore how a change in 
context, that is a change in audit standards, affects the supply of audit quality. Specifically, I 
explore how engagement-specific variation in the use of component auditors across 
engagements of multinational groups is associated with audit quality and fees. Component 
auditors are auditors that audit the financial statements of a group component and are under the 
supervision of the principal (group) auditor who is ultimately responsible for assurance over 
and quality of the group financial statements. The engagement of component auditors is an 
economic tradeoff for the principal auditor. On the one hand, using component auditors can 
result in efficiency gains, reduce costs and exploit local knowledge and expertise of component 
auditors. On the other hand, by accepting responsibility for the work of component auditors, 
the principal auditor faces an agency problem due to information asymmetry about the 
performance of component auditors who, without holding ultimate responsibility for their audit 
work on components, might shirk. To address the principal-agent problem in group audits, 
audit standards require the principal auditor to satisfy him/herself that the involvement of 
component auditors does not result in compromised audit quality, for example through 
undertaking quality checks and reviews and supervision of component’s audit work. This is a 
costly task and complex coordination and communication challenges arise. For this reason, 
international and national regulatory and standard-setting bodies have voiced significant 
concerns over the quality of these group audits in recent years, especially of multinational 
group audits where audit work spans across jurisdictions. These standard-setters have and are 
revising audit standards on group audits. Hence, I assess whether a change in group audit 
standards that strengthened the requirements for principal auditors affects audit quality.  
In the second study (Chapter 3) of this dissertation, I investigate the relationship 
between audit quality and the introduction of public oversight over the audit profession 
internationally. The introduction of public oversight has been the most fundamental 
institutional change in the audit landscape of the last decades. Public oversight boards (POBs) 
are independent of and charged with regulatory oversight over the audit profession, replacing 
a system of self-regulation. With inspections as the main work effort of POBs to detect and 
improve audit quality deficiencies, POBs can drive improvements in the audit process, thus 
affecting auditor ability. Public oversight can also affect auditor incentives to supply audit 
quality through the threat of regulatory sanctions on auditors, which can subsequently lead to 
reputational damages and litigation risk. From a theoretical viewpoint, regulatory oversight 
through mechanisms such as inspections by POBs can provide investors with confidence that 
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audits meet a minimum level of quality standards and independence requirements (Aobdia & 
Shroff [2017]), thereby mitigating agency conflicts inherent in auditing (Watts & Zimmerman 
[1980]). However, the resources and costs required to conduct independent inspections are 
large, and regulatory agencies may not be competent to conduct inspections, or have the wrong 
incentives, thus being ineffective in fulfilling its task of serving the public (Stigler [1971]). 
Since the effectiveness of public oversight over the audit profession is not uncontested, I 
investigate the effect of the commencement of inspections of national POBs worldwide on 
audit quality.  
In the third study of this dissertation (Chapter 4), I investigate how two major incentives 
for auditors to supply audit quality, litigation and regulatory risk, interact and jointly affect 
auditor behavior and audit outcomes. Prior literature has investigated the effect of either 
regulatory risk, which poses a threat to auditors by means of financial, criminal or professional 
penalties, or litigation risk, which can lead to lawsuits and financial penalties, on audit 
outcomes. However, little is known about whether and how multiple risks interact to affect 
auditor behavior and audit outcomes. On the one hand, these risks could reinforce each other 
since both can lead to large penalties for auditors in case of audit failures (Peecher et al. [2013]). 
On the other hand, regulatory risk and litigation risk, which both impose penalties on auditors 
in case of audit failure, could act as alternative disciplining mechanisms and thus not have an 
incremental effect (Ye & Simunic [2017]; Fung, Raman, and Zhu. [2017]). Auditors can react 
to these risks in multiple ways, including increasing their fees to compensate for risk or higher 
audit effort, or by reporting more conservatively to avoid audit failure. Hence, in the third study 
I investigate whether and how two main incentives, litigation and regulatory risk, affect auditor 
conservative reporting behavior and audit pricing.  
1.2 Overview and findings of the dissertation chapters 
In this section, I provide a brief overview of each of the studies of this dissertation, 
including the setting, methodology and findings. 
In study one (Chapter 2), I first explore the determinants of the involvement of 
component auditors (these can be part of the principal auditor’s network or unaffiliated 
auditors) in the audit of large multinational clients and then examine how the involvement of 
component auditors (network or unaffiliated auditors) influences engagement audit quality and 
fees. Using the unique Australian setting of longstanding disclosures of audit fees paid to the 
principal and component (network and unaffiliated) auditors in the annual reports of MNEs, I 
find that almost half of all MNE audits in the sample covering the years 2006 to 2013 involve 
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component auditors. The likelihood and extent of component auditor involvement is associated 
with complexity and internationalization of MNEs, as well as principal auditor characteristics. 
Further, the extent of involvement of network auditors is determined by internationalization 
and size of MNEs, while the involvement of unaffiliated auditors is determined by principal 
auditor characteristics. The revision to the group audit standard (ISA 600) significantly reduced 
the extent of unaffiliated component auditor involvement. Furthermore, the results show that 
more involvement of component auditors is associated with lower audit quality (measured 
using earnings and revenue management proxies), while these audits are at the same time 
associated with higher audit fees. Audit quality is lower for network and unaffiliated auditors 
and the revision of the group audit standard (ISA 600) had no effect on audit quality or audit 
fees.  
In the second study of this dissertation (Chapter 3), I investigate the effect of the 
commencement of audit firm inspections by POBs internationally on audit quality and whether 
the effect of inspections on audit quality differ for large (Big 4) and small (non-Big 4) audit 
firms. Further, I describe differences in inspection characteristics related to the inspection 
approach, disclosure of inspection results and enforcement ability of POBs worldwide and 
consider the effect of these different inspection characteristics on audit quality. Using a 
generalized difference in difference design that exploits the staggered commencement of 
inspections in 50 countries, I find that for a sample of publicly listed clients over the period 
2003 to 2012, audit quality (measured as earnings and revenue management proxies) increases 
after inspection commencement. I further find that the effect of inspection commencement is 
higher for clients of Big 4 audit firms compared to clients of non-Big 4 firms. Lastly, the results 
show that the effect of inspection commencement is conditional on POBs disclosing inspection 
results publicly.  
In the third study of this dissertation (Chapter 4), I examine whether and how litigation 
and regulatory risk jointly affect auditor conservative reporting behavior and audit fees. I 
exploit the U.S. setting which features variation in auditor litigation risk across different U.S. 
states, both in terms of third-party and damage apportionment standards which capture different 
dimensions of litigation risk. Further, regulatory risk increased during the sample period 2001-
2009 with the introduction of public oversight over the audit profession, and specifically the 
introduction of inspections of audit firms at different time periods. Using these empirical 
proxies for litigation and regulatory risk, I find evidence these risks jointly increase audit fees, 
and conservative auditor reporting. Further, this effect is attributed to non-global audit firm 
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networks (Non-Big 6). This suggests that litigation and regulatory risks reinforce each other, 
rather than acting as substitutes.  
1.3 Contribution of the dissertation 
Overall, this dissertation contributes to the body of knowledge about factors that drive 
auditors to supply audit quality, and on the contextual factors that influence the supply of audit 
quality. Specifically, I examine settings that are of current and continued interest and concern 
to the audit profession, regulators and standard-setters, and the public at large: the audit quality 
consequences of group audits and the effectiveness of public oversight worldwide, as well as 
the interaction between regulatory and litigation risk. 
The first study (Chapter 2) demonstrates that in line with concerns of regulators and 
standard-setters, audit quality problems are prevalent in group audits involving component 
auditors, regardless of whether these components are part of the principal auditor’s network or 
unaffiliated. Further, while the revisions to auditing standard ISA 600 reduced the involvement 
of unaffiliated auditors, audit quality problems in group audits involving components persist 
after the revision. This large-scale study based on longstanding disclosures in the Australian 
setting contributes to the scant but emerging empirical literature on group audits and thus 
supports regulatory concerns that to date have been based on limited evidence. Further, this 
study is also informative to audit practitioners that work in group audit settings, and standard-
setters (i.e. the PCAOB and IAASB) that are currently revisiting the audit standard on group 
audits. Furthermore, users of group financial statements should be aware of the audit concerns 
surrounding group audits and the potential impact on the quality of group financial statements. 
Based on our findings, users might benefit from more public disclosure about involvement and 
extent of involvement of component auditors, especially given the lack of public disclosure in 
most jurisdictions. 
The second study (Chapter 3) contributes to the emerging literature on the benefits of 
the introduction of public oversight over the audit profession and in particular on the 
introduction of audit firm inspections in an international setting. The study provides evidence 
of audit quality improvements after commencement of inspection programs in jurisdictions 
worldwide and thus extends and generalizes the existing findings in the literature that 
concentrate on the effect of inspections in the US setting or international inspections by the US 
public oversight board. This study further describes differences in characteristics of inspection 
systems related to the work approach, disclosure and enforcement ability of POBs worldwide 
and provides evidence on the effect of inspection disclosure on reputation incentives for audit 
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firms. This description and analysis is useful in informing the ongoing discussions and 
decisions about mutual recognition of public oversight across countries and (re)design of POBs 
and their characteristics going forward.  
The third study (Chapter 4) contributes to understanding how different incentives for 
auditors affect auditor behavior and audit outcomes jointly. This question is important since it 
is largely unclear what the main contextual or institutional drivers for auditor behavior and 
outcomes are (Francis [2011]; Minutti-Meza [2014]), and how different risks that affect 
auditors work jointly (DeFond & Zhang [2014]). By identifying a setting that allows me to 
investigate how two forms of regulatory risk and litigation risk jointly affect auditor behavior 
and audit outcomes, I show that both risks reinforce each other. However, I also find evidence 
that high litigation and regulatory risk increases auditor conservative reporting. 
1.4 Outline of the dissertation 
The following three chapters present the three studies that were introduced in this chapter. 
Chapter 2 presents the study on the determinants of and audit outcomes from the involvement 
of component auditors in multinational group audits. Chapter 3 presents the study on the effect 
of the commencement of national inspection regimes on audit quality. Chapter 4 presents the 
study on the interaction between litigation and regulatory risk and its effect on audit outcomes. 
Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation by summarizing the main findings of the studies, 
discussing the implications and limitations, and offering directions for future research.  
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Chapter 2 - Involvement of Component Auditors in Multinational 
Group Audits: Determinants and Audit Outcomes34 
 
 
Abstract: We study the determinants of involvement of component auditors (either network 
and/or unaffiliated) in multinational (MNE) group audits and associated audit outcomes. We 
identify the involvement of component auditors, using unique Australian disclosures of group 
audit fees paid to the principal and component auditors. We first document that MNE 
complexity, degree of MNE internationalization, and auditor characteristics determine the 
extent and type of component auditor involvement. Next, we find that increased involvement 
of component auditors is associated with lower audit quality and higher audit fees. We then 
investigate the impact of the revision of the international auditing standard related to group 
audits, which expanded the principal auditor’s responsibilities, and show that, while this 
reduced the involvement of unaffiliated (but not network) auditors, quality problems remain.  
 
  
 
3 This chapter is based on a working paper with Elizabeth Carson, Roger Simnett, Ann Vanstraelen and Greg 
Trompeter. 
4 We thank Cecilia Chiu, Dale Fu, Hien Hoang, Lin Liao, Ashna Prasad, Yi Shi, Yang Xu and Yitang Yang for 
research assistance, and appreciate the comments of Ronen Gal-Or, Karla Johnstone, Bill Kinney, Clive Lennox, 
Sarah Stein, Per Christen Tronnes and Michael Willenborg. This paper has benefited from presentation at The 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board/Journal of Accounting Research Conference on Auditing and 
Capital Markets, the European Accounting Association Annual Meeting, American Accounting Association 
Annual Meeting, American Accounting Association Auditing Section Mid Year Meeting and Accounting and 
Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand Annual Meeting as well as workshops at Boston College, 
Deakin University, Florida International University, Maastricht University, the University of Melbourne, Monash 
University, University of Central Florida, University of Texas, University of Western Australia, UNSW Sydney 
and Villanova University. We acknowledge the financial support of the Australian Research Council and UNSW 
Business School. 
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2.1 Introduction 
The quality of multinational (MNE) group audits is a key area of concern for standard-
setters and regulators (International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) 
[2015a], [2015b], [2019a], International Forum of Independent Audit Regulators (IFIAR) 
[2018], the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) [2016], [2017]).5 This 
concern stems, in part, from the results of audit inspections by regulators, which have identified 
numerous examples of poor coordination and oversight when component auditors—and 
foreign component auditors in particular—are involved in an MNE group audit (e.g., Doty 
[2011], [2017], IFIAR [2018]). Problems with the quality of audits involving component 
auditors have also been highlighted by major international audit failures, such as those 
involving Parmalat, Royal Ahold, Satyam Corporation, and, more recently, BT.  
Despite these high-profile failures, published research on MNE group audits has been 
scant, primarily due to data constraints. Exceptions are the work of Dee, Lulseged, and Zhang 
[2015], who document, for a small sample of Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) issuers, 
negative market reactions and a decline in earnings response coefficients (ERCs) when the fact 
that part of an audit is outsourced to auditors, besides the principal auditor, is disclosed for the 
first time. From a survey of group audit leaders, Downey and Bedard [2019a] identify 
coordination and communication issues as key challenges in global group audits. With the 
recent introduction of the PCAOB’s requirement that firms disclose which audit firms are 
leading and which are assisting in audits,6 a number of concurrent papers exploring U.S. group 
audits have emerged (e.g., Burke, Hoitash and Hoitashet al. [2019], Dee et al. [2018]).7  
Our study investigates these concerns about MNE group audits, using large-scale 
longitudinal empirical evidence. It explores the determinants of component auditor 
involvement and the associated audit outcomes. Using longstanding Australian disclosures, we 
 
5 For example, James Doty, former chairman of the PCAOB, said in 2011, in relation to multinational group 
audits: “Our inspectors often see more than the principal auditor—or signing firm—does. In many cases principal 
auditors rely on high-level reports from subsidiary auditors. They often don’t review the work papers of the other 
auditors. Our inspectors do. And they often find problems in that work.” Internationally, IFIAR’s 2017 inspection 
findings reveal that group audits have frequent adverse findings at the engagement level (IFIAR [2018]). 
6 PCAOB Rule 3211 on Form AP, Auditor reporting of certain audit participants, effective for audit reports issued 
on or after June 30, 2017.  
7 The evidence based on first-time disclosures of component auditors in the United States appears mixed. Burke 
et al. [2019] report that the total percentage of audit hours conducted by component auditors harms audit quality 
(i.e., higher likelihood of restatement) while the mere use of a component auditor and the total number of 
component auditors that participated in the engagement do not affect audit quality. In contrast, Dee et al. [2018] 
document that audit quality is lower (i.e., higher discretionary accruals) when a component auditor is involved 
and that the use of more than one component auditor leads to lower audit quality compared to the use of only one 
component auditor, while there is no support for the idea that the percentage of the audit conducted by component 
auditors influences audit quality.  
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identify the extent of involvement of principal and component auditors (including whether a 
component auditor is a member of the principal auditor’s network or unaffiliated) in MNE 
group audits. The disclosure of group audit fees in Australia allows us to analyze questions that 
cannot be answered in the U.S. setting, where only audit hours are disclosed. Furthermore, in 
contrast to the U.S., Australian audit fee disclosures do not contain a minimum threshold for 
fees paid to component auditors, allowing all such instances to be identified. The international 
auditing standard used in our setting also differs from the U.S. equivalent.8 Finally, we can 
observe audit fee disclosures for principal and component auditors over an extensive period.  
We first explore which client and auditor characteristics are associated with the 
involvement of component auditors. Next, we examine whether this involvement is associated 
with variation in audit quality and fees. We further examine whether there is any incremental 
effect on quality and fees if the component auditor is from the principal’s network or is 
unaffiliated with the principal auditor.9 Finally, we examine the effects of a regulatory change 
aimed at strengthening the principal auditor’s responsibilities and clarifying procedures around 
the conduct of MNE group audits, with the objective of improving their quality. Specifically, 
we explore the impact of the revision of the international standard on group audits (ISA 600, 
operational for audits of accounting periods ending on or after December 15, 2010) on the 
association between involvement of component auditors in MNE group audits and audit 
outcomes.  
We identify 4,869 MNE group audits during the period of 2006–2013. We choose this 
period to provide sufficient observations both before and after the revision of ISA 600. We find 
that 2,349 (48.2 percent) of these audits involve component auditors, for which the median 
percentage of the audit fee paid to component auditors is 24%. We find that the likelihood and 
extent of involvement of component auditors is determined by the complexity and 
internationalization of the MNE as well as characteristics of the principal auditor. We observe 
some differences in the determinants of the involvement of different types of component 
auditors: that is, the size and degree of internationalization of the MNE affects the extent of 
use of network auditors but not of unaffiliated ones. As expected, Big 4 and large non-Big 4 
auditors, MNE specialists, and auditors with higher subsidiary location coverage are more 
 
8 For example, the IAASB requires that the principal auditor take full responsibility for the work performed by 
component auditors, while the PCAOB allows division of responsibility between principal and component 
auditors. 
9 The choice of type of component auditor (network or unaffiliated) is commonly a second-order decision, 
generally determined after having decided to use a component auditor in the group audit. This is further discussed 
in the hypothesis section. 
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(less) likely to use network (unaffiliated) auditors. Further, we find that revised ISA 600 
significantly reduced the involvement of component auditors.  
Next, we find that the increased use of component auditors is costlier and associated 
with lower audit quality (as measured by earnings management and revenue management 
proxies), which is consistent with regulatory concerns. When we distinguish between type of 
component auditor—network versus unaffiliated—for group audits using component auditors, 
quality problems appear to be associated with both types. Overall, we do not find evidence that 
the revision of ISA 600 affected audit fees or improved the quality of group audits using 
component auditors.  
Collectively, our results contribute to the emerging literature on group audits and are 
relevant for audit practice and standard-setters. In particular, our findings provide standard-
setters with evidence to support future modifications to auditing standards for group audits. We 
note that the revised ISA 600 provided the initial basis for the recent PCAOB initiatives to 
examine the work of the principal auditor’s regarding supervising the work of other auditors 
(Hanson [2016]). Given the relative lack of transparency about the identity and extent of use 
of component auditors in most countries, our findings also speak to calls for greater disclosure 
of this information.  
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides the relevant 
background for this study. Section 2.3 develops our research questions on the determinants of 
component auditor involvement and type of component auditor. Section 2.4 develops 
hypotheses on audit outcomes relating to the use of component auditors. Section 2.5 describes 
the method and empirical models. Section 2.6 presents the descriptive statistics as well as 
results of the main analyses, sensitivity analyses and robustness tests. Section 2.7 concludes, 
discusses the limitations of the study, and provides suggestions for future research.  
2.2 Background Information 
2.2.1 REGULATORY CONCERNS, DEVELOPMENTS, AND SETTING 
The quality of group audits, especially those extending across borders and where a substantial 
part of the audit is performed by component auditors, is a major concern of audit regulators 
(e.g., ASIC [2015], IFIAR [2018], PCAOB [2016], [2017], IAASB [2015a], [2015b], [2019]). 
Both major standard-setters, the PCAOB and the IAASB, have current initiatives to address 
concerns about quality of these audits. The IAASB was the first to revise its standard (ISA 
600), with the revisions aimed at improving the procedures around the conduct of group audits 
and the overall objective of improving their quality. Revised ISA 600, effective for periods 
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ending on or after December 15, 2010, expanded the principal auditor’s involvement in the 
work of component auditors, with components operating in foreign jurisdictions being 
identified as a risk factor (ISA 600 revised).10 This revised standard resulted in an increase in 
the requirements for involvement of the group auditor and a greater distinction between 
different types of component auditors, recognizing that a principal auditor could not necessarily 
rely on the work of a component auditor simply because the latter came from the same audit-
firm network.11 In contrast to the IAASB, the PCAOB’s group audit project has first mandated 
disclosure of component auditors involved in material areas of an audit (PCAOB 2015) while 
continuing to consider the role and responsibilities of the engagement partner.12 Additionally, 
while ISA 600 does not require disclosure of component auditors, it states that the 
responsibilities for a group audit reside solely with the engagement partner. Hence, unlike the 
PCAOB standard, there is no option of sharing responsibility between principal and component 
auditors.  
To investigate our research questions, we exploit the Australian setting, which is subject 
to IAASB standards and has a longstanding statutory disclosure rule, Australian Corporations 
Act s300 (11B) (a).13 The law requires all Australian listed companies to publicly disclose, in 
the notes to the financial statements, group audit fees paid to (1) the principal audit firm, (2) 
 
10 The ISA 600 (IAASB [2002]) requirements pre-2010 consisted of a total of only 18 paragraphs and four 
requirements, three being considerations that were required of the auditor (to consider: whether the auditor’s own 
participation is sufficient to be able to act as the principal auditor (para. 6); the professional competence of the 
other auditor (para. 7); and the significant findings of the other auditor (para. 12), and a requirement, to “perform 
procedures to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence, that the work of the other auditor is adequate for the 
principal auditor’s purposes, in the context of the specific assignment” (para. 8)). The revised ISA 600 contain 40 
paragraphs of requirements and 66 paragraphs of explanatory material represented a considerable extension to the 
four requirements contained in the preceding ISA 600. 
11 The IAASB continues to consider the issue of group audits in their standard-setting initiatives. After identifying 
additional concerns about the responsibilities of the engagement partner in specific circumstances, and an 
invitation to comment, the IAASB aims to revise ISA 600 with an exposure draft targeted for December 2019 
(IAASB (2019) “Proposed Strategy for 2020-2023 and Work Plan for 2020-2021,” available at 
http://www.ifac.org/publications-resources/proposed-strategy-2020-2023-and-work-plan-2020-2021). 
12 The final rule (Release No. 2015-008) was approved by the PCAOB on December 15, 2015, and approved by 
the SEC on May 10, 2016. The PCAOB continues to explore issues related to the role and responsibilities of the 
lead auditor. It sought supplemental comments on this issue in September 2017 (Docket 42): “The supplemental 
request for comment we are considering today builds on our initial proposal in April 2016: to strengthen existing 
requirements for the lead auditor’s involvement in the work of other auditors; and to establish a more uniform 
approach to a lead auditor's supervision of other auditors” (Doty [2017]).  
13 This disclosure has been in the Australian Corporations Act for over 25 years, following the disclosure of audit 
fees and non-audit fees in Australia since at least the 1980s. This reflects a legislative desire to better understand 
the quantum of audit fees and related auditor independence issues. These legislative requirements are supported 
by AASB 1054. While the disclosures require fees paid to the principal auditor, network auditors, and unaffiliated 
auditors, they do not require identification of the name of the specific network members or unaffiliated audit 
firm/firms involved. We include the standards for this audit fee disclosure and an example in appendix 2A of this 
chapter. To our knowledge, the Australian audit fee disclosures for group audits are the most comprehensive 
available. The closest in level of detail are the United Kingdom, but fees paid to unaffiliated auditors are not 
required to be disclosed (ICAEW [2014]).  
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other member firms within the principal auditor’s network, and (3) other auditors unaffiliated 
with the principal auditor.14 This allows us to analyze questions that cannot be answered in the 
U.S. setting, such as the efficacy of regulatory and standard-setting initiatives aimed at 
addressing concerns around quality of group audits.  
Australia differs from the United States in several important ways, one of which is that 
audits are undertaken in accordance with IAASB standards. Of particular interest in this study 
is the impact of the revision of an international auditing standard, ISA 600, on group audits. 
Australian disclosures also identify the involvement of component auditors in group audits 
based on audit fees, not audit hours. In Australia, information about all fees (of any quantum) 
paid to component auditors is provided; however, the identity of component auditors is not 
disclosed. In comparison, U.S. Form AP requires identification of component auditors 
conducting significant (i.e., at least 5%) audit work only (PCAOB [2017]) as well as the 
number and aggregate percentage of other accounting firms that individually represent less 
than 5% of total audit hours. Another difference is that, in Australia, the disclosure of fee split 
and component-auditor involvement is located in the notes to the financial statements, while in 
the United States, information about significant component auditors is on Form AP, submitted 
to the PCAOB and available on its website.  
2.2.2 PRIOR RESEARCH  
Using a qualitative approach, Barrett et al. [2005] were among the first researchers to 
examine coordination of work in multinational audits. They document, based on an in-depth 
case study of a Big 4 firm, that component auditors are not passive followers of interoffice 
instructions but exercise considerable discretion. Hanes [2013] provides a review of the 
literature in management and social psychology, focusing on how geographically distributed 
work affects coordination and communication, knowledge sharing, work design, and the social 
 
14 The total fee for the group audit is negotiated between the principal auditor and the client prior to the start of 
the engagement and is contained in the engagement letter. The principal auditor determines the work to be 
undertaken by component auditors, and the fees to be allocated to them which is based on size of the component, 
amount of audit work done, and country-specific charge rates. Based on discussions with audit partners, there is 
usually little room for audit fee negotiations between principal and component auditors, especially when those are 
network firms. In cases where a client component requires a statutory audit, it is common that the client or its 
component negotiates the audit fee directly with the component auditor, irrespective of whether the auditor is a 
network or unaffiliated firm. In practice, the audit fee allocated to component auditors is often perceived as 
insufficient to cover the full costs of the component auditor’s work.  
In Australia, the audit fees disclosed for an MNE group audit consist of the fees paid to the principal auditor, fees 
paid to members of the principal auditor’s network and unaffiliated component auditors (including amounts where 
the client contracts for and directly pays for the services of component auditors). The audit fee disclosures thus 
represent work effort of the principal and component auditors and can be influenced by audit fee negotiations or 
allocation decisions between principal and component auditors (Downey et al. [2018]).  
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identity of people conducting the work. In a similar vein, Gunn and Michas [2018] investigate 
the role of auditor multinational expertise in dealing with the complexity of MNE group audits 
and document, based on a U.S. sample, and find that audit quality is higher for auditors with 
MNE group audit expertise, specific expertise in the country where a significant subsidiary is 
located, or both. Further, Sunderland and Trompeter [2017] discuss problems faced in practice 
when conducting global group audits. Most recently, Downey and Bedard [2019a] examine 
challenges associated with co-ordination of group audit teams. With a survey of 147 U.S. group 
audit leaders, they show that clients’ size/regulatory status and global structure contribute to 
coordination and communication challenges while language and cultural barriers are less 
important. They further show that tacit coordination helps group auditors mitigate challenges, 
while modularization and ongoing communication appear less effective.  
The first archival study in the United States examining group audits was by Dee et al. 
[2015], who found that ERCs are lower and discretionary accruals are higher for companies 
that disclose for the first time the engagement of other auditors for a portion of the audit. The 
authors acknowledge the limited generalizability of these findings, given their small sample of 
149 U.S. audits relating to small audit firms not acting as principal auditors for any SEC issuer. 
Prompted by the increased regulatory attention, a number of recent concurrent working 
papers use the disclosure requirement of PCAOB Form AP on leading and participating 
auditors in the audit of SEC issuers. Burke et al. [2019] find, for a sample of 881 U.S public 
issuers with Form AP and an audit report due date between June 2017 and June 2018, that the 
total percentage of audit hours conducted by component auditors is associated with lower audit 
quality in the form of higher likelihood of quarterly restatement, longer audit delay, and higher 
audit fees. Further, they document that the mere use of a component auditor and the total 
number of component auditors in an engagement are associated with higher audit fees but not 
with restatement likelihood and audit delay. These results appear to contrast with those of Dee 
et al. [2018], who document that audit quality is lower (measured by discretionary accruals) 
when a component auditor is involved and that the use of more than one component auditor 
leads to lower audit quality and higher fees. Dee et al. find no support for the idea that the 
percentage of the audit work conducted by component auditors influences audit quality or audit 
fees.  
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2.3. Determinants of Component Auditor Involvement and Type of Component 
Auditor 
Based on our discussion above, inspection findings (PCAOB [2016], Harris [2017], 
IFIAR [2018]) and prior research (Sunderland and Trompeter [2017], Downey and Bedard 
[2019a], Burke et al. [2019]), we examine the factors that influence the decision to involve a 
component auditor. With regard to client characteristics, group auditors of MNEs with 
extensive, diverse international operations might face a greater need to involve component 
auditors, due to resource and time constraints or legal, language, and cultural barriers.15 With 
regard to auditor characteristics, audit firms with access to global networks and principal 
auditors with more expertise in auditing MNEs or in a client’s industry may be able to better 
handle a MNE group audit and thus have less need for component auditors. Audit firm or 
partner changes, however, might increase need for involvement of component auditors, as the 
new lead auditor needs time to become acquainted with the MNE. Subsidiary companies might 
also prefer to retain their legacy auditors (Sunderland and Trompeter 2017). Further, when the 
audit falls into the auditor’s busy season, auditors might be more inclined to use component 
auditors. Hence, we explore whether the decision to involve component auditors and the extent 
of this involvement is a function of (1) client complexity, (2) client internationalization, and 
(3) auditor characteristics.  
We also consider whether revised ISA 600 affected the group auditor’s involvement 
decision. As mentioned in section 2, while the revised standard did not change the principal 
auditor’s overall responsibility for the group audit, it enhanced the requirements on the 
principal auditor to supervise the component auditor. Since we do not have clear expectations 
about the determinants of component auditor involvement, we formulate the following research 
question. 
Research Question 1: Which client and auditor characteristics are associated with the 
involvement of component auditors?  
Component auditors can either be part of the principal’s audit firm network or 
unaffiliated. The decision as to which type to use can be considered a second-order choice, 
compared to the first decision whether to involve any component auditor.16 This decision may 
 
15 MNE client characteristics include subsidiary characteristics.  
16 Based on discussions with Australian audit partners involved in MNE group audits this is largely a two-stage 
decision process, where in the first stage it is determined whether and to what extent to involve a component 
auditor, and in the second stage the type of component auditor (network or unaffiliated) is decided on. The factors 
affecting the first and second stage are likely different. For example, in the first stage, the resource availability 
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be a function of auditor characteristics (including the availability of a network auditor in the 
component’s location), client preferences, and costs (Sunderland and Trompeter [2017]). MNE 
group audits conducted by global networks can be expected to draw on network members. 
Principal auditors might trust auditors from within their network more, might have more 
information about their quality controls, or might already have a working relationship with 
them. We also consider whether the enhanced requirements of revised ISA 600 affect the 
involvement of different types of auditors. We formulate the following research question to 
explore the determinants of type of auditor involvement. 
Research Question 2: Which characteristics are incrementally associated with the 
involvement of component auditors from the firm’s network versus unaffiliated firms? 
 
2.4. Audit Outcomes of Component Auditor Involvement  
As outlined previously, many of the concerns about MNE group audits relate to the 
involvement of component auditors. If a component auditor is used, there is the potential for 
information asymmetry between the principal auditor and the various component auditors 
(agents). The use of component auditors thus creates a multi-layered principal-agent problem 
for the signing partner. Bargaining power of the different parties might vary, depending on 
whether the component auditor is part of the audit firm network or is unaffiliated. In theory, 
the principal auditor must be able to satisfy him/herself that the involvement of component 
auditors does not result in compromised audit quality. In other words, the involvement of 
component auditors in the group audit forces the principal auditor to address this multi-layered 
principal-agent problem, regardless of the type of component auditor involved. 
However, as described by Sunderland and Trompeter [2017], the use of component 
auditors might help or hurt. On the upside, a component auditor can help alleviate language 
and cultural barriers and provide knowledge of local regulations, including tax laws. In line 
with this argument, Barrett et al. [2005] document that component auditors exercise 
considerable discretion in responding to local relationships and risks. On the downside, unless 
 
and cost of the principal auditor likely plays a large role, while in the second stage the availability and reliability 
of potential component auditors plays a role. Further, in specific circumstances, subsidiaries with a statutory audit 
requirement (e.g. based on size requirements in certain jurisdictions) might be able to choose their auditor 
independently of the parent firm. And in jurisdictions in which the principal auditor is not licensed (and no 
reciprocity agreement is in place), there will be a need to engage a component auditor. We cannot identify these 
cases specifically.  
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they are also the statutory auditor for that component, conducting work as a component auditor 
might not be considered a priority if time and resources are limited. Further, organization 
theory points to coordination and communication failures when interdependent teams operate 
in complex environments (Puranam, Raveendran, and Knudsen [2012]). Downey and Bedard 
[2019a] empirically confirm significant communication and coordination challenges in group 
audit teams. In line with the concerns raised by regulators and standard-setters, we hypothesize 
that audit quality is lower when component auditors are involved.  
The costs of an MNE group audit include expenses related to audit effort, both on the 
part of the principal auditor and of any component auditors. With component auditors, there 
are likely significant costs related to coordination, which might include supervision and 
oversight, quality reviews, and re-doing work. However, the cost of visiting subsidiaries is less 
when component auditors are involved. Overall, we expect that the costs of coordination 
outweighs the visiting costs and hypothesize that involving component auditors is associated 
with higher audit fees. Collectively, we test the following hypothesis. 
H1a: Audit quality (audit fees) is (are) lower (higher) when component auditors are 
involved. 
As argued above, the decision to use a network versus an unaffiliated component 
auditor can be considered a second-order choice. Hence, we investigate whether there is any 
incremental effect on audit quality and fees if the component auditor is from the network or 
unaffiliated. The problems of potential overreliance on the work of the component auditor can 
occur both when the component auditor is part of the principal’s audit-firm network and when 
the component auditor is unaffiliated with the principal auditor. With regard to network 
auditors, while branded (and commonly thought of) as a single entity, a global network is 
typically organized as an association of national partnerships that agree to affiliate and operate 
under a single global brand. Consequently, each member firm serves its geographic area and is 
subject to the laws and professional regulations of the country in which it operates (Carson 
[2009]). To ensure quality, the global networks invest heavily in training, development of audit 
methodologies, and the maintenance of groups of technical experts worldwide. Further, they 
expend considerable effort to ensure consistency across member firms. For example, when new 
audit methodologies are introduced, they are rolled out worldwide to all member firms. These 
efforts should result in greater uniformity across member firms. To the extent that network 
member firms are expected to provide uniform quality audits (IAASB 2015b), there should be 
no difference between the quality of work performed by members of the principal auditor and 
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that performed by other members within the global network. Further, the use of local network 
auditors with greater local expertise may be beneficial for the principal auditor.  
At the same time, if the component auditor is a member of the principal auditor’s 
network, the principal auditor may rely on the network’s quality control and inappropriately 
over-rely on the work undertaken by another member of the network. In other words, the 
principal auditor may assume that the work of fellow network members is of a quality similar 
to its own. This is consistent with the potential impact of attachment bias.17 This concern is 
illustrated by the following quote of James Doty [2011], former chair of the PCAOB: “For 
many large, multi-national companies, a significant portion of the audit may be conducted 
abroad—even half of total audit hours. In theory, when a network firm signs the opinion, the 
audit is supposed to be seamless and of consistently high quality. In practice, that is often not 
the case.”  
When the component auditor is unaffiliated (and possibly without a previous working 
relationship) with the principal auditor, the principal auditor runs a risk when accepting 
responsibility for its work. In this case, the principal group auditor must engage in a cost-benefit 
analysis to determine the appropriate extent of review or re-performance of the component 
auditor’s audit testing. Further, differences in regulation, practice standards, or quality controls 
may result in lower quality auditing where unaffiliated auditors are involved.  
At the same time, arguments can be put forward as to why the use of unaffiliated 
auditors would not be associated with lower audit quality. For example, research in psychology 
on “in-group/out-group” shows inherent biases against members of other groups, as does 
research examining differences in auditor judgments across countries (Nolder and Riley 
[2014]). This might make the principal auditor more cautious when unaffiliated auditors are 
involved and thus supervise their work more closely. We also note that the principal auditor 
has an incentive to use the work of unaffiliated auditors that can be trusted to deliver high audit 
quality, as they have to accept responsibility for their work.  
With regard to audit fees, it is unclear whether this differs for the involvement of 
network versus unaffiliated auditors. While the cost base of unaffiliated local audit firms might 
be more modest, compared to those associated with using network auditors (Sunderland and 
 
17 By attachment bias, we refer to the psychological observation that human judgments are affected by the 
subconscious biases that arise from the contextual relationships in which the judgments are made (Bazerman, 
Morgan, and Loewenstein [1997]). While Bazerman et al.’s conclusion that auditors cannot conduct impartial 
audits, due to self-serving biases, is seen as resulting from repeated interactions between auditors and their clients, 
it is equally applicable between parts of a global network. Although Bazerman et al.’s conclusion is questioned 
by King [2002], who finds that there are external pressures to neutralize unconscious biases favoring clients, there 
are fewer such pressures to reduce unconscious biases within a global network. 
Chapter 2 
20 
 
Trompeter [2017]), the use of a network auditor should be more efficient for the principal given 
the ongoing working relationships and established communication protocols between network 
members. Based on these opposing arguments, we formulate a null hypothesis for the 
incremental effect for network versus unaffiliated component auditors on audit quality and fees. 
H1b: There is no difference in audit quality (audit fees) based on the type of component 
auditor. 
Finally, we investigate whether the adoption of the revised ISA 600 changed audit 
quality and fees, for engagements that use component auditors, and whether there is any 
incremental effect post adoption of the revised ISA 600 for network versus unaffiliated 
component auditors. While the objective of the additional requirements contained in the revised 
ISA 600 was to improve audit quality of MNE groups involving component auditors, a number 
of arguments suggest this might not necessarily occur. First, component auditors are not passive 
followers of instructions but instead exercise considerable discretion in response to their local 
relationships and risks (Barrett et al. [2005]). Second, the revised ISA 600 did not change the 
ultimate responsibility for the MNE group audit, which continues to reside with the principal 
auditor. Third, the IAASB post-implementation review of the revised ISA 600 and the current 
proposal to address ISA 600 concerns in the IAASB Strategy 2020-2023 (IAASB [2019b]) 
suggests that ISA 600 is not being consistently understood and applied as intended (Sunderland 
and Trompeter [2017]). Furthermore, it is not clear whether there is an incremental effect post 
adoption of ISA 600 for network versus unaffiliated component auditors. Hence, we formulate 
our hypotheses on the impact of the revised ISA 600 in the null form. 
H2a: The association between the involvement of component auditors and audit quality 
(audit fees) is not different pre and post ISA 600. 
H2b: There is no difference in audit quality (audit fees) based on the type of component 
auditor pre and post ISA 600. 
 
2.5. Methodology 
2.5.1 SAMPLE SELECTION 
To investigate our research questions and hypotheses, we leverage the unique 
Australian setting, described in Section 2.2.1, which requires listed entities to disclose their 
audit fees paid to the principal auditor, audit firms related to the principal auditor, and other 
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auditors. To conduct our analyses, we use a sample of multinational companies listed on the 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) over the period 2006–2013. We focus on this period because 
it is around the introduction of the revised ISA 600 (effective date is for client year-ends on or 
after December 15, 2010). To determine the sample of multinational group audits, we identify 
the population of ASX listed companies on the Share Price and Price Relative (SPPR) Database 
over 2006–2013 (16,727 observations). We obtain financial data from the Morningstar Aspect 
Huntley Financial database and audit-related data from the UNSW Audit Fee and Audit 
Reporting database and manually collect additional data from annual report disclosures.18 From 
the initial sample, we remove observations in the financial sector, those with no subsidiaries, 
and those with only Australian subsidiaries prior to removing observations with missing 
financial, auditor, or additional information.19 We show our sample selection procedure in 
Table 1. As a result, we retain 4,869 firm-year observations of MNEs with one or more foreign 
subsidiaries. 
TABLE 1 
Sample Selection 
 Number of Observations 
Population of ASX listed companies 2006-2013                        16,727 
Less firm-years   
with joint auditors (more than one audit firm signs the audit 
opinion)20 
(29) 
in the financial sector (including property trusts) (2,906) 
with no subsidiaries (2,665) 
with only Australian subsidiaries21 (4,273) 
missing current year, t-1 or t-2 financial information on 
Morningstar, or missing share price data  
(1,985) 
Australian group audits with one or more foreign subsidiaries (MNEs)               4,869 
  
 
18 Sources for each variable are indicated in Table 2. 
19 We identify the subsidiaries and their countries of incorporation for each client firm from disclosures in the 
notes to the financial statements. AASB 12.2 notes that entities must disclose information that enables users of 
consolidated financial statements to evaluate the nature of, and risk associated with its interest in other entities. 
Specifically, AASB 12.10(a)(i) requires that financial statement disclosures be sufficient to enable users of 
consolidated financial statements to understand the composition of the group. In addition, companies must 
disclose related party relationships (between any parent and subsidiaries) when control exists, irrespective of 
whether there have been related party transactions (AASB 124.13). Thus, all controlled entities, significant or not, 
are disclosed in the notes to the financial statements of Australian listed companies, including the effective interest 
of the parent in the controlled entities. 
20 ISA 600 does not cover the conduct of joint audits. 
21 We also use a sub-sample of companies with only Australian subsidiaries for which the principal auditor does 
not engage a component auditor and for which all variables used in equation [2] are available in an additional 
analysis in section 2.6.4 (N=2,774; See Appendix 2D of this chapter). We further identify 152 audits of companies 
with only Australian subsidiaries that engage component auditors and for which all variables from equation [2] 
are available in additional analysis (reported in Section 2.6.5.4).  
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2.5.2 EMPIRICAL MODELS 
2.5.2.1 Determinants of Component Involvement  
To examine the determinants of component involvement for multinational group audits, 
we focus on both the likelihood and the extent of component auditor involvement as well as 
the type of component auditor involvement. We use the following model (ignoring subscripts).  
COMPONENT, COMPONENT%, NETWORK% or UNAFFILIATED% = 0 + 
 i Client Complexity +  j Client Internationalization + k Auditor 
Characteristics + Subsidiary Country / t, 
[1] 
where COMPONENT is an indicator variable equal to one if the percentage of group 
audit fees paid to auditors other than the principal auditors is larger than zero and zero 
otherwise. We use probit to analyze the dependent variable COMPONENT in the sample of 
MNEs. COMPONENT% captures the percentage of total group audit fees paid to auditors other 
than the principal auditor. NETWORK% captures the percentage of total group audit fees paid 
to network auditors. UNAFFILIATED% captures the percentage of total group audit fees paid 
to unaffiliated auditors. We use OLS regression to analyze these continuous dependent 
variables in the sample of MNEs with component auditors.22 
As described earlier, we expect the determinants of component auditor involvement 
and extent of component (network or unaffiliated) auditor involvement to be determined by (1) 
client complexity, (2) client internationalization, and (3) auditor characteristics.23 We capture 
client complexity with the following variables: client size, measured as the natural logarithm 
of total assets (LTA); the ratio of current to total assets (CATA); the quick ratio (QUICK); 
LEVERAGE; cash flow performance (PERFORM); an indicator variable for LOSS; and the 
growth in sales (SALESGROWTH) and PPE (PPEGROWTH). We measure client 
internationalization as the natural logarithm of the number of subsidiaries (LSUB); an indicator 
variable for a high proportion of foreign subsidiaries (FOREIGN); an indicator variable for a 
low percentage of English-speaking subsidiaries (LOWSUBSENGLISH); an indicator variable 
for a low percentage of foreign subsidiaries mandating IFRS adoption for listed entities 
(LOWIFRS); an indicator variable for a high average geographic distance between Australia 
 
22 I first analyze the choice to include a component auditor in the audit and use the MNE sample for this 
analysis. I then restrict the sample to the MNEs with component auditors when analyzing the determinants of 
the extent of component involvement (COMPONENT%). This restricts the analysis to a more homogenous 
sample. I elaborate on why we choose to analyze the MNE with component subsample in section 2.6.1. 
23 We cannot observe client preferences or costs in our setting and therefore restrict the analysis to the three 
observable factors mentioned. Some variables can arguably represent both client complexity and client 
internationalization.  
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and each subsidiary country (HIGHSUBDIST); and an indicator variable for low average 
subsidiary country rule of law (LOWRULE).24  
We include the following auditor characteristics as determinants of component and type 
of auditor involvement in our model: an indicator variable for whether the principal auditor is 
a BIG4 auditor or a LARGENONBIG4 auditor; an indicator variable for audit firm change 
(ADTCHANGE) and partner change (PTCHANGE) in the current year; an indicator variable 
for whether an audit falls into the auditor’s busy season (BUSY); MNESPEC and INDLEADER 
indicate whether the auditor is an MNE specialist (Gunn and Michas 2018) or a national 
industry leader (e.g., Reichelt and Wang 2010), respectively; and LOCATIONCOV, which 
measures the percentage of subsidiary countries in which the principal audit firm has a network 
member.  
We further control for companies in the MINING industry, given their specific 
characteristics and dominance in an Australian setting (Carson et al. [2012]) and include 
industry fixed effects (defined as two-digit GICS codes). We also include subsidiary country 
fixed effects to control for the time-constant differences across the countries of incorporation 
of an MNE’s foreign subsidiaries. We thus control for time-invariant conditions that might 
systematically affect audits in the countries in which component auditors are likely conducting 
work. To make estimation feasible, we aggregate countries with few observations into regions 
(see Table 2, Panel E) and create indicator variables for each country or region, equal to one if 
the client has one or more subsidiaries in that country/region. We further include year fixed 
effects in the main analyses.  
In a separate analysis, we investigate whether there are changes in the (extent of) 
component auditor involvement after the revision of ISA 600. We include all determinants 
discussed above and the variable ISA600, an indicator variable equal to one in the period after 
the revised ISA 600 became effective and zero otherwise. In this specification, we do not 
include year fixed effects, since these would subsume the effect of ISA600.25 We winsorize all 
continuous financial variables at the first and 99th percentile. We cluster standard errors at the 
client-firm level. All variables are defined and their sources disclosed in Appendix 2B of this 
chapter.  
  
 
24 We construct indicator variables for these client characteristics to avoid multicollinearity problems when using 
continuous versions of these variables. 
25 We considered adding a time trend to this regression. However, descriptive statistics reveal that there is no clear 
linear trend over the full sample period that would justify the use of a linear time trend variable.  
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2.5.2.2 Analyses of Audit Outcomes  
The audit outcomes of interest are audit fees (LAFEE) and audit quality. To measure 
audit quality, we rely on and are restricted to proxies of earnings and revenue management that 
have commonly been used as proxies for audit quality in U.S. studies (e.g., Francis and Michas 
[2013]) as well as in the international auditing literature across a range of countries (e.g., 
Francis, Michas and Seavey [2011], Kwon, Lim, and Tan [2007], Carcello and Li [2013], 
Lennox, Wu and Zhang [2016], Fung et al. [2017]).26 We recognize that these are measures of 
financial reporting quality and might not be direct proxies for audit quality. However, financial 
reporting quality is a joint product of clients and auditors (Antle and Nalebuff [1991]), and the 
goal of auditors is to increase financial statement reliability (DeFond and Zhang [2014]). In 
addition, these publicly available measures of financial reporting quality are generally 
associated with practitioner assessments of audit quality (Aobdia [2019]). Specifically, as a 
measure of earnings management, we use the absolute value of total accruals (|TA|) and control 
for all regressors of the performance-adjusted Jones model and their interactions with industry-
years in our audit quality model (equation [2]).27 
We supplement the accrual-based measures of audit quality with measures of revenue 
management, based on the work of McNichols and Stubben [2008] and Stubben [2010] This 
measure has been used as a proxy for audit quality (Minutti-Meza [2013]) and in an 
international setting (Chen et al. [2011]). Following Chen et al. [2018], we use a one-step 
procedure and use the absolute value of the scaled change in accounts receivables ( ) as 
the dependent variable and control for the scaled change in revenue and its interaction with 
industry-years in our audit quality model (equation [2]).28  
 
26 In the Australian setting, we are limited in the financial reporting quality measures available, in part, due to the 
period under investigation. Specifically, restatements are extremely rare (e.g., Ahmed and Goodwin [2007]). 
Additionally, due to the large number of mining companies, going concern rates are extremely high in Australia, 
and the propensity to issue going concern opinions changed over the sample period, due to the impact of the global 
financial crisis (e.g., Xu et al. [2013]), making this an unreliable measure of audit quality for our sample period. 
Further, the commonly used incidence of small profit for which we have data available is less suitable for the 
Australian setting, as has been shown elsewhere (e.g., Coulton, Taylor, and Taylor [2005[). This is in part due to 
the high proportion of mining companies listed on the ASX, which have a specific accounting treatment. 
27 In our main analysis we use a one-stage approach, as suggested by Chen et al. [2018]. The one-stage approach 
avoids biased coefficient estimates that results from the two-stage approach, i.e. first estimating discretionary 
accruals or revenue and then using these as dependent variables. This approach is also implemented in recent 
papers such as those by Gipper et al. [2018] and Godsell et al. [2017]. 
28 We also rerun our analysis using the two-stage approach by first calculating the conventional measure of 
performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, based on the work of Jones [1991] and Kothari et al. [2005] and the 
conventional measure of discretionary revenues as dependent variables (not tabulated). We confirm our results. 
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Our model of interest to investigate our hypotheses is in the form of an OLS model and 
is specified as follows (ignoring subscripts): 29 
|TA|, |  0 + 1Variable of Interest + Controls + [First-
stage regressors*Industry-Year] + Subsidiary Country/Industry/Year Fixed 
t.  
[2] 
To test the first set of hypotheses on the association between component (network or 
unaffiliated) auditor involvement and audit quality, the variables of interest in the audit quality 
analyses are COMPONENT% (NETWORK% or UNAFFILIATED%), capturing the percentage 
of group audit fees paid to component (network or unaffiliated) auditors. To alleviate the 
concern that we estimate mechanical relationships between the dependent variable audit fees 
and the continuous variables of interest that are calculated from audit fees, we construct 
indicator variables for high versus low component involvement (COMPONENT25%, 
NETWORK25%, and UNAFFILIATED25%) that equal one if more than 25 percent of audit 
fees are paid to component, network or unaffiliated auditors and zero otherwise. We choose 
this cut-off value since approximately 50 percent of the audits in the MNE component auditor 
sample pay 25 percent or more of audit fees to component auditors. We analyze this model in 
the sample of MNEs with components.30  
To test our second set of hypotheses, the effect of ISA 600 on audit quality for those 
audits involving component auditors, we include an interaction effect between ISA 600 and 
extent of component involvement (ISA600*COMPONENT%) and different types of 
components (ISA600*NETWORK%, ISA600*UNAFFILIATED%) as well as all main effects. 
The variable ISA600 equals one if the client’s financial year ends on or after 15 December 
2010, the effective date of the revised ISA 600 and zero otherwise.  
We include the variables measuring client complexity as included in equation [1], 
following the literature (e.g., Francis and Michas [2013], Francis and Yu [2009], Gipper et al. 
[2018]). We further include the following variables as controls in the audit quality model: the 
volatility of sales (SALESVOL) and operating cash flows (OCFVOL) over the last three years; 
absolute total accruals in the prior year (|TA|_L); market-to-book ratio (MB); annualized 
market-adjusted return (ANNUAL); lagged accounts receivable (RECTOVER_L); and accounts 
payable turnover (PAYTOVER_L). We also control for FOREIGN and LOWRULE since the 
literature shows that groups tend to manage their earnings through foreign operations, 
 
29 In sensitivity analyses, we use tobit regression to account for the censored nature of the data. 
30 I elaborate on why we choose to analyze the MNE with component subsample in section 2.6.1. 
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especially those with weak institutional environments (e.g., Dyreng et al. [2012], Beuselinck 
et al., [forthcoming]). Further, we include the same auditor-level controls as in equation [1], 
except LOCATIONCOV.  
In the audit fee model, we include the same controls as described above as well as 
additional variables that affect audit fees (e.g., Ferguson, Francis and Stokes [2003], Carson 
and Fargher [2007]): the absolute value of total accruals (|TA|), the type of audit opinion issued 
to the client (MOPINION), the year-to-year growth in assets (GROWTH), and the year-to-year 
industry growth (INDGROWTH). We further include measures that are likely to influence audit 
fees in the group audit setting: the natural logarithm of the number of subsidiaries (LSUB), an 
indicator variable for a large distance between Australia and subsidiary countries 
(HIGHSUBDIST), and the natural logarithm of the weighted average per-capita GDP of each 
subsidiary country (LSUBGDP). All financial continuous variables are winsorized at the first 
and 99th percentile. Similar to equation [1], we also include subsidiary country, industry, and 
year fixed effects.31 We cluster standard errors by client firm. All variables are defined in 
Appendix 2B of this chapter. 
 
2.6. Results 
2.6.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
Our sample consists of 4,869 multinational group audit observations over the period 2006–
2013 (the MNE sample). Of these, 51.8 percent (2,520 observations) are audited by the 
principal auditor only, without the involvement of component auditors, and the remaining 
observations (48.2 percent; 2,349 observations) are audited by principal auditors and involve 
component auditors. We refer to the former as MNEs without component auditors and the latter 
as MNEs with component auditors. Of the MNEs with component auditors sample, 35.9 
percent (843 observations, 285 unique companies) are audited by the principal auditor and 
component auditors of the principal auditor’s audit firm network only, while 50.3 percent 
(1,182 observations, 437 unique companies) are audited by the principal auditor and 
unaffiliated component auditors only and 13.8 percent (324 observations, 124 unique 
companies) are audited by the principal auditors and a mix of network and unaffiliated 
component auditors.  
 
31 We discuss our results using client fixed effects in sensitivity analyses.   
Chapter 2 
27 
 
In Table 2, Panel A, we show descriptive statistics for the MNEs sample and for the 
samples of MNEs with and without component auditors. For those audits involving component 
auditors, on average, 27.8 percent of the total group audit fees are paid to components 
(COMPONENT%), of which, on average, 13.4 percent are paid to network auditors 
(NETWORK%) and 14.4 percent to unaffiliated auditors (UNAFFILIATED%). We show the 
distributions of these variables as histograms in Appendix 2C of this chapter (Graph 1, Panels 
A–C). 32 
The absolute value of total accruals (|TA|) is, on average, 16.2 percent of assets for 
MNEs. |TA| is significantly lower in the MNEs with component auditors (13.1 percent), 
compared to those without (19.1 percent). The average of the absolute value of change in 
accounts receivables (| ) is 0.08 percent of total assets in the MNEs with component 
auditors and 0.09 percent in those without. The natural logarithm of CPI-adjusted audit fees is 
4.823, on average, in the MNEs sample and significantly higher in the MNEs with component 
auditors sample (5.318), compared to the MNEs without component auditors sample (4.361). 
The descriptives for the control variables indicate that those MNEs with component auditors 
are significantly different from those without. On average, MNEs with component auditors are 
larger (LTA), less liquid (QUICK), better performing (LOSS; PERFORM), less volatile 
(OCFVOL), and more international (LSUB; FOREIGN), compared to MNEs without 
component auditors. Further, on average, a significantly higher percentage of observations of 
MNEs with component auditors are audited by Big 4 auditors (BIG4)33 and industry leaders 
(INDLEADER). MNEs without component auditors, on average, engage a higher percentage 
of second-tier audit firms (LARGENONBIGN).  
In Panel B of Table 2, we show descriptives of the key variables and dependent 
variables pre and post ISA 600 for the MNEs and MNEs with component auditors. We find a 
significant decrease in COMPONENT% from the pre- to post-ISA-600 period for MNEs and 
MNEs with component auditors (p-value<0.1, one-tailed) and in UNAFFILIATED% for the 
MNEs (p-value<0.1; one-tailed), which provides some univariate indication that the 
involvement of component auditors declined in the period after the revision of ISA 600.  
We further show the industry and year composition of our subsamples in Table 2, Panel 
C and D. As is characteristic in Australia, the largest portion of companies are from the 
 
32 For over 93 percent (83 percent) of these observations, the proportion of the total audit fee paid to component 
auditors exceeds 5 (10) percent. For 345 observations (15 percent), the audit fees paid to the principal auditor are 
below 50 percent, indicating that, for 85 percent of observations, the principal auditor conducts a substantial part 
of the work. For the majority of the observations, component work is thus material to the overall group audit. 
33 The Big 4 market share of 51.9 percent for MNEs is in line with other Australian studies (Ferguson et al. [2018]). 
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materials industry (GICS two-digit code=15), which includes mining companies. In Table 2, 
Panel E, we further show the country of incorporation (or regions, where there are less than 
100 observations) of subsidiaries and the number and proportion of MNEs with at least one 
subsidiary in that location. We use this table to code subsidiary country fixed effects. 
To investigate our research questions and hypotheses, we mainly rely on the sample of 
MNEs with component auditors but also run our tests using the full MNE sample (i.e., those 
MNEs with and without component auditors), which are briefly discussed in footnote 43. Due 
to the significant differences in company and auditor characteristics between the MNEs with 
and without component auditors and the highly skewed variables of interest in the MNE sample 
(see histograms of COMPONENT%, UNAFFILIATED%, and NETWORK% in Graph 1, Panels 
A–C, in Appendix 2C), we test our hypotheses on the relatively homogenous subsample of 
MNEs with component auditors. In this way, we also avoid imposing a functional form on the 
association between the variables of interest and audit quality and fees.34 As described in more 
detail in section 6.4, we further identify control groups for testing H2a.  
 
 
34 The high skewness of the variables in the MNE sample suggests a nonlinear relationship with audit outcomes. 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics (continued) 
Panel C: Industry composition 
GICS industry classification 
GICS 
two-digit 
code 
MNEs 
MNEs with 
Component 
Auditors 
MNEs without 
Component 
Auditors 
N % N % N. %    
Energy 10 748 15.36 306 13.03 442 17.54 
Materials 15 1,548 31.79 695 29.59 853 33.85 
Industrial 20 757 15.55 434 18.48 323 12.82 
Consumer Discretionary 25 579 11.89 332 14.13 247 9.8 
Consumer Staples 30 133 2.73 88 3.75 45 1.79 
Health Care 35 469 9.63 209 8.9 260 10.32 
Information Technology 45 470 9.65 233 9.92 237 9.4 
Telecommunication Services 50 76 1.56 28 1.19 48 1.9 
Utilities 55 89 1.83 24 1.02 65 2.58 
Total 4,869 100 2,349 100 2,520 100 
Panel D: Year composition 
MNEs 
MNEs with  
Component Auditors 
MNEs without  
Component Auditors 
Year N % N % N %    
2006 446 9.16 218 9.28 228 9.05 
2007 535 10.99 272 11.58 263 10.44 
2008 598 12.28 287 12.22 311 12.34 
2009 605 12.43 292 12.43 313 12.42 
2010 670 13.76 340 14.47 330 13.1 
2011 662 13.6 318 13.54 344 13.65 
2012 658 13.51 315 13.41 343 13.61 
2013 695 14.27 307 13.07 388 15.4 
Total 4,869 100 2,349 100 2,520 100 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics (continued) 
Panel E: Subsidiary composition 
MNEs with Component Auditors MNEs 
Subsidiary location 
N with at least 
one subsidiary 
Proportion with at 
least one subsidiary 
N with at least one 
subsidiary 
Proportion with at 
least one subsidiary 
USA 963 41.00% 1849 37.97% 
United Kingdom35 935 39.80% 1420 29.16% 
New Zealand 819 34.87% 1281 26.31% 
Singapore 662 28.18% 934 19.18% 
Hong Kong 580 24.69% 777 15.96% 
Europe - Other36 411 17.50% 599 12.30% 
China 381 16.22% 528 10.84% 
Malaysia 361 15.37% 462 9.49% 
Canada 336 14.30% 470 9.65% 
Indonesia 284 12.09% 392 8.05% 
South Africa 268 11.41% 374 7.68% 
Africa - Other37 262 11.15% 489 10.04% 
Central America - 
Other38 239 10.17% 381 7.83% 
Asia - Other39 233 9.92% 336 6.90% 
Germany 223 9.49% 318 6.53% 
India 205 8.73% 285 5.85% 
Thailand 193 8.22% 238 4.89% 
Papua New Guinea 189 8.05% 273 5.61% 
Netherlands 186 7.92% 254 5.22% 
British Virgin 174 7.41% 351 7.21% 
South America - 
Other40 171 7.28% 249 5.11% 
Central Asia - Other41 170 7.24% 235 4.83% 
Mauritius 152 6.47% 205 4.21% 
Brazil 149 6.34% 225 4.62% 
Chile 144 6.13% 201 4.13% 
Pacific-Other42 142 6.05% 214 4.40% 
Spain 135 5.75% 172 3.53% 
France 128 5.45% 170 3.49% 
Philippines 128 5.45% 166 3.41% 
Sweden 107 4.56% 144 2.96% 
Japan 100 4.26% 136 2.79% 
Ghana 98 4.17% 136 2.79% 
Namibia 65 2.77% 138 2.83% 
35 Includes Channel Islands, England, Guernsey, Ireland, Isle of Man, Jersey, Northern Ireland, Scotland and United Kingdom. 
36 Includes Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
Georgia, Gibraltar, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Montenegro, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Russia, Siberia, Slovakia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Serbia, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine. 
37 Includes Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Kenya, 
Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
38 Includes Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, British Anguilla, Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Netherlands Antilles, Panama, Puerto Rico, Trinidad and Turks and Caicos 
Islands. 
39 Includes Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, Laos, Macau, Mongolia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
Taiwan, and Vietnam. 
40 Includes Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Netherland Antilles, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela. 
41 Includes Afghanistan, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jebel Ali Free Zone, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Uzbekistan. 
42 Includes American Samoa, Cook Islands, Fiji, New Caledonia, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Western Samoa and 
Vanuatu. 
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2.6.2 DETERMINANTS OF COMPONENT AUDITOR INVOLVEMENT 
In Table 3, Columns (1)–(5), we present our main analyses on the determinants of 
likelihood and extent of component involvement. We first analyze which determinants are 
associated with the likelihood of involving a component auditor (Column 1; Pseudo R2 of 16.5 
percent) in the MNEs sample. We find that component auditors are more likely to be involved 
when client firms are complex, measured as company size (LTA) and higher levels of current-
to-total assets (CATA). We also find that the degree of internationalization, measured as the 
number of subsidiaries (LSUB) and high percentage of foreign subsidiaries (FOREIGN), 
significantly increases the likelihood of involving a component auditor. The likelihood of 
involving component auditors is also higher when the average distance to subsidiary countries 
is high (HIGHSUBDIST), making location visits for the principal auditor more time consuming 
and costly. We also find that, when average subsidiary rule of law is low (LOWRULE), the 
likelihood of component involvement is higher. This could indicate that principal auditors 
prefer to engage local component auditors when audit work is conducted in very different 
institutional settings, compared to Australia which has a high rule of law score. In terms of 
auditor characteristics, we find that MNE specialist auditors (MNESPEC) with more expertise 
in auditing international groups are less likely to involve component auditors. An auditor 
change (ADTCHANGE) significantly increases the likelihood of involving a component 
auditor. This result could be attributed to higher workload in first-year audits, which might lead 
principal auditors to rely on components, or subsidiaries might prefer to retain their legacy 
auditors (Sunderland and Trompeter 2017). For transparency reasons, we examine the cross-
sectional association between determinants and the extent of component auditor involvement 
in the MNE sample in Column 2 (R2 of 23.9 percent). In Column 3, we examine the 
determinants of the extent of component auditor involvement for the more homogenous MNEs 
with component auditor sample (R2 of 28.1 percent). We find that client size (LTA) is positively 
associated with the extent of component involvement (COMPONENT%), while liquidity 
(QUICK) is negatively associated. We further find that those clients with a high percentage of 
foreign subsidiaries (FOREIGN), a low percentage of foreign subsidiary countries that mandate 
IFRS (LOWIFRS), and a high average distance from parent to subsidiary countries 
(HIGHSUBDIST) are associated with greater component involvement. The number of 
subsidiaries (LSUB) is insignificant, which shows that the extent of component involvement is 
not determined by the mere number of subsidiaries but rather their characteristics and location. 
Specifically, communication and coordination is likely to be more challenging in foreign 
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subsidiaries, subsidiaries that are located farther away from the parent, and those that might 
apply different accounting standards. We also find that Big 4 auditors that act as principal 
auditors involve a lower percentage of component auditors in their audits. These auditors likely 
have more resources, allowing them to complete more of the group audit themselves. Further, 
we find that the extent of involvement of component auditors increases after a principal auditor 
switch (ADTCHANGE) and is higher if the audit firm network covers a higher percentage of 
subsidiary countries (LOCATIONCOV).  
When dividing the extent of component involvement into the extent of network auditor 
involvement (Column 4; R2 of 39.1 percent) and extent of unaffiliated auditor involvement 
(Column 5; R2 of 34.4 percent) for the sample of MNEs with component auditors, important 
differences in determinants for these two subgroups emerge. Specifically, we find that Big 4 
and large non-Big 4 auditors (BIG4 and LARGENONBIG4), i.e., those auditors with access to 
a worldwide network, involve a significantly higher percentage of network auditors and that 
Big 4 auditors are significantly negatively associated with UNAFFILIATED%. The network 
coverage of subsidiary countries (LOCATIONCOV) is also significantly positively associated 
with NETWORK%. We further find that those auditors with expertise in auditing MNEs 
(MNESPEC) involve a significantly higher percentage of network auditors but a significantly 
lower percentage of unaffiliated auditors. Further, after a principal auditor change 
(ADTCHANGE), the extent of network involvement is lower, while the extent of unaffiliated 
involvement is higher. This might indicate that legacy auditors are retained by subsidiaries 
(Sunderland and Trompeter 2017). In terms of client internationalization, we find that 
NETWORK% is positively associated with clients with high percentage of foreign subsidiaries 
(FOREIGN), those with a low percentage of English-speaking subsidiaries 
(LOWSUBSENGLISH), and those with a low percentage of foreign subsidiaries located in 
countries with mandatory IFRS adoption (LOWIFRS). UNAFFILIATED% is positively 
associated with average distance to subsidiary locations (HIGHSUBSDIST) but negatively 
associated with difference in accounting standards (LOWIFRS). These differences could be 
explained by the fact that network auditors might be preferred in situations requiring more 
coordination and communication.  
In Table 3, Columns (6)–(10), we show the same analyses as before but include the 
variable ISA600 rather than year fixed effects to investigate whether the likelihood and extent 
of component involvement changes after the revision of ISA 600. Note that the significance 
and signs of all other determinants do not change in these models, compared to the models that 
contain year fixed effects. We do not find a change in the likelihood of involving a component 
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auditor (COMPONENT) after ISA 600 (Column 1). However, for the sample of MNEs with 
component auditors, we find evidence that the extent of component involvement 
(COMPONENT%, Column 8) significantly decreases in the post-ISA 600 period. As was 
described in section 2.1, revised ISA 600 expanded the principal auditor’s responsibility for 
the work of component auditors. The significant reduction in extent of component auditor 
involvement post-ISA 600 could be a reaction of principal auditors to these new requirements. 
We also find that this reduction can be attributed to a significant decrease in the extent of 
involvement of unaffiliated auditors (Column 10), while there is no significant decrease in the 
extent of involvement of network auditors (Column 9). However, revised ISA 600 explicitly 
points out that principal auditors cannot rely on the work of component auditors without 
adequate supervision, review and testing, regardless of whether they are from the same 
network. 
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2.6.3 COMPONENT AUDITOR INVOLVEMENT AND AUDIT OUTCOMES 
To analyze H1a and b, we show cross-sectional associations between extent of auditor 
involvement (by auditor type) and audit quality and audit fees for the sample of MNEs with 
component auditors.43  
Table 4, Panel A, shows the analysis for H1a on the association between component 
auditor involvement and audit quality and audit fees. In Column 1, we find that a higher extent 
of component auditor involvement (COMPONENT%) is associated with a significantly lower 
level of audit quality, as measured by total accruals (|TA|). We also find a significant one-tailed 
effect for revenue management ). In terms of the economic effect, a one standard 
deviation increase in COMPONENT% results in an increase of 9.2% in average absolute total 
accruals (|TA|).44 We find similar results when using high percentages of component auditor 
involvement (COMPONENT25%). We further find that audit fees are higher for those 
companies with high component auditor involvement. In economic terms, MNEs with high 
component auditor involvement have 13.2 percent higher audit fees on average, compared to 
those without. Overall, this provides support for H1a, and thus also for the audit quality 
concerns surrounding group audits involving component auditors voiced by audit standard-
setters and regulators. 
We present the results for H1b on the difference in audit quality and fees based on the 
type of component auditor in Panel B of Table 4 for the sample of MNEs with component 
auditors. We find evidence that the extent of involvement of both network and unaffiliated 
auditors (NETWORK% and UNAFFILIATED%) are significantly associated with decreased 
audit quality, measured as a positive association with |TA| (p-value<0.05, two-tailed).  
43 We do not identify a control group for this analysis, since the extent of component involvement is only 
observable if MNEs choose to involve a component. However, we also run our regressions on the full MNE 
sample (untabulated). In this table, we analyze in the MNE sample the association between 1) COMPONENT only 
and audit outcomes; 2) COMPONENT25% only and audit outcomes; and 3) COMPONENT and 
COMPONENT25% and audit outcomes. We do not find significant associations between our measures of audit 
quality and COMPONENT when included separately or COMPONENT25% when included separately. However, 
when we include both COMPONENT and COMPONENT25% jointly in the regression, we find positive and 
significant coefficients for COMPONENT25% for all audit outcomes, in line with our expectations. In these 
analyses, the coefficients for COMPONENT are significantly negative indicating that, on average, the MNEs with 
component auditors have higher audit quality, indicating that the MNEs with and without components are very 
different groups of companies. We view this result as an additional reason for analyzing the effect of component 
auditor involvement in the more homogenous group of MNEs with component auditors only. 
44 0.188 (one standard deviation increase in COMPONENT%)*0.0646 (coefficient of COMPONENT%) = 0.012. 
This is an increase of 9.2 percent in average total accruals (0.012/0.131=0.092). 
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TABLE 4 
Extent and type of component auditor involvement and audit outcomes  
Panel A: Extent of component auditor involvement for MNEs with Component Auditors 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables |TA| |TA|   LAFEE 
COMPONENT% 0.0646** 0.0069† 
(0.027) (0.005) 
COMPONENT25% 0.0168* 0.0022† 0.1319*** 
(0.009) (0.001) (0.028) 
CATA -0.0118 -0.0121 -0.0016 -0.0016 0.2077***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.003) (0.003) (0.072)
QUICK -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0069***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
PERFORM 0.0974*** 0.0968*** 0.0020 0.0020 -0.1418***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.002) (0.002) (0.048) 
LTA -0.0131*** -0.0125*** -0.0001 -0.0000 0.3576***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.014) 
LEVERAGE 0.0701** 0.0705** 0.0047 0.0047 0.1600*** 
(0.031) (0.032) (0.003) (0.003) (0.057) 
PPEGROWTH 0.0003 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0026** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
SALESGROWTH 0.0025* 0.0025* 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0032 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
SALESVOL -0.0191 -0.0182 0.0018 0.0019 0.2115***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.002) (0.002) (0.053) 
OCFVOL 0.2481** 0.2476** -0.0050 -0.0049 0.0016 
(0.098) (0.097) (0.006) (0.006) (0.150) 
|TA|_L 0.0779** 0.0784** -0.0014 -0.0014 
(0.032) (0.032) (0.002) (0.002) 
MB 0.0052*** 0.0050** 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0074* 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004)
ANNUAL 0.0080 0.0082 0.0006 0.0006 -0.0120 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.013)
RECTOVER_L 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
PAYTOVER_L 0.0005 0.0005 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0007 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
MINING -0.0215 -0.0236 0.0018 0.0016 0.0048 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.002) (0.003) (0.053) 
ADTCHANGE -0.0191 -0.0180 0.0014 0.0015 -0.1289***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.002) (0.002) (0.030) 
BIG4 -0.0259 -0.0267 0.0010 0.0010 0.2826*** 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.003) (0.003) (0.056) 
LARGENONBIGN -0.0356 -0.0348 0.0049* 0.0049* 0.0163 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.003) (0.003) (0.048) 
MNESPEC -0.0003 -0.0013 -0.0014 -0.0015 0.0328 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.031) 
INDLEADER 0.0064 0.0065 0.0028* 0.0028* 0.0987** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.040) 
BUSY -0.0055 -0.0056 0.0002 0.0002 0.0259 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.038) 
FOREIGN -0.0056 -0.0042 -0.0019 -0.0019 0.0087 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.042) 
LOWRULE -0.0047 -0.0042 0.0022 0.0023 -0.0694 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002) (0.043)
|TA| 0.1630**
(0.063)
INDGROWTH -0.0547 
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(0.065) 
GROWTH -0.0287***
(0.010)
MOPINION 0.1504***
(0.032) 
LSUB 0.1234*** 
(0.026) 
LSUBGDP -0.0511* 
(0.028)
HIGHSUBDIST 0.0634
(0.039) 
Constant 0.1122*** 0.1194*** 0.0044 0.0052 3.0987*** 
(0.041) (0.042) (0.005) (0.005) (0.326)     
Observations 2,349 2,349 2,349 2,349 2,349 
R-squared 0.508 0.507 0.124 0.123 0.904 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Subsidiary country FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Interactions with first-stage regressors YES YES YES YES NO 
Robust standard errors clustered at the client firm level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, † 
p<0.2 (one-tailed significance); All variables are defined in Appendix 2B 
We further find evidence that NETWORK25% is significantly positively associated 
with |TA| and | | (p-value<0.1, two-tailed). UNAFFILIATED25% is significantly positively 
associated with |TA| (p-value<0.1, one-tailed). Overall, this suggests that audit quality 
problems exist when involving component auditors to a greater extent, regardless of their type. 
We further find that both NETWORK25% and UNAFFILIATED25% are significantly 
positively associated with audit fees (p-value<0.01, two-tailed). This provides evidence that 
audit fees are higher for MNEs with greater involvement of any type of component auditor, 
which reflects significant costs related to coordination and supervision of both types of 
component auditors. However, we find that the coefficient of NETWORK25% is significantly 
larger than the coefficient of UNAFFILIATED25%, indicating that audits involving network 
component auditors are costlier than those involving unaffiliated auditors (F-value=0.0231). 
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TABLE 4 
Extent of type of auditor involvement and audit quality  
Panel B: Extent of use of network auditors for MNEs with Component Auditors 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables |TA| |TA|   LAFEE 
NETWORK% 0.0745** 0.0068 
(0.033) (0.006) 
UNAFFILIATED% 0.0547* 0.0070 
(0.030) (0.005) 
NETWORK25% 0.0181* 0.0034* 0.1883*** 
(0.011) (0.002) (0.039) 
UNAFFILIATED25% 0.0167 0.0012 0.0884*** 
(0.012) (0.002) (0.032) 
Observations 2,349 2,349 2,349 2,349 2,349 
R-squared 0.508 0.507 0.124 0.124 0.904 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Subsidiary country FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Interactions first-stage regressors YES YES YES YES NO 
Robust standard errors clustered at the client firm level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, † 
p<0.2 (one-tailed significance); All variables are defined in Appendix 2B 
2.6.4 THE EFFECT OF ISA600 ON COMPONENT AUDITOR INVOLVEMENT AND 
AUDIT OUTCOMES  
For our analyses of H2a, we first test cross-sectionally the impact of ISA 600 on the 
association between extent of component involvement and audit quality for MNEs with 
component auditors. We then analyze the impact of ISA 600 on this association, by studying 
the differential effect of ISA 600 on the treatment group (MNE with component auditors), 
compared to a control group, effectively implementing a difference-in-differences design with 
a continuous treatment. ISA 600 applies to all group audits but deals with the special 
considerations that apply where one or more component auditors are involved (ISA 600.1). We 
identify the sample of MNEs that do not involve component auditors (MNEs without 
component auditors sample) as our primary control group.45 Further, we identify national 
(nongroup) companies that do not involve component auditors as an additional control group 
that is least affected by ISA 600.46  
45 We acknowledge that ISA 600 still applies to the sample of MNEs without component auditors to the extent 
that these are group audits.  
46 This control group has the drawback that our proxies for audit quality in this sample might be influenced by 
factors that differ from factors influencing audit quality for MNEs, which might call into question the parallel 
trends assumption underlying the difference-in-differences design. For example, our measures of audit quality of 
MNEs could be influenced by the exposure to shocks from other economies that do not impact national companies. 
By using both control groups, each with its limitations, one can gain confidence that we can better isolate the 
effect of ISA 600, if any, for MNEs with component involvement. Table 1, Panel A, of the Appendix 2D of this 
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Table 5 presents our analyses on whether the revision of ISA 600 affected the 
association between the extent of component (network or unaffiliated) auditor involvement and 
audit quality. Table 5, Panel A, shows the analysis for the MNE component auditor sample 
where we find that, while the extent of involvement of component auditors (COMPONENT%) 
is positively associated with |TA| (p-value<0.05, one-tailed), we do not find evidence that this 
association is affected by ISA 600. Similarly, we find that COMPONENT25% is positively 
associated with |TA| and audit fees while the interaction with ISA600 is insignificant. The main 
effect of ISA600 is insignificant in the audit quality model and negatively significant in the 
audit fee model, indicating that audit fees decreased over the sample period. Overall, our 
evidence cannot reject the null hypothesis formulated in H2a.47  
In Table 5, Panel B, we rerun the analysis on the MNEs, including MNEs without 
component auditors as a control group. In this model, the main effect of ISA600 reflects the 
general time trend in audit quality for the treatment and control group. We also include an 
indicator variable, COMPONENT, that equals one if the audit involves a component auditor 
and zero otherwise, to control for the choice to involve a component auditor. We include the 
interaction COMPONENT*ISA600 to control for the choice to involve a component auditor 
and the potential effect of ISA 600 on the choice to involve a component auditor. We do not 
have an expectation about the sign of the coefficients for COMPONENT and 
COMPONENT*ISA600. This is because the treatment (COMPONENT=1) and control groups 
(COMPONENT=0) might have an overall different level of audit quality. In Panel B of Table 
6, we continue to find insignificant results for the interactions of extent of component 
involvement and ISA 600 (COMPONENT%*ISA600) in the audit quality and fee models. 
Further, we continue to find evidence of a negative cross-sectional association between 
COMPONENT% and COMPONENT25% and our measures of audit quality and fees.  
chapter shows descriptive statistics for the sample of national companies that do not involve component auditors, 
and in Panel B, we show the analysis of the effect of ISA600 on the association between COMPONENT% 
(COMPONENT25%) and audit outcomes. In this analysis, we fail to find a significant effect of ISA600 on the 
association. 
47 We follow the approach of Chung and Kallapur [2003] to check whether the insignificance of the effect of ISA 
600 on the association between COMPONENT% and audit outcomes is due to a lack of a real effect of ISA 600 
or due to low power of our tests (e.g., because we measure audit quality and audit effort with noise). For the pre-
ISA-600 period, we find that the difference in total accruals between clients that fall in the first and third quartiles 
of COMPONENT% at the upper 95 percent confidence interval is 3.59 percent. For the post-ISA-600 period we 
find that the difference is 4.09 percent, which is even higher than in the pre-ISA-600 period. This indicates that, 
even at the upper 95 percent confidence limit, ISA 600 did not have an effect. This is similar for the other audit 
outcomes. We calculate the upper 95 percent confidence limit for the coefficient as (coefficient+standard 
error*1.96) and multiply this number with the interquartile range of COMPONENT% to estimate the difference 
in audit outcomes at the 95% confidence limit. 
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TABLE 5 
ISA 600 and audit outcomes  
Panel A: MNEs with Component Auditors 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables |TA| |TA|   LAFEE 
COMPONENT% 0.0633** 0.0080 
(0.031) (0.005) 
COMPONENT%*ISA600 0.0047 -0.0021 
(0.037) (0.006)
COMPONENT25% 0.0234** 0.0019 0.1470*** 
(0.011) (0.002) (0.036) 
COMPONENT25%*ISA600 -0.0108 0.0005 -0.0278 
(0.014) (0.002) (0.038)
ISA600 -0.0022 0.0028 0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0716** 
(0.015) (0.014) (0.002) (0.001) (0.029)
Observations 2,349 2,349 2,349 2,349 2,349 
R-squared 0.505 0.504 0.122 0.121 0.903 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Subsidiary country FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO NO NO 
Interactions first-stage regressors YES YES YES YES NO 
Robust standard errors clustered at the client firm level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, † 
p<0.2 (one-tailed significance); All variables are defined in Appendix 2B 
Panel B: MNEs 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables |TA| |TA|   LAFEE 
COMPONENT% 0.0593* 0.0096* 
(0.032) (0.005) 
COMPONENT%*ISA600 0.0012 -0.0028 
(0.039) (0.007)
COMPONENT25% 0.0244** 0.0026 0.1719*** 
(0.012) (0.002) (0.036) 
COMPONENT25%*ISA600 -0.0118 0.0001 -0.0320 
(0.015) (0.002) (0.038)
COMPONENT -0.0193 -0.0145 -0.0046** -0.0031* 0.2029*** 
(0.012) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.033) 
COMPONENT*ISA600 -0.0035 0.0014 0.0034 0.0025 -0.0137 
(0.016) (0.013) (0.002) (0.002) (0.034)
ISA600 0.0042 0.0040 -0.0029** -0.0030** 0.1226**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.001) (0.001) (0.057)
Observations 4,869 4,869 4,869 4,869 4,869 
R-squared 0.441 0.441 0.076 0.076 0.890 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Subsidiary country FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO NO NO 
Interactions first-stage regressors YES YES YES YES NO 
Robust standard errors clustered at the client firm level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, † 
p<0.2 (one-tailed significance); All variables are defined in Appendix 2B 
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We find that the main effect of ISA 600 is significantly negative for | | and audit 
fees, indicating that audit quality increased in the post-ISA-600 period in the MNE sample. 
The main effect of ISA 600 is positive in the audit fee model, indicating that, for MNEs, audit 
fees increased during our period of interest. 
In untabulated analyses, we do not find any evidence of an effect of ISA 600 on the 
association between extent of network or unaffiliated auditors and audit quality in any of our 
samples. Hence our evidence fails to reject H2b. Overall, our finding that the revisions to ISA 
600 do not appear to have improved audit quality might be due to a number of reasons, 
including that ISA 600 did not significantly change the responsibility of the principal auditor 
and that component auditors continued to exercise significant discretion, even after the revision 
of the standard. 
2.6.5 ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
2.6.5.1 Subsidiary country characteristics 
 The literature finds that companies with foreign operations manage earnings through 
subsidiaries, especially those in weak institutional environments (e.g., Dyreng et al. [2012], 
Beuselinck et al., [forthcoming]). We thus further test whether the association between 
COMPONENT% (and NETWORK% and UNAFFILIATED%) and our measures of audit 
quality is more pronounced if the average rule of law of the MNEs’ subsidiaries is lower. In 
Table 6, Panel A, we interact COMPONENT% with an indicator variable for low average rule 
of law (LOWRULE) for the client’s subsidiary countries. We continue to find a significant main 
effect for COMPONENT% and no significant interaction effect with LOWRULE for audit 
quality measured as |TA|. However, we find a positive significant interaction effect for audit 
quality measured as | |, indicating that the extent of component involvement is positively 
associated with revenue management if the component auditor work is conducted in weak 
institutional environments. In untabulated analyses, we further find that this significant result 
only holds in the period prior to the revision of ISA 600 (ISA600=0) but not afterward 
(ISA600=1), indicating that audit quality increased for those MNEs with subsidiaries in, on 
average, weak rule of law countries after the revision of ISA 600.48 In Table 6, Panel B, we 
also find that the interaction term between NETWORK% and UNAFFILIATED% and 
LOWRULE is positive and significant for audit quality measured as | |. We again find that 
48 We do not find a similar result when regressing COMPONENT% or COMPONENT25% without the interaction 
with LOWRULE on our measures of audit quality in the pre- and post-ISA-600 period of our sample. We find that 
the coefficients for COMPONENT% and COMPONENT25% remain significant for measure |TA| in both periods 
and that the coefficients remain insignificant for measure  in both periods. 
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these associations are only significant in the pre-ISA 600 period but not in the post-period 
(untabulated).  
TABLE 6 
Interaction between component auditor involvement and rule of law 
 Panel A: Extent of component auditor involvement and average subsidiary Rule of Law 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables |TA| |TA|   LAFEE 
COMPONENT% 0.0612* -0.0007 
(0.032) (0.004)
COMPONENT%*LOWRULE 0.0111 0.0263**
(0.053) (0.012) 
COMPONENT25 0.0144 0.1455*** 
(0.010) (0.035) 
COMPONENT25%*LOWRULE 0.0073 0.0064* -0.0440 
(0.020) (0.003) (0.052) 
LOWRULE -0.0081 -0.0083 -0.0056 -0.0013 -0.0462 
(0.020) (0.016) (0.004) (0.003) (0.052) 
Observations 2,349 2,349 2,349 2,349 2,349 
R-squared 0.508 0.507 0.130 0.126 0.904 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Subsidiary country FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Interactions first-stage regressors YES YES YES YES NO 
Robust standard errors clustered at the client firm level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, † 
p<0.2 (one-tailed significance); All variables are defined in Appendix 2B 
Chapter 2 
46 
 
TABLE 6 
Interaction between component auditor involvement and rule of law (continued)  
Panel B: Extent of network and unaffiliated auditor involvement and average subsidiary Rule of Law  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables |TA| |TA|   LAFEE 
            
NETWORK% 0.0773**  -0.0004   
 (0.039)  (0.004)   
NETWORK%*LOWRULE -0.0085  0.0278**   
 (0.059)  (0.014)   
UNAFFILIATED% 0.0410  -0.0011   
 (0.034)  (0.005)   
UNAFFILIATED%*LOWRULE 0.0376  0.0253**   
 (0.059)  (0.013)   
NETWORK25%  0.0203  0.0011 0.1936*** 
  (0.013)  (0.002) (0.049) 
NETWORK25%*LOWRULE  -0.0062  0.0082* -0.0227 
  (0.022)  (0.005) (0.075) 
UNAFFILIATED25%  0.0098  -0.0016 0.1104** 
  (0.014)  (0.002) (0.044) 
UNAFFILIATED25%*LOWRULE  0.0167  0.0074* -0.0593 
  (0.025)  (0.004) (0.062) 
LOWRULE -0.0103 -0.0084 -0.0056 -0.0020 -0.0521 
 (0.019) (0.016) (0.004) (0.003) (0.052) 
      
Observations 2,349 2,349 2,349 2,349 2,349 
R-squared 0.508 0.507 0.130 0.128 0.904 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Subsidiary country FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Interactions first-stage regressors YES YES YES YES NO 
Robust standard errors clustered at the client firm level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, † 
p<0.2 (one-tailed significance); All variables are defined in Appendix 2B 
 
2.6.5.2 Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors 
To check whether our results are driven by certain principal auditors, we rerun our main 
analyses for the subsample of Big 4 auditors and the subsample of non-Big 4 auditors. Group 
audit engagements with a non-Big 4 principal auditor have a significantly higher extent of 
component involvement (average COMPONENT%=30 percent), compared to those with a Big 
4 principal auditor (average COMPONENT%=27 percent). As would be expected, the extent 
of involvement of unaffiliated component auditors (network component auditors) is lower 
(higher) in the Big 4 sample, compared to the non-Big 4 sample (Big 4 sample: average 
UNAFFILIATED%=8 percent and average NETWORK%=19 percent; non-Big 4 sample: 
average UNAFFILIATED%=25 percent and average NETWORK%=5 percent). When splitting 
the sample into MNEs with component auditors that are audited by a Big 4 auditor versus a 
non-Big 4 auditor, we only find that COMPONENT% is significantly positive for the audit 
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quality measure |TA| in the non-Big 4 subsample only.49 We find that audit fees are positively 
associated with COMPONENT% in both subsamples. We tabulate these analyses in Table 7. 
This provides some evidence that the type of principal auditor (Big 4 or non-Big 4) drives the 
audit quality results we document in Table 5. We continue to find no effect of ISA 600 on the 
association between extent of auditor involvement and audit quality for either subsample. 
 
 
49 We further find that this result is driven by unaffiliated component auditors (UNAFFILIATED%) in the non-
Big 4 subsample. However, given the low percentage of network auditor involvement for this subsample, the lack 
of a significant association between NETWORK% and our measures of audit quality might be due to low power. 
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2.6.5.3 Changes in Component percentage 
To provide further evidence on the effect of component auditor involvement on audit 
quality, we also analyze whether changes in component auditor involvement have an effect on 
audit quality. Specifically, we separately analyze whether a decrease in component percentage 
(Component%) or an increase in component percentage (Component%) affects audit quality 
for the sample of MNEs with component auditors (Table 8).50 In line with our hypotheses, we 
expect an increase (decrease) in component percentage to be associated with lower (higher) 
audit quality. Consistent with these expectations, we find that a year-to-year decrease (increase) 
in component percentage is associated with higher (lower) audit quality, measured as | | (p-
value <0.1, two-tailed).  
TABLE 8 
Changes in component auditor involvement  
 Decrease  Increase 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES |TA|  LAFEE  |TA|  LAFEE 
               
 -0.0073 -0.0021* -0.0063  0.0077 0.0020* 0.0104 
 (0.008) (0.001) (0.017)  (0.008) (0.001) (0.017)         
Observations 2,349 2,349 2,349  2,349 2,349 2,349 
R-squared 0.506 0.123 0.901  0.506 0.123 0.901 
Controls YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Subsidiary country FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Interactions with first-stage 
regressors YES YES NO  
YES YES NO 
Robust standard errors clustered at the client firm level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, † 
p<0.2 (one-tailed significance); All variables are defined in Appendix 2B 
 
2.6.5.4 National audits involving component auditors 
The involvement of component auditors is not restricted to multinational audits but can 
also occur in national group audits. We observe 152 of these audits that involve a component 
auditor, with average COMPONENT% of 26% and median COMPONENT% of 21%. 
Analyzing this subsample (untabulated), we do not find a significant association between 
COMPONENT% or UNAFFILIATED% and our measures of audit quality. We do, however, 
find a significantly negative coefficient for NETWORK% for audit quality measured as |TA|, 
indicating that audit quality is significantly higher when network auditors are involved in 
national audits. We further find that audit fees are significantly higher when the extent of 
 
50 Note that rather than taking first differences and analyzing the magnitudes of changes over time, which are 
relatively small, we code increases (decreases) as an indicator variable equal to one if we observe a year-to-year 
increase (decrease) and zero otherwise. Hence, we separately analyze increases (decreases). 
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component auditor involvement is high (COMPONENT25%) and that this is driven by the 
involvement of network auditors (NETWORK25%). We also do not find that ISA 600 has a 
significant impact on the association between audit quality and extent of component 
involvement for national group audits. This indicates that audit quality problems from 
involving component auditors in group audits are mainly centered around multinational audits, 
i.e., those group audits for which communication and coordination problems are likely most 
prevalent.  
2.6.5.5 Selection bias 
We only observe our variable of interest (COMPONENT%) for a subset of the full 
sample of MNEs, i.e., those that choose to involve a component auditor. Hence, we restrict our 
main analyses to the sample of MNEs with component auditors. However, our estimates of the 
effect of extent of component auditor involvement on audit quality might be biased if sample 
selection bias is present and unobservable factors that affect component auditor choice also 
affect audit quality. To address this potential problem, we rely on a Heckman-type selection 
model.51 As our exclusion restriction, we choose a dummy variable indicating high weighted-
average distance between parent company location and subsidiary countries (HIGHSUBDIST). 
The exclusion restriction (instrument) should be relevant, i.e., correlated with COMPONENT, 
and valid, i.e., uncorrelated with audit quality. We argue that high average subsidiary distance 
should be correlated with the likelihood of component auditor involvement as principal 
auditors that are time and resource constrained should be more likely to engage component 
auditors to conduct work in distant locations. We show, in our first-stage probit model (Table 
4, Column 1), that HIGHSUBDIST is correlated with COMPONENT. We further test for 
relevance of the exclusion restriction with the Kleibergen-Paap-LM statistic and the Stock and 
Yogo (2005) test and find support for the relevance assumption and thus a correlation between 
HIGHSUBDIST and COMPONENT.52 Regarding validity of the exclusion restriction, we do 
not expect the high weighted average distance between parent company location and subsidiary 
countries to be correlated with our measures of audit quality. While research has shown that 
audit quality differs around the world (e.g., Francis and Wang 2010), it should not be 
 
51 Because we observe the dependent variable, audit quality, for the full MNE sample, rather than only for those 
MNEs that choose to involve component auditors, we manually run the first-stage probit model to estimate the 
likelihood of involving a component and include the estimated inverse mills ratio in the second-stage OLS 
regressions on the MNEs with component auditors sample. To correct for inconsistency of the variance-covariance 
matrix in the second-stage regressions, we bootstrap standard errors, using 500 samples. Due to the number of 
observations being limited, we only include the first-stage regressors without their interactions with industry-year. 
52 The Kleibergen-Paap-LM statistic is highly significant (p-value<0.01, two-tailed), indicating that the null 
hypothesis of underidentification of the model can be rejected. Further, the Cragg-Donald-Wald F-statistic is 
larger than the Stock-Yogo critical value at 10% relative bias.  
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systematically higher or lower for clients for which the weighted average distance to subsidiary 
countries is large. When applying the Heckman correction to our model (Table 9), we draw the 
same inferences for the audit quality outcome |TA| and LAFEE. We further find a significant 
result for COMPONENT% for the audit quality outcome .  
TABLE 9 
Selection Bias: Heckman model  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES |TA| |TA|   LAFEE 
            
COMPONENT% 0.0597**  0.0060†   
 (0.024)  (0.004)   
COMPONENT25%  0.0214**  0.021* 0.1315*** 
  (0.009)  (0.001) (0.018)       
Observations 12,788 12,788 12,788 12,788 2,349 
R-squared 0.335 0.270 0.077 0.077 0.904 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Interactions with first-stage regressors NO NO NO NO NO 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, † p<0.2 (one-tailed 
significance); All variables are defined in Appendix 2B       
 
2.6.6 SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
2.6.6.1 Low principal auditor involvement 
To check whether the results are driven by those observations with a high extent of 
component involvement, we exclude the 30 observations for which the component auditors are 
paid more than 75 percent of the total fees. These are cases where concerns about the lack of 
principal auditor involvement and oversight are most prevalent. When excluding these 
observations, our inferences for our main analyses remain the same (untabulated).  
2.6.6.2 Client firm fixed effects 
 We rerun our main analyses using client firm fixed effects to account for time-invariant 
unobservable client-specific factors that can influence our audit quality proxies (untabulated). 
We continue to find significant results for COMPONENT% for |TA| as the audit quality 
measure. We find a one-tailed significant effect for COMPONENT% for | | as the measure 
of audit quality. We further find that audit fees are higher for high extent of component 
involvement (COMPONENT25%). We fail to find support for a significant effect of ISA 600 
on the association between COMPONENT% and COMPONENT25% and audit quality.  
 
2.6.6.3 Tobit 
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We rerun our main audit quality analyses using tobit, rather than OLS, as our accrual 
and revenue management proxies are unsigned and thus truncated at zero. Our inferences 
remain the same (untabulated). 
2.7. Conclusions and Limitations 
Regulators have raised concerns about the quality of the audits of multinational groups, 
especially those involving component auditors. These concerns are based on inspection 
findings relating to relatively small and risk-based samples. Large-scale empirical research on 
how MNE group audits are conducted and whether this affects audit quality is scant, primarily 
due to data constraints. As a first step in advancing knowledge of MNE group audits using 
large-scale data, we make use of unique, long-standing Australian disclosures, which allow 
identification of the extent of involvement of principal and component auditors in group audits 
based on audit fees.  
We find that component auditors are more likely to be involved and to a larger extent 
when MNE client firms are more complex and have a higher degree of internationalization. 
Extent of component auditor involvement is higher when the client has more foreign 
subsidiaries that are located farther away from the parent and apply different accounting 
standards. In situations requiring more coordination and communication, principal auditors are 
more likely to engage network component auditors. In terms of auditor characteristics, we find 
that Big 4 principal auditors involve a lower percentage of component auditors in their audits. 
We further find that Big 4 and large non-Big 4 principal auditors involve a higher percentage 
of their network member firms as component auditors and that Big 4 principal auditors in 
particular are negatively associated with the use of unaffiliated auditors as component auditors. 
The overlap between subsidiary locations and the countries in which global audit firm networks 
have coverage is also associated with the use of network auditors, while principal auditors with 
expertise in auditing MNEs involve a higher percentage of network auditors but a lower 
percentage of unaffiliated auditors in undertaking MNE group audits.  
In line with the concerns of regulators and standard-setters, our findings suggest that 
there are persistent audit quality issues for group audits involving component auditors, 
regardless of whether those auditors are part of an international network or unaffiliated. While 
the revision of ISA 600 reduced the involvement of unaffiliated (but not network) auditors, 
quality problems remain. Our research thus supports the view that further work is needed to 
address audit quality concerns for MNE group audits and identifies areas to which standard-
setters and regulators might wish to direct future efforts.  
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Our study is subject to several limitations. Our audit quality measures only capture 
some aspects of audit quality (DeFond and Zhang [2014]). However, other commonly 
employed measures (such as Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) or 
restatements) are not available for Australian firms and the propensity to issue going concern 
opinions changed over the sample period, due to the impact of the global financial crisis (e.g., 
Xu et al. [2013]), making this an unreliable measure of audit quality for our sample period. We 
recognize that our results show cross-sectional associations only, and we cannot make any 
claims about causality. However, we attempt to address this by also investigating changes in 
component auditor involvement and address selection bias using a Heckman model. Further, 
while we control for the jurisdictions in which the subsidiaries are incorporated, we cannot 
observe in which jurisdictions component auditors are conducting their work and the identity 
of the other (unaffiliated) component auditors involved (e.g., whether unaffiliated component 
auditors are Big 4 or non-Big 4 auditors). We are also restricted in observing potentially 
important determinants that explain component involvement and the extent of that 
involvement, such as ownership of subsidiaries.  
As more data on group audits in different jurisdictions become available, for example, 
under the new PCAOB disclosure rules, future research might be able to address these types 
of questions. More generally, as time proceeds, it will be interesting to investigate how public 
disclosure of group audit arrangements affects both audit quality and user perceptions of 
audit quality across the globe. 
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Appendices Chapter 2 
 
Appendix 2A: Audit Fee Disclosures 
The requirements of Australian companies to disclose audit fees paid to the principal and 
component network and component unaffiliated auditors are included in AASB 101 “AASB 
101 - Presentation of Financial Statements - October 2006” as Australian specific requirements 
(as designated by the AUS paragraphs to show differences from the IAASB paragraph):  
Aus126.1     An entity, other than a group, shall disclose in the financial report, the amounts paid or 
payable to: 
(a)       the auditor of the entity for an audit or a review of the financial reports of the entity; 
(b)       the auditor of the entity for non-audit services in relation to the entity, disclosing separately 
the nature and amount of each of the non-audit services provided by the auditor; and 
(c)       a related practice of the auditor for non-audit services in relation to the entity, disclosing 
separately the nature and amount of each category of non-audit service. 
 
Aus126.2     The following information shall be disclosed in the financial report of a group, the 
amounts paid or payable to: 
(a)       the auditor of the parent of the group, for an audit or a review of the financial report of any 
entity in the group; 
(b)       the auditor of the parent of the group, for non-audit services in relation to any entity in the 
group, disclosing separately the nature and amount of each of the non-audit services provided by the 
auditor; 
(c)       a related practice of the auditor of the parent of the group, for non-audit services in relation to 
any entity in the group, disclosing separately the nature and amount of each of the non-audit services 
provided by the auditor; 
(d)       the auditors of the subsidiaries in the group, other than those disclosed in accordance with 
paragraph Aus126.2(a), for an audit or a review of the financial reports of those subsidiaries; 
(e)       the auditors of the subsidiaries in the group, other than those disclosed in accordance with 
paragraphs Aus126.2(b) and (c), for non-audit services in relation to any entity in the group, disclosing 
separately the nature and amount of each of the non-audit services provided by the auditor; and 
(f)       a related practice of the auditors of the subsidiaries in the group, other than those disclosed in 
accordance with paragraphs Aus126.2(b) and (c), for non-audit services in relation to any entity in the 
group, disclosing separately the nature and amount of each of the non-audit services provided by the 
auditor. 
 
In practice the disclosures are observed as follows:53 
 The fee paid to the principal auditor (i.e. lead auditor) 
 The fee paid to audit firms related to the principal auditor (i.e., affiliated firms that are 
members of the principal auditor’s network). 
 The fee paid to other auditors (i.e., unaffiliated firms that are not members of the 
principal auditor’s network). 
An example of these disclosures from Note 9 of the 2012 annual report of Amcor Limited is 
provided below in Figure 1. 
 
53 Audit fees paid to each category of auditor are required. The disclosure does not require identification of the 
specific network members or the name of the unaffiliated audit firm/firms involved in the group audit. 
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Figure 1: Audit Fee Disclosures from Amcor Limited’s Annual Report 
These disclosure standards were later relocated into AASB 1054, Australian Additional 
Disclosures [2011], to reflect the harmonization of disclosure requirements between Australia 
and New Zealand.  
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Appendix 2B: Variable Descriptions 
Variable Definitions 
COMPONENT 
 
COMPONENT% 
 
COMPONENT25% 
 
NETWORK% 
 
NETWORK25% 
an indicator variable, 1 if audit fees are paid to an auditor other than the principal auditor, 0 
otherwise (Source: UNSW Audit Fee and Audit Reporting Database). 
a continuous variable based on the percentage of audit fees paid to an auditor other than the 
principal auditor (Source: UNSW Audit Fee and Audit Reporting Database). 
an indicator variable, 1 if audit fees paid to a component auditor are 25 percent of total fees or 
higher, 0 otherwise (Source: UNSW Audit Fee and Audit Reporting Database). 
the percentage of total group audit fees paid to the network (Source: UNSW Audit Fee and 
Audit Reporting Database)                                                                                                                                                                                                          
an indicator variable, 1 if audit fees paid to a network component auditor are 25 percent of total 
fees or higher, 0 otherwise (Source: UNSW Audit Fee and Audit Reporting Database). 
UNAFFILIATED% 
 
UNAFFILIATED25% 
the percentage of total group audit fees paid to unaffiliated auditors (Source: UNSW Audit Fee 
and Audit Reporting Database). 
an indicator variable, 1 if audit fees paid to an unaffiliated auditor are 25 percent of total fees or 
higher, 0 otherwise (Source: UNSW Audit Fee and Audit Reporting Database). 
ISA600 an indicator variable, 1 if client year-end is on or after 15 December 2010, otherwise 0. 
|TA| 
 
|  
 
LAFEE 
the absolute value of total accruals scaled by lagged total assets (Source: Morningstar Aspect 
Huntley Financial database). 
the absolute value of the change in accounts receivables scaled by lagged total assets (Source: 
Morningstar Aspect Huntley Financial database). 
the natural log of the sum of total audit fees paid to the principal auditor, network auditor and 
unaffiliated auditors ($ thousands), Consumer Price Index adjusted (Source: Morningstar Aspect 
Huntley Financial database). 
ADTCHANGE an indicator variable, 1 if there is an audit firm change in year t, 0 otherwise (Source: UNSW 
Audit Fee and Audit Reporting Database). 
ANNUAL the annualized market-adjusted return (Source: SPPR database). 
BIG4 an indicator variable, 1 if the principal audit firm is a Big 4 auditor, 0 otherwise (Source: 
UNSW Audit Fee and Audit Reporting Database). 
BUSY an indicator variable, 1 if the client firm has a June 30 fiscal year-end, 0 otherwise (Source: 
Morningstar Aspect Huntley Financial database). 
CATA the ratio of current assets to total assets (Source: Morningstar Aspect Huntley Financial 
database). 
FOREIGN an indicator variable if the proportion of foreign subsidiaries is greater than 25%, 0 otherwise 
(Source: hand-collected from annual reports). 
GROWTH Total Assetst/Total Assetst-1 (Source: Morningstar Aspect Huntley Financial database); 
HIGHSUBDIST an indicator variable, 1 if the natural logarithm of the weighted average geographic distance 
between the largest city of Australia and largest city of each subsidiary country is in the upper 
quartile of the distribution, 0 otherwise (Source: hand-collected from annual reports; Mayer and 
Zignago [2011]). 
INDGROWTH i,t i,t-1 by two-digit GICS code (Source: Morningstar Aspect 
Huntley Financial database). 
INDLEADER an indicator variable, 1 if the audit firm is a national industry leader (based on client assets) in 
the client’s industry (two-digit GICS code) in a particular year, 0 otherwise. (Source: 
Morningstar Aspect Huntley Financial database; UNSW Audit Fee and Audit Reporting 
Database). 
LARGENONBIG4 an indicator variable, 1 if the principal audit firm is BDO or Grant Thornton, 0 otherwise 
(Source: UNSW Audit Fee and Audit Reporting Database). 
LEVERAGE the ratio of total liabilities to total assets (Source: Morningstar Aspect Huntley Financial 
database). 
LOCATIONCOV the percentage of subsidiary countries in which the principal audit firm has a network member 
(Source: subsidiary information hand-collected from annual reports; audit firm network 
information hand-collected from audit firm websites). 
LOSS an indicator variable, 1 if the client firm incurs a loss in the current year, 0 otherwise (Source: 
Morningstar Aspect Huntley Financial database). 
LOWIFRS an indicator variable, 1 if the percentage of foreign subsidiaries that are located in countries 
with substantial adoption of IFRS as their accounting standards is below the median, 0 
otherwise (Source: subsidiary information hand-collected from annual reports; information on 
IFRS adoption from https://www.ifrs.org/use-around-the-world/use-of-ifrs-standards-by-
jurisdiction/; Trimble [2018]). 
LOWSUBSENGLISH an indicator variable, 1 if the percentage of total subsidiaries incorporated in an English-
speaking country (official or de jure) is in the lowest quartile of the distribution, 0 otherwise 
(Source: subsidiary information hand-collected from annual reports; Mayer and Zignago 
[2011]). 
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LOWRULE An indicator variable, 1 if the weighted average rule of law of the client’s subsidiary countries is 
in the lowest quartile of the distribution (Source: subsidiary information hand-collected from 
annual reports; Rule of Law from Kaufmann et al., [2010]). 
LSUB the natural log of the number of subsidiaries (Source: hand-collected from annual reports);  
LSUBGDP the natural log of the weighted average per-capita GDP of the client firm’s subsidiary countries, 
averaged over the years 2006-2013 (Source: hand-collected from annual reports; Kaufmann et 
al. [2010]). 
LTA the natural log of Consumer Price Index adjusted total assets at year-end (Source: Morningstar 
Aspect Huntley Financial database). 
MB the market to book ratio at year-end (Source: Morningstar Aspect Huntley Financial database); 
MINING 
 
MNESPEC 
 
 
an indicator variable, 1 if the client firm is in the mining industry, 0 otherwise (Source: 
Morningstar Aspect Huntley Financial database). 
an indicator variable, 1 if the audit firm is an MNE specialist in a particular year, defined as an 
audit firm whose market share of auditing international clients (defined as the ratio of foreign to 
total subsidiaries) is in the upper quartile of the distribution, 0 otherwise (Source: UNSW Audit 
Fee and Audit Reporting Database, Morningstar Aspect Huntley Financial database).54 
MOPINION an indicator variable, 1 if the client receives a qualified, modified or emphasis of matter 
opinion, 0 otherwise (Source: UNSW Audit Fee and Audit Reporting Database). 
OCFVOL the volatility of cash flow from operations over the last three years (Source: Morningstar Aspect 
Huntley Financial database). 
PAYTOVER_L 
 
cost of goods sold in year t-1 scaled by total accounts payable in year t-1 (Payable Turnover 
ratio) (Source: Morningstar Aspect Huntley Financial database). 
PERFORM operating cash flow scaled by total assets (Source: Morningstar Aspect Huntley Financial 
database). 
PPEGROWTH the year-to-year percentage change in gross property plant and equipment (Source: Morningstar 
Aspect Huntley Financial database). 
PTCHANGE an indicator variable, 1 if there is an audit partner change, but not audit firm change, in year t, 0 
otherwise (Source: UNSW Audit Fee and Audit Reporting Database). 
QUICK the ratio of current assets less inventories to current liabilities (Source: Morningstar Aspect 
Huntley Financial database). 
RECTOVER_L total revenue in year t-1 scaled by total accounts receivable in year t-1(Receivables Turnover 
ratio) (Source: Morningstar Aspect Huntley Financial database). 
SALESGROWTH sales in current year less sales in previous year divided by previous year’s sales (Source: 
Morningstar Aspect Huntley Financial database). 
SALESVOL the volatility of sales calculated over the last three years (Source: Morningstar Aspect Huntley 
Financial database). 
|TA|_L the lagged absolute value of total accruals in year (t-1) (Source: Morningstar Aspect Huntley 
Financial database). 
  
 
  
 
54 Unlike Gunn and Michas [2018], we do not know foreign assets, and therefore calculate this measure using the 
percentage of foreign to total subsidiaries. 
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Appendix 2C: Histograms of COMPONENT%, NETWORK% and UNAFFILIATED% 
Graph 1, Panel A: Histograms COMPONENT% 
  
Graph 1, Panel B: Histogram NETWORK% 
 
Graph 1, Panel C: Histogram UNAFFILIATED% 
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Appendix 2D: National Groups without Component Auditors 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
  
MNEs with Component 
Auditors (1) 
(N=2,349; 45.9%)  
National Groups without 
Component Auditors (2)  
(N=2,774; 54.1%)  
Comparison 
(1)-(2) 
  Mean Median SD  Mean Median SD  t-statistica 
Variables of interest and dependent variables              
COMPONENT  1.000 1.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000   
COMPONENT%  0.278 0.244 0.188  0.000 0.000 0.000   
COMPONENT25%  0.487 0.000 0.500  0.000 0.000 0.000   
NETWORK%  0.134 0.000 0.187  0.000 0.000 0.000   
NETWORK25%  0.228 0.000 0.419  0.000 0.000 0.000   
UNAFFILIATED%  0.144 0.064 0.182  0.000 0.000 0.000   
UNAFFILIATED25%  0.241 0.000 0.428  0.000 0.000 0.000   
ISA600  0.560 1.000 0.496  0.527 1.000 0.499  0.033** 
|TA|  0.131 0.060 0.211  0.172 0.081 0.259  -0.041*** 
  0.008 0.000 0.025  0.010 0.000 0.033  -0.002** 
LAFEE  5.318 5.150 1.265  4.004 3.855 0.871  1.314*** 
Controls           
ADTCHANGE  0.104 0.000 0.305  0.096 0.000 0.294  0.008 
ANNUAL  0.083 -0.061 0.788  0.112 -0.130 0.932  -0.029 
BIG4  0.585 1.000 0.493  0.383 0.000 0.486  0.202*** 
BUSY  0.817 1.000 0.386  0.898 1.000 0.303  -0.080*** 
CATA  0.438 0.419 0.246  0.411 0.362 0.271  0.027** 
FOREIGN  0.814 1.000 0.390  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.814*** 
GROWTH  1.298 1.050 1.190  1.373 1.067 1.286  -0.076** 
HIGHSUBDIST  0.270 0.000 0.444  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.270*** 
INDGROWTH  1.110 1.080 0.128  1.125 1.089 0.129  -0.014*** 
INDLEADER  0.179 0.000 0.384  0.092 0.000 0.289  0.087*** 
LARGENONBIGN  0.332 0.000 0.471  0.453 0.000 0.498  -0.121*** 
LEVERAGE  0.387 0.376 0.322  0.309 0.196 0.405  0.077*** 
LOCATIONCOV  0.834 1.000 0.252  1.000 1.000 0.000  -0.166*** 
LOSS  0.467 0.000 0.499  0.672 1.000 0.470  -0.205*** 
LOWIFRS  0.412 0.000 0.492  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.411*** 
LOWRULE  0.282 0.000 0.450  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.282*** 
LOWSUBSENGLISH  0.269 0.000 0.444  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.269*** 
LSUB  2.509 2.303 1.268  1.234 1.099 0.941  1.275*** 
LSUBGDP  10.453 10.692 0.663  10.867 10.867 0.000  -0.414*** 
LTA  4.705 4.462 2.224  3.267 3.112 1.801  1.438*** 
MB  2.408 1.505 3.214  2.281 1.377 3.495  0.127 
MINING  0.296 0.000 0.457  0.479 0.000 0.500  -0.183*** 
MNESPEC  0.266 0.000 0.442  0.270 0.000 0.444  -0.004 
MOPINION  0.193 0.000 0.395  0.254 0.000 0.435  -0.061*** 
OCFVOL  0.079 0.045 0.101  0.101 0.054 0.137  -0.022*** 
PAYTOVER_L  3.471 0.226 5.788  -2.803 0.000 6.484  6.274*** 
PERFORM  -0.051 0.031 0.329  -0.133 -0.046 0.423  0.082*** 
PPEGROWTH  1.517 0.047 8.808  1.884 0.050 10.239  -0.368 
PTCHANGE  0.230 0.000 0.421  0.210 0.000 0.407  0.020** 
QUICK  4.427 1.438 9.664  7.214 2.479 12.882  -2.788*** 
RECTOVER_L  8.009 5.232 16.217  15.802 4.805 42.194  -7.794*** 
SALESGROWTH  0.916 0.008 5.460  0.143 0.027 0.249  0.016 
SALESVOL  0.159 0.080 0.225  1.129 0.000 6.393  -0.213 
|TA|_L  0.151 0.061 0.444  0.193 0.084 0.354  -0.052*** 
a t-statistic clustered at the company level; *** two-tailed p<0.01, **two-tailed p<0.05, * two-tailed p<0.1, † p<0.2 (one-
tailed significance) 
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Appendix 2D: National Groups without Component Auditors (continued)  
Panel B: ISA 600 and audit outcomes for MNEs with Component Auditors and National Groups 
without Component Auditors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables |TA| |TA|   LAFEE 
            
COMPONENT% 0.0714**  0.0082   
 (0.031)  (0.006)   
COMPONENT%*ISA600 -0.018  -0.018   
 (0.037)  (0.007)   
COMPONENT25%  0.0300**  0.0020 0.1609*** 
  (0.012)  (0.002) (0.036) 
COMPONENT25%*ISA600  -0.0162  0.0006 -0.0318 
  (0.015)  (0.002) (0.038) 
COMPONENT 0.0014 0.0054 -0.0014 -0.0003 0.2540*** 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.002) (0.002) (0.050) 
COMPONENT*ISA600 0.0011 0.0073 0.0008 -0.0001 -0.0393 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002) (0.033) 
ISA600 -0.0656*** -0.0652*** -0.0048* -0.0048* -0.0215 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.003) (0.003) (0.065) 
      
Observations 5,123 5,123 5,123 5,123 5,123 
R-squared 0.395 0.395 0.061 0.060 0.895 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Subsidiary country FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO NO NO 
Interactions first-stage regressors YES YES YES YES NO 
Robust standard errors clustered at the client firm level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, † 
p<0.2 (one-tailed significance) 
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Chapter 3 – The Effect of National Inspection Regimes on Audit 
Quality5556 
 
 
Abstract: An international key reform aimed at improving audit quality has been the 
introduction of public oversight over the auditing profession by the various national public 
oversight bodies (POBs). The foundation of their strategy is inspections of audit firms. 
However, little is known about the impact of inspections on audit quality internationally. We 
examine the effect of POB inspections on audit quality, and explore the association of 
inspection characteristics and audit quality. Applying a difference-in-differences design 
exploiting the staggered inspection commencement for a large international sample over the 
period 2003-2012, we find that audit quality of listed clients increases after inspections 
commence, and is sustained in future years. We find a stronger effect for clients of Big 4 audit 
firms. Further, we find some evidence of cross-sectional variation in audit quality for 
differences in inspection characteristics. Overall, our study contributes to our knowledge about 
the impact of inspections on audit quality. 
 
  
 
55 This chapter is based on a working paper with Elizabeth Carson, Roger Simnett and Ann Vanstraelen. 
56 We thank Anna Huggins, Ashna Prasad, Shirley Tsau, Yang Xu and Lei Zou for research assistance, and 
Martijn Duffels (The Netherlands Authority for Financial Markets), Janine van Diggelen, (then Chairman of 
IFIAR), and Gary Pflugrath, (Director of Public Policy and Regulation at the International Federation of 
Accountants) for helping us gain access to the public oversight bodies (POBs) of the respective countries, as 
well as the various national POB representatives who responded to our data requests. A previous version of this 
paper was presented HEC Lausanne, the University of Auckland, University College Dublin, the University of 
Mannheim, UNSW Sydney, the University of Groningen, the Conference on Auditing and Capital Markets 
(PCAOB/JAR conference), the Annual Congress of the European Accounting Association, the European 
Auditing Research Network Symposium, the International Symposium on Audit Research, the Midyear 
Auditing Meeting of the American Accounting Association, the Accounting and Finance Association of 
Australia and New Zealand Conference, and the UTS Sydney Conference. We appreciate the comments of 
Christian Leuz, Stephan Hollander, Mathieu Mulders and Jeff Cohen, our discussants Neil Fargher, Nemit 
Shroff, Cassandra Estep, Tobias Svanström and Lasse Niemi, and other participants at these 
conferences/workshops. We further acknowledge the financial support of the Australian Research Council and 
the Maastricht University Peter Thijssen Fund.  
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3.1 Introduction 
In the last fifteen years, one of the key reforms directed at improving the quality of auditing 
has been the application of public oversight to the activities of the auditing profession. 
Internationally, several countries have developed independent national public oversight bodies 
(POBs) that oversee their national auditing profession, moving away from a non-public 
oversight system.57 These POBs are independent of the auditing profession and became 
responsible for audit regulatory functions in the public interest (International Forum of 
Independent Audit Regulators (IFIAR) [2018]; Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) [2018]). The U.S. was one of the front-runners in introducing public oversight of the 
auditing profession, and the PCAOB model of independent public oversight has formed the 
basis for many other national POBs that were installed in the following years (Harris [2009]). 
A key strategy and work effort of all national POBs is the implementation of a system 
of recurring inspections of audit firms that are undertaking audits of public interest entities 
(PIE) (IFIAR [2018]). While independent public oversight supported by a comprehensive audit 
firm inspection program is presented as a more effective way to ensure audit quality than other 
forms of regulation of the auditing profession, concerns have been raised about whether this is 
actually more effective at ensuring audit quality than other forms of regulation. These concerns 
include a trade-off between expertise and independence of public oversight, the incentives that 
POBs face, organization of inspections and the resulting effect on audit quality (e.g. DeFond 
[2010]). Given the significant amount of resources invested in public oversight, its effect on 
audit quality is an important empirical question.  
We also consider that the commencement of national inspection programs may not have 
a similar impact on all types of audit firms (and their clients). On the one hand, inspections 
may have a greater impact on Big 4 audit firms due to these firms’ heightened concerns over 
reputation and enforcement actions as well as the opportunities to transfer learning throughout 
their global networks, resulting in larger audit quality increases than for non-Big 4 firms. On 
 
57 A range of approaches were employed by countries prior to the installation of public oversight: self-regulation 
by the auditing profession as found in the U.S. (e.g. DeFond [2010]), Australia (Smith & Simnett [2005]), and EU 
countries including Denmark, France, Ireland, the Netherlands and the U.K. ; 
governmental oversight (e.g. in Finland )), and mixed systems, such as in Germany, 
. Certain countries did not have any type of oversight prior to the 
installation of public oversight (e.g. Austria, )). Depending on the oversight system, 
some countries had certain inspection systems in place, such as peer-reviews under a self-regulatory system. The 
existence of such prior systems of quality control, regardless of the type of system, would bias against us finding 
improvements in audit quality from such initiatives. 
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the other hand, inspections may not further increase audit quality for Big 4 firms due to their 
higher ex-ante audit quality if POBs strive for uniform standards of audit quality.  
We further identify that, while inspection programs are the key foundation of all 
national POBs’ strategies and work efforts, divergent approaches to the implementation of 
these inspection programs have developed. Specifically, we consider factors that are directly 
related to how inspections are conducted, whether and how results are disclosed and the 
potential consequences of deficient inspections. As these differences in inspection regimes may 
impact the effectiveness of inspections as a regulatory instrument, an analysis of the effect of 
inspections in an international setting and effect of different design choices on audit quality is 
warranted.  
Overall, we examine the effect of the commencement58 of national independent POB’s 
inspection programs on audit quality. We further examine whether the effect of commencement 
of inspections on audit quality differs between Big 4 compared to non-Big 4 firms. Lastly, we 
explore whether and how differences in organization of inspection regimes impact audit 
quality.  
As is common in international archival research, it is an empirical challenge to 
disentangle the effect of inspections on audit quality from other factors and events. To address 
this challenge, we use a generalized difference-in-differences specification that exploits the 
staggered commencement of inspections in various countries, and control for country and time 
fixed effects. In the absence of more direct measures of audit quality for a large international 
sample, we infer audit quality using common proxies of financial reporting quality for which 
data are available in an international setting, including the level of absolute abnormal and total 
accruals, working capital accruals, discretionary revenues, changes in accounts receivable, the 
incidence of small profits and timely loss recognition of audit firms’ client companies. We 
view our proxies as indicative of audit quality since audited financial statements are a joint 
product of clients and auditors (Antle & Nalebuff [1991]) and the ultimate goal of the auditor 
is to increase the reliability of financial reporting (DeFond & Zhang [2014]). This view is 
consistent with recent empirical evidence showing that commonly used financial reporting 
quality measures are correlated with audit process quality (Aobdia [2019]). 
Using this difference-in-differences specification, we investigate the effect of 
inspection commencement on audit quality for a sample of 157,370 listed clients from 50 
 
58 This study focuses on the commencement of inspections by POBs as opposed to the legal introduction of 
inspections.  
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countries for the period 2003-2012 (full sample), irrespective of whether they have commenced 
inspections prior to our sample period, commence inspections during our sample period or do 
not commence inspections, and for the subsample of 90,364 listed clients from 27 countries 
that commence inspections between 2004-2011 (inspection commencement sample). We find 
that, for both the full sample and the inspection commencement sample, measures of earnings 
management (absolute abnormal, total and working capital accruals) and revenue management 
(discretionary revenues, changes in accounts receivables) significantly decrease for clients 
whose audit firms are subject to national inspection programs compared to clients of audit firms 
that are not subject to inspections. For both samples, we also find that clients of audit firms 
which are subject to inspections by national POBs are associated with more timely loss 
recognition, compared to clients of audit firms which are not, while we do not find an effect of 
inspection commencement on earnings management around the zero earnings threshold. We 
also find that the effect of inspection commencement on audit quality, for our measures of 
accruals and revenue management and small profits, is more pronounced for clients of Big 4 
audit firms compared to clients of non-Big 4 audit firms. Further, we find little evidence of an 
anticipatory effect of inspections and show that the positive effect of inspections on audit 
quality is sustained over time. We also find some support for a differential effect of inspections 
on audit quality, conditional on inspection regime choices by the POB for the inspection 
commencement sample, in particular with regard to inspection disclosure. Our overall results 
are largely consistent across a number of additional and sensitivity analyses and controlling for 
concurrent events that may affect our measures of audit quality. 
Overall, our findings contribute to the emerging literature on the benefits of public 
oversight of the auditing profession and audit firm inspection programs by providing evidence 
on the audit quality effects of inspections conducted by national POBs and the characteristics 
of inspections associated with audit quality improvements. We thus extend the literature on the 
audit quality effects of PCAOB inspections and other national inspection regimes to a larger 
international setting. Our analyses also shed light on audit quality and reputation incentives for 
audit firms arising from public oversight, in settings other than the U.S. Our insights may also 
prove useful for POBs and regulators across the world in their ongoing discussions and 
decisions regarding mutual recognition of public oversight across countries.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we provide the 
relevant background for the study and formulate the hypotheses that we test. In Section 3.3, we 
describe the data, descriptive statistics and research design. In Section 3.4, we present the 
results of the study and we conclude in Section 3.5.  
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3.2 Background and hypotheses development 
In the last fifteen years we have witnessed a significant shift in audit regulation and 
institutions, through the introduction of public oversight and the commencement of inspections 
of audit firms. In many countries, POBs were newly created, or existing institutions were given 
additional responsibility, to replace self-regulation by the audit profession or other existing 
forms of oversight, as discussed in footnote 57. The commonality of these POBs is that they 
are (1) independent of the auditing profession, and (2) engaged in audit regulatory functions in 
the public interest (as defined by IFIAR [2018]). Inspections of audit firms are the main 
approach employed by POBs for identifying and improving deficiencies in audit quality and 
driving improvements in the audit process. Although considerable resources go into these 
national inspection regimes, very little is known about their effect on audit quality, except for 
studies on the impact of PCAOB inspections in the U.S. and PCAOB inspections 
internationally, which we outline further below.  
From a theoretical view, regulatory oversight through mechanisms such as inspections 
by POBs can provide investors with confidence that audits meet a minimum level of quality 
standards and independence requirements (Landes & Posner [1975]; Polinsky [1980]; Coates 
[2007]; Aobdia & Shroff [2017]), thereby mitigating agency conflicts inherent in auditing 
(Watts & Zimmerman [1980]). Studies on POBs, in particular the PCAOB, have further argued 
that an independent inspection process may be superior to a peer review system by way of 
greater independence, objectivity, and availability of resources (e.g., Carcello et al. [2011]; 
Gunny & Zhang [2013]). Further, stricter standards and larger penalties could be expected to 
provide stronger incentives to improve audit quality (DeFond [2010]). However, a public 
regulator may not be effective in fulfilling its task of ensuring that audits are of quality if it is 
not competent to undertake such inspections, has the wrong incentives or acts under regulatory 
capture (Stigler [1971]; Mahoney [2001]). The PCAOB was criticized early in its existence for 
using staff with limited expertise, inadequate transparency of procedures and inspection 
outcomes, slow feedback (e.g., Glover et al. [2009]), and the use of risk-based inspection 
sampling which may result in inspection findings that are not representative for the entire client 
portfolio of an audit firm (e.g., Church & Shefchik [2012]; Peecher et al. [2013]). Thus, the 
benefits of public oversight and its effect on audit quality are not uncontested. 
Empirical research on PCAOB inspections in the U.S. shows that inspection results can 
discriminate between various levels of audit quality (e.g., Gunny & Zhang [2013]) and there is 
support for a positive effect of inspections on audit quality (e.g., Carcello et al. [2011], DeFond 
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& Lennox [2017]). PCAOB inspections also increase the reporting credibility and trust 
investors place in the financial reporting of clients of inspected audit firms (Gipper et al. 
[2017]). Research has also been conducted on the informational value of PCAOB inspection 
reports or sanctions (e.g., Dee et al. [2011]) and the impact of inspection reports on hiring and 
firing of audit firms (e.g., Lennox & Pittman [2010]; Abbott et al. [2013]).  
With regard to international considerations, the impact of the international reach and 
inspections of non-U.S. audit firms by the PCAOB on audit quality, including spillover effects 
to domestic clients of these non-U.S. audit firms, has recently become a topic of research (e.g. 
Lamoreaux [2016]; Fung et al. [2017]; Krishnan et al. [2017]; Aobdia & Shroff [2017]; Shroff 
[2017]). This research consistently finds that international access by the PCAOB and 
international inspections conducted by the PCAOB are positively associated with audit quality, 
and also appear to lead to real economic effects for audit firms and their clients (Aobdia & 
Shroff [2017], Shroff [2017]). Research on other POBs is limited but finds some support for 
the ability of inspections to discriminate audit quality in the Netherlands (van Opijnen et al. 
[2016]) and in Spain (Fuentes et al. [2015]). Florou & Shuai [2017] also find some evidence 
of audit quality varying with inspection regime characteristics in Europe. However, inferences 
from these studies may not be generalizable to other POB inspections and settings (Aobdia & 
Shroff [2017]) or to international settings in general, which is the aim of this study. In 
particular, we investigate in an international setting the impact of commencement of 
inspections on audit quality and whether this effect differs between Big 4 compared to non-Big 
4 audit firms, and also explore the association of inspection characteristics and audit quality. 
The differences in the timing of the commencement of inspections across the various 
countries (see Table 2) provides a setting to address our research questions. Even though there 
is a debate around whether inspections by POBs are effective at improving audit quality, we 
expect that the commencement of regular inspections by independent POBs affects audit 
quality in these countries for the following reasons.59 First, the inspection process can provide 
important incentives to audit firms for improving their engagement quality and firm-wide 
quality control systems in order to avoid reputational losses if audit quality deficiencies are 
detected. Reputational concerns may play a significant role in incentivizing audit firms to 
provide quality audits, especially in countries with low legal liability for auditors (e.g. Weber 
et al. [2008]; Skinner & Srinivasan [2012]). Second, audit firms may have concerns about 
 
59 We argue that it is the commencement of the inspection regime per se, not only the execution of inspections at 
specific audit firms, that is of importance in improving audit quality, as it is from this time that there will be 
interactions between the POB and audit firms. 
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enforcement actions and sanctions, and the consequences thereof, should audit quality 
deficiencies be detected, and may therefore improve audit quality (e.g. Dee et al. [2011]). 
Third, regular inspections are designed to detect deficiencies in audit quality, and the 
communication of these deficiencies to audit firms can lead to a learning and feedback effect, 
ultimately resulting in better audit quality. Fourth, as discussed above, there is evidence, mainly 
relating to the U.S. and the international reach of the PCAOB, that public oversight and 
inspections impact audit quality. Hence, while we acknowledge the criticisms of independent 
inspection regimes, we expect that audit quality increases for clients of audit firms that become 
subject to independent inspections by national POBs. We therefore hypothesize that: 
H1: Audit quality increases for clients of audit firms that become subject to inspections 
by national POBs.  
We further examine whether inspection commencement has a differential effect on Big 
4 audit firms. On the one hand, it can be argued that Big 4 audit firms that deliver higher audit 
quality ex-ante may be affected less by or react less to the commencement of inspections than 
non-Big 4 firms with lower ex-ante audit quality (DeAngelo [1981]). In this regard, POBs may 
focus their resources more on those audit firms for which they expect low ex-ante audit quality 
when conducting their inspections, resulting in a larger effect on audit quality for non-Big 4 
firms. Overall, it can be expected that POBs strive to achieve uniformly high audit quality 
across all audit firms that fall under their responsibility, regardless of their size.  
On the other hand, Big 4 audit firms and their clients may respond more to the 
commencement of inspections through POBs than non-Big 4 firms. Public oversight and 
inspections focus on areas of risk, which are more likely to occur in larger and more complex 
clients, of which Big 4 audit firms typically audit a larger market share. Big 4 audit firms and 
their clients may also be more concerned about potential consequences from inspections, 
including adverse reputational effects, and any resulting regulatory actions and legal penalties. 
Further, individual Big 4 audit firms communicate the findings of inspection processes into 
their network-wide quality review processes (IFIAR [2018]), leading to greater feedback and 
learning effects from the inspection process for Big 4 audit firms compared to non-Big 4 audit 
firms. This may result in Big 4 audit firms demonstrating a larger reaction to the 
commencement of inspections in terms of audit quality changes. 
Given these competing arguments, we formulate the following null hypothesis: 
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H2: There is no difference in the increase in audit quality for the clients of Big 4 versus 
non-Big 4 audit firms that become subject to inspections by national POBs. 
In addition to the two main hypotheses, we examine whether there is an association 
between choices made by national POBs in the design of inspection processes and audit quality. 
In this regard, we consider factors that are directly related to how inspections are conducted, 
whether and how results are disclosed and the potential consequences of deficient inspections. 
Specifically, we analyze the association of (1) the characteristics of the inspection regime, 
including the type of oversight (direct oversight, through oversight of the professional body or 
a combination) and the frequency of inspection; (2) the disclosure decisions made by POBs, 
including whether inspection results are disclosed and the type of disclosure of inspection 
results (individual inspection reports per audit firm or an aggregate report); and (3) the ability 
of the POB to impose sanctions on audit firms based on inspection results (enforcement ability) 
with our measures of audit quality. Arguments can be made as to how each inspection 
characteristic can be positively or negatively associated with, or unrelated to, audit quality. 
Further, it is difficult to determine ex-ante the relative influence of individual inspection 
characteristics. We therefore do not formally hypothesize the relationship between these 
inspection characteristics and audit quality and provide this as exploratory analyses. 
3.3 Data, descriptive statistics, and research design 
3.3.1 SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTION 
Our sample period relates to the period 2003-2012. We choose 2003 as the starting year 
of our sample since this was the year when the PCAOB started conducting inspections 
following the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. It was also the commencement of 
a period of extensive discussion on the benefits and costs of audit firm oversight both in the 
U.S. and internationally. To examine the effect of audit firm inspections by POBs, we consider 
a 10-year period from this starting year until 2012 during which many countries installed POBs. 
Further, this sample period includes observations in years before and after most countries that 
chose to adopt a public oversight system during the sample period 2003-2012 initiated 
inspections.60  
We use the Worldscope database to collect financial data for the listed companies of 
the countries in our sample. We started with all countries available in Worldscope and checked 
 
60 The year 2012 is an appropriate final year as those countries that had not installed a POB that conducts 
independent inspections by the end of our sample period had not done so by the end of 2017, except for Pakistan 
that installed a POB during 2016.  
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the number of observations for which four key data items (total assets, sales, net income and 
operating income) were available in  2012, the last year of our sample period. Countries with 
more than 50 listed company observations for these 4 items in 2012 were retained in the initial 
sample, which resulted in a sample of 53 countries.  
As outlined in Table 1, from our initial sample of listed companies in these 53 countries, 
we next exclude all financial institutions and utilities, consistent with prior literature (Francis 
& Michas 2013). We further eliminate observations with insufficient financial data for the 
independent variables required for our models (as described in the next section and in Appendix 
3A of this chapter). To calculate the dependent variables for our models, we eliminate 
observations from countries with less than 100 observations and then eliminate observations 
with insufficient data to enable the calculation of abnormal accruals and discretionary revenues 
(Appendix 3A of this chapter)61. Finally, the 26 observations pertaining to clients of Arthur 
Andersen in 2003 are eliminated. The final dataset contains listed companies from 50 countries, 
of which 36 are conducting inspections by the end of 2012. Of these 36 countries, 27 
commenced inspections between 2004-2011 (inspection commencement sample) which allows 
us to observe a change in the inspection variable within these countries. The final full sample 
is an unbalanced panel with 24,913 unique clients over the years 2003-2012, a total of 157,370 
client-year observations.62 The sample of firms commencing inspections between 2004-2011 
results in a total of 90,364 client-year observations. 
TABLE 1 
Sample selection 
 Number of Observations 
Client-year observations in Worldscope 2003-2012 (53 countries) 281,833 
Less:   
Clients with SIC Codes between 6000-6999 and 4400-4999 (33,737) 
Missing financial variables (74,598) 
Countries with less than 100 observations  (80) 
Observations lost due to calculation of independent variables and 
countries with less than 100 observations (3 countries) 
(16,102) 
Observations audited by Arthur Andersen in 2003 (26) 
Full sample (50 countries) 157,370 
Inspection commencement sample (27 countries) 90,364 
  
 
61 We lose observations due to the truncation of variables for the models in Appendix 3A of this chapter at the 1st 
and 99th percentile for each country-year, following Francis & Michas [2013]. This eliminates extreme 
observations in our diverse dataset of international firms. 
62 While our sample period is 2003-2012, we also collect data for 2002 and 2001 for the calculation of some 
variables (see Appendix 3A of this chapter) 
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To gather information on the inspection commencement dates and other characteristics 
of each of the POBs in our sample, we consult the country profile documentation available on 
the IFAC website, the IFIAR website, the World Bank website, and the official websites of the 
POBs. For the 50 countries in the final sample, we did not identify POBs63 from publicly 
available sources for 14 countries. For the 36 countries for which we identified a POB, we 
collected information on the commencement of inspections and other inspection characteristics 
from publicly available data from the above-mentioned websites (as indicated under column 
titled Sources in Table 2 or the related footnotes). To corroborate the information from publicly 
available sources, we surveyed64 most POBs in the sample65, to confirm the commencement 
date of inspections and the information on inspection characteristics. We received responses 
from all countries that were successfully contacted. 
By examining the responses from these sources, we can establish the date of inspection 
commencement, the frequency and type of inspection system, as well as information on 
inspection disclosure and enforcement ability of the POBs in each country. This information is 
documented in Table 2 which provides an overview of the year in which inspections by 
independent POBs commenced, details of the inspection characteristics and year of mandatory 
IFRS adoption.66 
3.3.2 EMPIRICAL MODELS 
3.3.2.1 Measures of audit quality 
To test our hypotheses, we infer audit quality using common proxies of financial 
reporting quality for which we have data consistently available for all countries in our 
international sample. Our proxies are 1) absolute (abnormal) accruals, 2) absolute working 
capital accruals, 3) absolute discretionary revenues, 4) changes in accounts receivable, 5) the 
incidence of small profits and 6) timely loss recognition.67 We recognize that these measures 
are measures of financial reporting quality and may not be direct proxies for audit quality since 
pre-audited financial statements are not observable. Nevertheless, audited financial statements 
are a joint product of clients and auditors (Antle & Nalebuff [1991]) and the ultimate goal of 
 
63 Note that we adopt IFIAR’s definition of POBs, outlined in Section 3.2 of this study. 
64 The initial survey was sent out in the summer of 2015, and a follow-up survey was carried out in spring of 2016. 
65 We were unable to successfully contact the POBs of the Philippines, Romania and Russia and as a result, rely 
on publicly available sources to identify the inspection start date and other inspection characteristics. Because 
certain POB characteristics could not be identified for these countries based on publicly available sources, we 
exclude observations from these countries in the analyses of the POB and inspection characteristics. 
66 In our analyses, we control for mandatory IFRS adoption which is a concurrent event that may affect audit 
quality 
67 For details on data definitions and models, see Appendix 3A of this chapter.  
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the auditor is to increase the reliability of financial reporting (DeFond & Zhang [2014]). 
Further, Aobdia [2019] shows that commonly used financial reporting quality measures are 
correlated with audit process quality, measured as PCAOB inspection findings, in the U.S. 
setting. Hence, given the lack of availability of more direct measures of audit quality for a large 
international sample68, we view our proxies as indicative of audit quality.  
First, and as a benchmark for findings in prior literature, we consider reduced 
managerial discretion resulting in lower absolute abnormal accruals, all other things being 
equal. We measure absolute abnormal accruals (|ATA|) as the absolute values of the residuals 
of the performance-adjusted cross-sectional modified Jones model (Jones [1991]; Dechow et 
al. [1995]; Kothari et al. [2005]) which we estimate for each industry-year including country 
fixed effects. This model has also been widely used in the international auditing literature to 
infer audit quality (e.g., Kwon et al. [2007]; Francis et al. [2013]). Chen et al. [2018] show that 
when using a two-step model and explanatory variables are correlated, coefficients and 
standard errors may be biased. In line with the suggestion in Chen et al. [2018], and as 
implemented in Gipper et al. [2017] and Godsell et al. [2017], we therefore estimate a model 
that regresses the absolute value of total accruals (|TA|) on all regressors of the performance-
adjusted Jones model (in Appendix 3A of this chapter) and all regressors of our model of 
interest (equation [1] below), include a set of interaction variables between the Jones model 
regressors and industry and year fixed effects, and include country fixed effects.  
As an alternative measure for absolute (abnormal) accruals, we use abnormal working 
capital accruals based on the expectation model in DeFond & Park [2001]. A common 
argument in the literature is that working capital accruals are more susceptible to manipulation 
than non-working capital accruals (e.g., DeFond & Jiambalvo [1994]; Teoh et al. [1998]). 
Further, this measure is less sensitive to estimation issues that arise due to data limitations in 
the international setting when modelling normal accruals. We calculate abnormal working 
capital accruals (|AWCA|) as realized working capital minus expected working capital, where 
expected working capital is assumed to be a fixed proportion of sales (Dechow et al. [1998]; 
DeFond & Park [2001]).  
We further supplement the accrual-based measures of audit quality with a measure of 
revenue manipulation based on McNichols & Stubben [2008] and Stubben [2010]. This 
 
68 More direct measures of audit fees and auditor reporting are not readily discernable in Worldscope or are subject 
to large measurement error. For example, audit fees might be reported excluding or including non-audit fees and 
the type of modified audit opinion cannot be readily identified. Further, Worldscope only indicates whether the 
auditor’s opinion is qualified or unqualified (which groups together all types of modifications and does not allow 
for the separate identification of going concern opinions, see Fan & Wong [2004]). 
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measure of discretionary revenues has been used in an international setting (Chen et al. [2011]) 
and as a proxy for audit quality (Minutti-Meza [2013]), and has been found to be less prone to 
measurement bias and more powerful at detecting earnings management than accruals models 
(Stubben [2010]). We calculate discretionary revenues (|DR|) as the absolute value of the 
residuals from regressing the change in accounts receivables on the change in revenues for each 
industry-year and include country fixed effects. Since the calculation of discretionary revenues 
relies on a two-step procedure which can result in biased coefficients and standard errors (Chen 
et al. [2018]), we also estimate a model that regresses the absolute value of the change in 
accounts receivables (| |) on the change in revenue and all regressors of our model of 
interest (equation [1] below) and include a set of interaction variables between the change in 
revenue and industry and year fixed effects, and include country fixed effects.  
As an additional audit quality measure, we use the incidence of small profits. Prior 
literature looking at earnings distributions around benchmarks has interpreted the incidence of 
small profits as evidence of income-increasing earnings management to meet or beat the zero-
earnings benchmark and avoid losses (e.g. Burgstahler & Dichev [1997]). We suggest that 
auditors’ incentives to constrain earnings management to meet or beat the zero-earnings 
benchmark is higher when audit firms are inspected by POBs. We define small profits as profits 
that fall between 0 and 1% of ROA, consistent with Gul et al. [2013].69  
Lastly, we test our hypotheses with a model of timely loss recognition (TLR). The speed 
with which economic losses are recognized is a function of managerial and auditor incentives, 
as well as institutional factors (e.g. Ball et al. [2003]). We thus test whether auditor’s incentives 
to require clients to report more conditionally conservatively increases when audit firms are 
inspected by POBs. We rely on a model which recognizes the asymmetric relationship between 
accruals and client performance for economic gains and losses (Ball & Shivakumar [2005]). It 
is expected that economic losses are captured by accruals in a more timely manner than gains. 
We choose this measure as a measure of TLR for our international study, since the Basu [1997] 
measure which regresses earnings on stock returns might induce measurement bias in cross-
country studies (Holthausen [2003]). 
 
 
 
69 Prior literature uses various cutoff values of ROA to define small profits. Gul et al. [2013] define small profits 
as ROA between 0 and 1%. Frankel et al. [2002], Ashbaugh et al. [2003] and Carey & Simnett [2006] define small 
profits as ROA between 0 and 2%. Francis & Yu [2009] define small profits as ROA between 0 and 5%. We 
choose a conservative cutoff value of 1% as in Gul et al. [2013], but also report results with a higher cutoff value 
of 2%. 
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3.3.2.2 Empirical models for testing the hypotheses 
Our empirical design uses a difference-in-differences methodology which exploits the 
fact that there are differences in the timing of the commencement of inspections by national 
POBs. Every untreated client at a point in time acts as a control for a treated client in the same 
time period. That is, we compare the difference in audit quality before and after the 
commencement of inspections for clients in countries that commence inspections to the same 
difference for clients in countries that do not commence inspections. Since our full sample also 
includes clients in countries that had commenced inspections prior to the start of our sample 
period, we also show results for the subsample of countries for which we can observe audit 
quality pre and post inspection commencement (i.e. those countries commencing inspections 
between 2004 and 2011).  
In our main specification, we use inspections as treatments and include country and 
year fixed effects, in addition to various client-level control variables.70 We expect audit firms 
which become subject to inspections by POBs to improve the quality of their audits. The 
identification of the effect of inspection commencement on audit quality hinges on the 
assumptions underlying the difference-in-differences methodology, including exogeneity of 
the treatment and parallel trends in audit quality of the control and treatment group absent 
inspection commencement.71 We implement a test for the parallel trends assumption by 
including a contemporaneous treatment plus lags and leads of the treatment in our models 
(Autor [2003]; Atanasov & Black [2016]).  
To test our hypotheses, we use the following model, where standard errors are clustered 
at audit client level72 and we use OLS for the accrual quality and discretionary revenue 
analyses73, and probit for the small profit analyses: 
 
70 We do not include various country-level factors that have been shown to explain variation in financial reporting 
quality (e.g. Rule of Law, Financial Development, as in Francis et al. [2013]) since including country fixed effects 
subsumes these variables, which have little variation across time.  
71 As discussed in the limitations section, we acknowledge that the commencement of inspections may not be 
exogenous, since the introduction of POBs and inspections may be a result of low audit quality, inducing a 
simultaneity bias. Further, the assignment of the treatment to countries is likely not random.  
72 We cluster standard errors by audit client to adjust for correlation of observations for one client across years. 
Whilst the variable of interest is at the country level and clients within a country are jointly assigned to the 
treatment, we argue that not all clients in a country may be treated equally by the commencement of inspections 
(for example, the treatment effect may differ by audit firm type). Further, as not all audit firms may be inspected 
directly upon commencement of inspections, the use of clustering at country level may not be appropriate in this 
setting. Nevertheless, we discuss results when clustering standard errors at the country level in sensitivity analyses. 
73 In sensitivity analyses (not tabulated), we use tobit analyses instead of OLS for the discretionary accruals, total 
accruals, working capital accruals and discretionary revenue analyses, since these proxies are measured in absolute 
values and are thus left-censored. Inferences from equation [1] remain the same when using tobit, instead of OLS 
for these audit quality proxies.  
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[1] 
Where |ATAi,t| is the absolute value of performance-adjusted abnormal total accruals 
measured by the modified Jones model; |TAi,t| is the absolute value of total accruals in year t74; 
|AWCAi,t| is the absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals; |DRi,t| is the absolute 
value of discretionary revenues; | ARi,t| is the absolute value of the change in accounts 
receivable; SmallProfiti,t is an indicator variable if ROA is between 0 and 1% (or 0 and 2%). 
The dependent variables are defined in Appendix 3A of this chapter. 
The variable of interest for testing Hypothesis 1 is Inspectioni,t, which is an indicator 
variable taking the value of 1 when the observation relates to a country and year where 
independent inspections are taking place.75 We hypothesize that inspections improve audit 
quality and thus expect a negative coefficient for . Big4i,t is an indicator variable equal to one 
when the client-year observation is audited by a Big 4 audit firm.76 We expect that Big 4 audit 
firms provide higher audit quality and thus predict a negative coefficient for . To investigate 
Hypothesis 2, we add interaction terms between all variables in the model and Big4i,t.. The 
interaction between Inspectioni,t and Big4i,t is our variable of interest for Hypothesis 2 and 
allows us to test whether inspections have a differential impact on the audit quality of clients 
of Big 4 compared to non-Big 4 audit firms. 
We include the following control variables in equation (1). We add the variable IFRSi,t 
which is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the client-year observation is subject to 
mandatory IFRS accounting standards77, to control for the potential confounding event of the 
 
74 As discussed above, in line with Chen et al. [2017] we regress total accruals on all regressors of equation [1] 
and all regressors of the performance-adjusted Jones model (Appendix 3A of this chapter) and include a set of 
interaction variables between the Jones model regressors and industry, year and country fixed effects. 
75 We are aware that the unit of analysis is the inspection regime level, while equation [1] is conducted at the firm-
level, which may overweight large countries in the sample. We address this concern in sensitivity analyses using 
hierarchical linear modelling and checking for robustness when excluding the largest countries from the sample. 
76 Note that the Worldscope database reports the auditor name as a current variable, thus overwriting historical 
auditor data. To address this limitation, we also collect historical auditor data for the fiscal year 2003 from the 
Orbis database by Bureau van Dijk. If the auditor is the same in the 2003 Orbis database and the 2012 Worldscope 
database, it is assumed that no auditor change has taken place. For those firms with changes in auditors, we identify 
when the auditor switch has taken place using the historical files of the Orbis database. In total, we are able to 
confirm 53% of the Big 4/non-Big 4 observations (83,548 client-year observations) using the Orbis database, of 
which 93.3% are coded the same as in the Worldscope database. Results based on the Orbis-based auditor variable 
are consistent with the main results except for the main effect of Inspection becoming insignificant in the 
interaction model with Big4 for the measures |ATA| and |TA|. 
 77 We expect a positive coefficient . Ahmed et al. [2013] and Capkun et al. [2016] argue that IFRS provides 
substantially greater flexibility and discretion in accounting to companies compared to local GAAPs, leading to 
an increase in earnings management after its mandatory adoption.  
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adoption of international financial reporting standards (IFRS). As client-level controls, we 
include the following covariates: Sizei,t is the natural logarithm of total assets; CFOi,t is the 
operating cash flow scaled by total assets; Growthi,t is the percentage of year-to-year growth in 
sales; Lossi,t is an indicator variable for a loss in the current year; MBi,t is a company’s market 
value of equity scaled by book value of equity; PPE Growthi,t is a company’s one year growth 
in gross property, plant and equipment from year t-1 to year t; Leveragei,t is the ratio of long-
term debt to total assets; Sales Voli,t is the standard deviation of a company’s sales from year t-
2 through year t; CFO Voli,t is the standard deviation of cash flow from operations from year t-
2 through year t; Lagged TAi,t is total accruals lagged by one year; GDP_annualgrowthi,t is the 
national GDP growth as a percentage; Country is a vector of country indicator variables; 
Industry (2-digit SIC code) is a vector of industry indicator variables and Year is a vector of 
year indicator variables78. 
To investigate the effect of inspections on timely loss recognition, we adopt the 
following model (equation [2]) used in Francis et al. [2013] which is based on Ball & 
Shivakumar [2005] and Bushman & Piotroski [2006]:  
 , = + , + , + , , + ,
+ , , + ,
+ , , ,
+  ,  
+   , ( , / , )
+  , , ,
+ / /   +  
[2] 
Where TAi,t are total accruals calculated as net income before extraordinary items less 
cash flow from operations, scaled by lagged total assets; NegCFOi,t is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if cash flow from operations is negative and zero otherwise; CFOi,t is cash flow from 
operations scaled by lagged total assets. The main variable of interest is Inspectioni,t, which is 
an indicator variable taking the value of 1 when the observation relates to a country and year 
where independent inspections are taking place. As client-level controls, we include Salesi,t, 
MBi,t and Leveragei,t, (Francis et al. [2013]) where MBi,t and Leveragei,t are defined above and 
Salesi,t is the natural logarithm of sales in year t. We further include IFRSi,t if a client-year 
 
78 All continuous dependent and independent variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
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observation is subject to mandatory IFRS reporting. Consistent with Francis et al. [2013], Rule 
of Lawi,t is sourced from the World Bank database and included in this analysis to allow timely 
loss recognition to differ between countries with different governance quality.79 We include 
two-way interactions between IFRSi,t, Salesi,t, MBi,t, Leveragei,t and Rule of Lawi,t and 
NegCFOi,t (CFOi,t) respectively and three-way interactions between IFRSi,t, Salesi,t, MBi,t, 
Leveragei,t and Rule of Lawi,t and NegCFOi,t and CFOi,t. We further include country, industry 
and year fixed effects and cluster standard errors at client level. 
A positive coefficient for the interaction between NegCFOi,t and CFOi,t ( ) indicates 
timely loss recognition. The coefficient of interest for testing Hypothesis 1 is the three-way 
interaction between NegCFOi,t, CFOi,t and Inspectioni,t, since we predict that economic losses 
are recognized faster in accruals than economic gains. We therefore expect that the coefficient 
 is incrementally significant to  and positive. To investigate Hypothesis 2 on the interaction 
effect between Inspectioni,t and Big4i,t, we include a four-way interaction term between these 
variables and NegCFOi,t and CFOi,t. A signficiantly positive (negative) coefficient for this four-
way interaction would indicate higher (lower) timely loss recognition for clients of Big 4 audit 
firms after inspection commencement, compared to clients of non-Big4 firms after inspection 
commencement.  
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 2 presents the 50 countries included in the sample and the public oversight 
features. At the end of the sample period (2012), 36 of the 50 countries in our sample (85.81% 
of all observations) had commenced inspections and 27 countries have observations pre- and 
post-inspection commencement (inspection commencement sample). Table 280 further 
demonstrates that within the group of countries with a public oversight system in place, there 
is considerable variation in the organization of public oversight. There is variation in the type 
of inspection system that is in place, where inspections can be directly performed by a POB 
(20 countries), through oversight of the national professional accountancy body (7 countries), 
or through a combination of these systems (3 countries) where audit firms are inspected by 
both a POB and by the national professional accountancy body with oversight of the POB. Five 
79 Note that including interaction effects between NegCFO, CFO and country indicators is infeasible for 
estimation purposes. 
80 We are unable to confirm certain information on inspection characteristics for Romania, Russia and the 
Philippines. We therefore exclude these countries from the analyses of public oversight and inspection 
characteristics. Hence, the number of countries mentioned in this paragraph on POBs and inspection 
characteristics may not add to 36.  
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countries switch from through oversight (of the national professional accountancy body) to 
direct inspections and 1 country switches from combination to direct during the sample period. 
The frequency of inspections varies from no set period (“on demand” (Brazil) or “no provision” 
(Indonesia)), to 3 years for PIE audit firms (which is the minimum requirement for EU 
countries) up to annually for large audit firms (Canada, France, Germany, Switzerland, 
Thailand, U.K. and U.S.). Sixteen POBs conduct more frequent inspections for large audit 
firms than for small audit firms.81 POBs also differ in terms of whether and how inspection 
results are disclosed. Thirty POBs publicly disclose the inspection results, of which 5 POBs 
(Norway, Russia, Sweden, U.K., U.S.) disclose inspection results for each audit firm 
individually, while 25 POBs disclose an aggregate report of the findings across audit firms. 
Lastly, POBs differ in their enforcement ability, where 24 POBs can impose sanctions directly, 
while 3 hold oversight over the enforcement process of the national professional accountancy 
body, 3 POBs have a combination of direct enforcement and enforcement through oversight, 
and 5 do not hold responsibility for enforcement over the audit function.82 Overall, POBs vary 
substantially in their organization of the inspection process, disclosure of inspection results and 
in their enforcement rights. 
  
 
81 The definition of large and small audit firms depends on the jurisdiction, where certain jurisdictions define large 
audit firms as those with more than a certain number of issuers under audit (e.g. U.S., Germany), and others make 
the distinction based on audit firm’s size (e.g. Big 4 in Australia, Big 6 in France).  
82 In cases where the POB is not involved in or does not oversee enforcement over the audit function, the 
responsibility often resides with the legislative system of a country which may act based on findings or 
recommendations of the POB or the profession. 
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Table 3 presents, for our full sample, the descriptive statistics of the dependent and 
control variables, the variables of interest, the distribution across industries and years, and the 
dependent variables and inspection percentage by country. Table 3, Panel A, shows that the 
mean (median) absolute value of abnormal total accruals is 0.059 (0.039). For the absolute 
value of abnormal working capital accruals, the mean (median) absolute value is 0.066 (0.036). 
The mean (median) absolute value of discretionary revenues is 0.037 (0.023) and the mean 
(median) value of total accruals scaled by lagged total assets is -0.046 (-0.036). These values 
are close to those reported in prior literature (Chen et al. [2011]; Ahmed et al. [2013]; Francis 
et al. [2013]). 
Table 3, Panel B shows, for observations in countries that commence inspections 
between 2004 and 2011, descriptive statistics for client-year observations subject to inspections 
(Inspection=1) and not subject to inspections (Inspection=0) and a t-test of the mean difference. 
As expected, the mean of all dependent variables is significantly lower for those observations 
subject to inspections, compared to those not subject to inspections. We also find significant 
differences for most control variables, showing that client-year observations subject to 
inspections are larger in size (total assets), have higher market to book value, but lower cash 
flow performance and score higher on rule of law, compared to client-year observations not 
subject to inspections. 
Table 3, Panel C, shows that the majority of the observations (58.04%) relate to the 
manufacturing industry (SIC 2-3), followed by 15.83% in the services industry (SIC 7-8), and 
12.01% in the mining industry (SIC 1). It also shows that there has been an increase in the 
number of observations per year (except for 2012) with the sample composition ranging from 
6.67% in 2003 to 12.50% in 2011. 
Table 3, Panel D, outlines the number of observations, dependent variables and 
inspection percentage per country for each of the 50 countries included in the full sample (in 
total, 157,370 client-year observations). The most highly represented countries in the sample 
in terms of number of observations are Japan (24,241 15.40% of sample) and the U.S. (24,759 
15.73% of sample). All other countries individually represent less than 10% of the total 
sample.117 Besides the number of observations and percentage of observations per country, 
Table 3, Panel D, shows the mean dependent variables for the models in equations [1] and [2] 
for each country. This gives a better understanding of the size of the average dependent 
117 In sensitivity analyses we address the unequal number of observations across countries by running our analyses 
excluding the two largest countries in terms of observations, U.S. and Japan. 
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variables per country and allows for comparisons of the average dependent variables with 
averages in single-country studies.  
TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for dependent and control variables for the total sample in the period 2003-2012 
(n=157,370)118 
Continuous variables 
Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev.  Min 
25th 
percentile 
75th 
percentile Max 
|ATA| 157,370 0.059 0.039 0.062 0.000 0.016 0.079 0.304 
|TA| 157,370 0.075 0.052 0.080 0.000 0.024 0.097 0.533 
|AWCA| 157,370 0.066 0.036 0.096 0.000 0.015 0.076 0.707 
|DR| 157,370 0.037 0.023 0.041 0.000 0.009 0.050 0.211 
 157,370 0.048 0.027 0.065 0.000 0.010 0.060 0.756 
TA 157,370 -0.046 -0.036 0.144 -1.093 -0.084 0.010 0.445 
Size 157,370 11.981 11.939 1.922 7.177 10.732 13.209 16.669 
CFO 157,370 0.045 0.060 0.155 -0.734 0.001 0.120 0.390 
Growth 157,370 0.150 0.073 0.468 -0.680 -0.037 0.219 3.196 
MB 157,370 2.017 1.310 2.742 -5.420 0.720 2.410 17.650 
PPE Growth 157,370 0.126 0.051 0.340 -0.620 0.002 0.160 2.140 
Leverage 157,370 0.118 0.054 0.158 0.000 0.000 0.179 0.798 
Sales Vol 157,370 0.123 0.079 0.136 0.003 0.039 0.153 0.810 
CFO Vol 157,370 0.057 0.036 0.070 0.003 0.020 0.066 0.484 
Lagged TA 157,370 -0.046 -0.035 0.152 -0.874 -0.084 0.011 0.415 
Sales 157,370 11.680 11.794 2.296 4.382 10.454 13.141 16.642 
GDP annual growth 157,370 3.869 3.068 4.073 -14.800 1.607 6.465 15.240 
Rule of Law 157,370 0.984 1.312 0.797 -0.970 0.456 1.616 2.014 
Indicator variables  
(main analyses) 
Inspection characteristics  
(% of inspection commencement sample where Inspection=1) 
Variables N Mean Variables N119 0 1 2 3 
SmallProfit1 157,370 0.074 InspDisc 67,131 10.77% 89.23% 
SmallProfit2 157,370 0.150 InspDiscType 67,131 10.77% 78.18% 11.05% 
Inspection 157,370 0.717 Enforcement 67,131 33.31% 8.57% 58.11% 
IFRS 157,370 0.265 InspFreq 67,131 67.42% 32.58% 
Big4 157,370 0.574 TypeOversight 67,131 37.68% 22.29% 40.03% 
Loss 157,370 0.258 
NegCFO 157,370 0.246 
118 Table 3 reports Size and Sales as natural logarithms of total assets and net sales or revenues, respectively. To 
give a better picture of the size and sales of the companies in our sample we report values for total assets and net 
sales in USD below:  
Variables (USD) N Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Total Assets 157,370  1,062,307  153,181  3,964,624  
Net Sales or Revenues 157,370  1,029,193  132,410  4,107,797  
119 Inspection characteristics are reported for all country-year observations with an inspection regime in place for 
the inspection commencement sample, and excluding all country-year observations from the Philippines, Romania 
and Russia for which we were unable to confirm the inspection characteristic variables.  
Chapter 3 
87 
 
TABLE 3  
Descriptive Statistics (continued) 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for client-year observations for which Inspections have been commenced 
(Inspection=1) and have not been commenced (Inspection=0) and t-test for the mean difference for the sample of 
countries that commence inspections between 2004-2011. 
 
Inspection=1 
(N=68503) 
 Inspection=0 
(N=21861) 
 T-test of mean 
difference 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev.  Mean Median Std. Dev.  T-statistic p-value 
|ATA| 0.053 0.035 0.056  0.056 0.039 0.056  7.438 0.000 
|TA| 0.067 0.048 0.070  0.072 0.054 0.068  9.359 0.000 
|AWCA| 0.057 0.032 0.085  0.061 0.037 0.078  4.719 0.000 
|DR| 0.034 0.021 0.038  0.037 0.024 0.040  9.828 0.000 
 0.043 0.024 0.057  0.049 0.028 0.062  12.533 0.000 
TA -0.046 -0.037 0.120  -0.032 -0.034 0.103  14.901 0.000 
Size 12.002 11.940 1.878  11.757 11.609 1.638  -17.262 0.000 
CFO 0.042 0.056 0.144  0.067 0.067 0.115  22.769 0.000 
Growth 0.129 0.047 0.493  0.123 0.070 0.370  -1.645 0.100 
MB 1.714 1.120 2.257  1.576 1.100 1.811  -8.279 0.000 
PPE Growth 0.111 0.035 0.348  0.107 0.044 0.302  -1.568 0.117 
Leverage 0.099 0.045 0.133  0.100 0.053 0.126  0.292 0.770 
Sales Vol 0.114 0.073 0.128  0.122 0.080 0.130  7.658 0.000 
CFO Vol 0.052 0.034 0.063  0.049 0.036 0.050  -5.052 0.000 
Lagged TA -0.047 -0.036 0.135  -0.031 -0.031 0.118  16.384 0.000 
Sales 11.671 11.882 2.433  11.580 11.521 1.910  -5.053 0.000 
GDP ann. growth 2.489 2.205 3.684  5.698 4.900 4.248  107.906 0.000 
Rule of Law 1.267 1.326 0.537  0.877 0.871 0.597  -91.033 0.000 
SmallProfit1 0.082 0 0.274  0.080 0 0.271  -0.710 0.478 
SmallProfit2 0.170 0 0.376  0.155 0 0.362  -5.076 0.000 
Inspection 0.394 0 0.489  0.142 0 0.349  -70.551 0.000 
IFRS 0.663 1 0.473  0.673 1 0.469  2.654 0.008 
Big4 0.275 0 0.447  0.214 0 0.410  -18.157 0.000 
Loss 0.241 0 0.428  0.199 0 0.399  -12.823 0.000 
 
 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics for industry and year composition for the total sample in the period 2003-2012 
(n=157,370) 
1-digit SIC code N Percent  Year N Percent 
0 1,761 1.12  2003 10,494 6.67 
1 18,893 12.01  2004 11,545 7.34 
2 35,449 22.53  2005 12,476 7.93 
3 55,881 35.51  2006 13,417 8.53 
4 2,261 1.44  2007 15,815 10.05 
5 18,216 11.58  2008 17,430 11.08 
7 18,286 11.62  2009 18,022 11.45 
8 6,623 4.21  2010 19,029 12.09 
Total 157,379 100  2011 19,672 12.50 
    2012 19,470 12.37 
    Total 157,370 100 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics (continued) 
 
Panel D: Descriptive statistics for country composition, mean dependent variables and inspection percentage by country 
for the total sample in the period 2003-2012 (n=157,370) 
Country N %N |ATA| |TA| |AWCA| |DR| 
Small 
Profit TA Inspection 
ARGENTINA 199 0.13 0.037 0.078 0.056 0.026 0.040 -0.016 0.000 
AUSTRALIA 7,262 4.61 0.076 0.087 0.096 0.036 0.019 -0.099 0.876 
AUSTRIA 280 0.18 0.027 0.062 0.038 0.017 0.061 -0.042 0.779 
BELGIUM 457 0.29 0.039 0.075 0.047 0.025 0.053 -0.045 0.696 
BRAZIL 861 0.55 0.050 0.075 0.064 0.031 0.059 -0.032 1.000 
BULGARIA 499 0.32 0.062 0.085 0.106 0.042 0.138 -0.011 0.790 
CANADA 5,055 3.21 0.075 0.101 0.085 0.038 0.028 -0.111 0.955 
CHILE 743 0.47 0.042 0.065 0.052 0.026 0.051 -0.022 0.000 
CHINA 11,828 7.52 0.070 0.079 0.073 0.041 0.134 -0.011 1.000 
DENMARK 670 0.43 0.047 0.078 0.054 0.029 0.064 -0.056 1.000 
EGYPT 486 0.31 0.050 0.071 0.071 0.030 0.047 -0.018 0.673 
FINLAND 797 0.51 0.041 0.071 0.047 0.028 0.049 -0.045 0.442 
FRANCE 3,053 1.94 0.047 0.064 0.042 0.038 0.066 -0.039 1.000 
GERMANY 3,177 2.02 0.060 0.080 0.060 0.038 0.063 -0.045 0.633 
GREECE 917 0.58 0.042 0.067 0.057 0.032 0.128 -0.037 0.613 
HONG KONG 5,741 3.65 0.080 0.092 0.087 0.054 0.048 -0.027 0.000 
INDIA 8,798 5.59 0.074 0.084 0.078 0.056 0.076 0.008 0.000 
INDONESIA 1,840 1.17 0.062 0.080 0.069 0.036 0.113 -0.019 1.000 
ISRAEL 1,347 0.86 0.054 0.068 0.060 0.034 0.064 -0.027 0.000 
ITALY 1,037 0.66 0.032 0.059 0.040 0.027 0.101 -0.043 0.690 
JAPAN 24,241 15.40 0.034 0.046 0.033 0.025 0.141 -0.037 0.914 
JORDAN 414 0.26 0.045 0.073 0.074 0.028 0.070 -0.019 0.000 
KOREA (SOUTH) 8,462 5.38 0.061 0.068 0.059 0.042 0.078 -0.025 0.762 
KUWAIT 362 0.23 0.040 0.074 0.062 0.029 0.055 -0.031 0.000 
MALAYSIA 4,819 3.06 0.057 0.067 0.068 0.039 0.083 -0.023 0.347 
MEXICO 592 0.38 0.037 0.062 0.042 0.023 0.059 -0.023 0.000 
NETHERLANDS 655 0.42 0.039 0.069 0.046 0.032 0.058 -0.053 0.608 
NEW ZEALAND 410 0.26 0.032 0.074 0.061 0.019 0.039 -0.046 0.127 
NORWAY 693 0.44 0.055 0.084 0.062 0.038 0.043 -0.057 1.000 
OMAN 302 0.19 0.044 0.076 0.062 0.027 0.020 -0.005 0.000 
PAKISTAN 1,083 0.69 0.064 0.081 0.079 0.032 0.063 -0.009 0.000 
PERU 469 0.30 0.051 0.086 0.067 0.029 0.051 -0.021 0.000 
PHILIPPINES 675 0.43 0.064 0.084 0.079 0.035 0.090 -0.019 0.914 
POLAND 1,345 0.85 0.071 0.092 0.076 0.054 0.068 -0.008 0.517 
ROMANIA 326 0.21 0.061 0.082 0.091 0.040 0.193 -0.023 0.801 
RUSSIA 798 0.51 0.070 0.088 0.081 0.059 0.091 -0.001 0.619 
SAUDI ARABIA 450 0.29 0.032 0.060 0.051 0.015 0.031 -0.014 0.000 
SINGAPORE 3,279 2.08 0.071 0.085 0.076 0.049 0.064 -0.017 0.929 
SOUTH AFRICA 1,327 0.84 0.053 0.074 0.054 0.036 0.021 -0.029 0.787 
SPAIN 452 0.29 0.037 0.065 0.047 0.026 0.088 -0.040 0.998 
SRI LANKA 651 0.41 0.044 0.063 0.058 0.028 0.055 -0.007 1.000 
SWEDEN 1,946 1.24 0.057 0.076 0.062 0.039 0.031 -0.043 1.000 
SWITZERLAND 1,086 0.69 0.033 0.057 0.040 0.022 0.037 -0.046 0.538 
TAIWAN 11,144 7.08 0.058 0.070 0.060 0.038 0.075 -0.027 0.459 
THAILAND 2,760 1.75 0.059 0.077 0.061 0.035 0.045 -0.024 0.341 
TURKEY 1,189 0.76 0.061 0.082 0.076 0.043 0.061 -0.014 0.907 
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3.4.2 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
3.4.2.1 Effect of inspections on audit quality 
Table 4, Panel A, presents for the full sample of countries, the results for the test of 
Hypothesis 1 on the association between inspections and audit quality, measured by the 
absolute value of abnormal and total accruals (Columns (1) and (2)), and the absolute value of 
abnormal working capital accruals (Column (3)). The results of audit quality measured as the 
absolute value of discretionary revenues are reported in Column (4), and the results of the 
absolute value of change in accounts receivable as the dependent variable are reported in 
Column (5). Columns (6) and (7) report the results of the small profit or loss analysis, where 
small profit is defined as ROA between 0 and 1% and ROA between 0 and 2%, respectively. 
All models are significant at p<0.01 with R2 between 18.2% and 34.7%. Using OLS 
regression120, the results show a significant negative coefficient for Inspection for all but the 
small profit analyses (Columns (6) and (7)). This implies that companies domiciled in country-
years with an inspection regime have significantly lower levels of abnormal total accruals 
(p<0.01), total accruals (p<0.01) and working capital accruals (p<0.01), than companies in 
country-years not subject to inspections. In terms of economic significance, the commencement 
of inspections decreases the absolute value of abnormal total accruals by 4.7% on average, the 
absolute value of total accruals by 4.5% on average, and the absolute value of working capital 
accruals by 4.9% on average, when scaling the coefficient by the mean value of the respective 
accruals for the full sample, holding all other values constant.  
We confirm these results with the revenue management analyses in Columns (4) and 
(5). Inspection is associated with significantly less absolute discretionary revenues (p<0.01) 
(Column (4)), and significantly less absolute change in accounts receivables (p<0.01) (Column 
(5)). This implies that there is a decrease in revenue management for clients of audit firms 
domiciled in countries and years that are subject to inspections, compared to clients of audit 
firms domiciled in countries and years that are not subject to inspections.  
 
120 Using tobit models, for the models that are censored at 0 (due to the use of absolute values), does not change 
the inferences of the results of our analyses. 
UKRAINE 105 0.07 0.097 0.154 0.140 0.071 0.086 -0.001 0.000 
UK 5,893 3.74 0.058 0.074 0.058 0.037 0.043 -0.055 0.928 
US 24,759 15.73 0.067 0.092 0.082 0.035 0.031 -0.115 1.000 
VIETNAM 1,636 1.04 0.090 0.109 0.102 0.061 0.087 0.025 0.000 
Total 157,370 100 0.059 0.075 0.066 0.037 0.074 -0.046 0.717 
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We fail to find evidence of a decrease in the likelihood of small profit occurrence 
(Columns (6) and (7)), with an insignificant coefficient of Inspection for both small profit 
defined as ROA between 0 and 1% and when defined as ROA between 0 and 2%.  
Table 4, Panel B, we present the results for the subsample of countries for which we 
observe a change in the treatment, i.e. which commence inspections between 2004 and 2011 
(N=90,364). The results reflect the inferences from the full sample, and additionally the 
coefficient for small profit 0-1% (Column (6)) becomes significant in the predicted direction. 
Collectively, this provides evidence that audit quality increases in those countries that 
commence inspections, with inspected audit firms appearing to act as a stronger constraint on 
accrual and revenue management when being subject to inspections by POBs. There is, 
however, a lack of evidence that inspected audit firms act as a significant constraint for earnings 
management around the zero earnings threshold. Most control variables are significant with 
signs in the expected direction.  
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Table 4, Panel C, shows the results of the association between inspections and timely 
loss recognition, our final measure of audit quality. We use OLS regression to analyze the 
timely loss recognition model. The baseline and main models are significant (p<0.01) with R2 
of 17.7% and 32.3%, respectively. Column (1) shows the results for the baseline model with 
only NegCFO and CFO, and fixed effects, as predictors of total accruals. The significantly 
positive coefficient of the interaction term between NegCFO and CFO (p<0.01) in Column (1) 
provides evidence of timely loss recognition in this large international sample, which is also 
reported in prior literature (see Francis et al. [2013]). Column (2) presents the results for the 
full sample where the interaction between NegCFO and CFO is significant (p<0.01), providing 
evidence of timely loss recognition. The coefficient of the interaction term between NegCFO, 
CFO and Inspection is highly significant (p<0.01) and positive. This indicates that negative 
cash flows are recognized faster in total accruals for clients whose audit firms are subject to 
inspections, compared to clients whose audit firms are not subject to inspections. Column (3) 
shows the results for the subsample of countries that commence inspections between 2004 and 
2011. While the interaction term between NegCFO and CFO is significantly negative, 
indicating absence of timely loss recognition in the sample, the interaction term of NegCFO, 
CFO and Inspection is significantly positive, indicating that clients of audit firms domiciled in 
countries that commence inspections have significantly more timely loss recognition after 
commencement than clients in countries that have not (yet) commenced inspections. In terms 
of control variables, the positive and significant interaction term between NegCFO, CFO and 
Rule of Law confirms results from prior literature (e.g. Francis et al. [2013]) that timely loss 
recognition is higher in countries with higher rule of law. Contrary to expectations, we find 
that clients of Big 4 audit firms have significantly less timely loss recognition (interaction term 
NegCFO*CFO*Big4; p<0.01) compared to clients of non-Big 4 audit firms in the full sample. 
We do not find a difference in timely loss recognition for clients of Big 4 versus non-Big 4 
audit firms for the sample of countries that commence inspections between 2004 and 2011 
(Column (3)).  
Overall, the results in Table 4 confirm our expectation that inspections increase audit 
quality when measured as timely loss recognition for clients of audit firms that are subject to 
inspection, compared to clients of audit firms not subject to inspection. 
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Table 4 
Effect of Inspections (continued) 
Panel C: Timely Loss Recognition for the full sample and the inspection commencement sample 
(1) (2) (3) 
Full Sample Full Sample 
Inspection 
Commencement 
Sample 
VARIABLES TA (baseline) TA TA 
NegCFO 0.0380*** -0.0847*** -0.0747***
(0.002) (0.009) (0.011) 
CFO -0.4002*** -0.6177*** -0.2866***
(0.007) (0.053) (0.054) 
NegCFO*CFO 0.7158*** 0.6473*** -0.2198** 
(0.017) (0.087) (0.106) 
Inspection 0.0040** 0.0028 
(0.002) (0.002) 
NegCFO*Inspection 0.0068** 0.0063* 
(0.003) (0.004) 
CFO*Inspection -0.0131 0.0001 
(0.012) (0.013) 
NegCFO*CFO*Inspection 0.3568*** 0.2085***
(0.032) (0.046) 
Big4 0.0003 0.0021 
(0.001) (0.002) 
NegCFO*Big4 -0.0068** 0.0010 
(0.003) (0.004) 
CFO*Big4 0.0316** 0.0222 
(0.014) (0.017) 
NegCFO*CFO*Big4 -0.2351*** -0.0472 
(0.029) (0.038) 
Constant -0.0195* -0.0471*** -0.1406***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.011) 
Observations 157,370 157,370 90,364 
Control Variables and their 
interactions with NegCFO and CFO YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.177 0.323 0.259 
Industry/Year/Country FE YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors clustered at the client firm level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All 
variables are defined in Appendix 3B 
3.4.2.2 Impact of Inspections on Audit Quality of Big 4 vs Non-Big 4 Audit Firms  
Table 5, Panel A, shows analyses that examine whether inspections have a differential 
effect on clients audited by the Big 4 audit firms compared to those audited by non-Big 4 audit 
firms for the accrual, discretionary revenue and small profit analyses for the full sample. The 
models are all significant (p<0.01) with R2 ranging between 18.2% and 35.3%. The main 
effects for the variables Big4 and Inspection are significant and negative as expected for all 
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accrual measures (Columns (1)-(3)) and the absolute change in accounts receivable model 
(Column (5)). The coefficient for Inspection is insignificant for the discretionary revenue 
model (Column (4)), while the coefficient for Big4 remains significant. This indicates that 
accrual management and revenue management are lower for clients of Big 4 audit firms, which 
is consistent with prior literature (e.g. Becker et al. [1998]). 122 Further, accrual and revenue 
management (except for discretionary revenue) is lower for clients of audit firms domiciled in 
country-years that are subject to inspections compared to clients of audit firms domiciled in 
country-years that are not subject to inspections. The coefficient of the interaction term 
between Inspection and Big4 is highly significant (p<0.01) and negative for all accrual 
management measures (Column (1) – (3)) and revenue management measures (Column (4) – 
(5)), indicating that the effect of inspections on accrual and revenue management is 
incrementally more pronounced for clients of Big 4 audit firms than for clients of non-Big 4 
audit firms. We do not find evidence of an effect of inspection commencement or differential 
effect of inspection commencement for clients of Big 4 vs non-Big 4 audit firms on earnings 
management around the zero earnings threshold. Most control variables (unreported) are 
significant with signs in the expected direction. 
We confirm the inferences from the full sample for the sample of countries that install 
inspections between 2004 and 2011. In addition, we find significant negative coefficients for 
Inspection and the interaction effect of Inspection with Big4 for the small profit analysis where 
small profit is defined as ROA between 0 and 1%. Thus, there is some evidence of an effect of 
inspections on earnings management around the zero earnings threshold for this subsample.  
122 We acknowledge that there is discussion in the literature on the sensitivity of the Big 4 effect to research design 
choices (Lawrence et al. [2011]; DeFond et al. [2016]; Lawrence et al. [2016]). 
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Table 5, Panel C, shows the results for the association between the interaction term of 
Big4 and Inspection in the timely loss recognition model. The interaction term NegCFO*CFO 
is positive and significant, indicating timely loss recognition in the full sample (Column (1)), 
like in Table 4, Panel C, while it is negative and significant in the subsample of countries that 
introduce inspections between 2004-2011 (Column (2)). We do not find evidence of more 
timely loss recognition for Big4 audit firms (insignificant coefficient for NegCFO*CFO*Big4) 
for either sample, but find evidence consistent with more timely loss recognition for clients of 
audit firms subject to inspections, compared to those not subject to inspections (significant 
positive coefficient for NegCFO*CFO*Inspection) in both samples, like in Table 4, Panel C. 
The coefficient of the four-way interaction term between NegCFO, CFO, Inspection and Big4 
which tests for a differential effect of inspections on timely loss recognition for Big 4 versus 
non-Big 4 firms is negative and significant (p<0.1) in the full sample (Column (1)), indicating 
that there is a differential impact of inspections on Big 4 versus non-Big 4 firms, but not in the 
expected direction. That is, in the full sample we find that timely loss recognition is lower for 
clients of Big 4 firms subject to inspections, than for clients of non-Big 4 firms subject to 
inspections. However, this coefficient is insignificant in the sample of countries that commence 
inspections between 2004 and 2011.  
Overall, the results of the accrual and revenue management and small profit analysis 
provide support for the fact that inspections have a greater impact on clients of Big 4 firms, 
while the timely loss recognition results do not. 
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Table 5 
Effect of Inspections and Big 4 (continued) 
Panel C: Timely Loss Recognition for the full sample and the inspection commencement sample 
(1) (2) 
Full Sample 
Inspection 
Commencement 
Sample 
VARIABLES TA TA 
NegCFO -0.0737*** -0.0637***
(0.014) (0.018) 
CFO -0.7008*** -0.2458* 
(0.102) -0.0637***
NegCFO*CFO 0.6749*** -0.4404** 
(0.138) (0.180) 
Inspection 0.0054** 0.0017 
(0.003) (0.003) 
NegCFO*Inspection 0.0143*** -0.4404** 
(0.004) (0.180) 
CFO*Inspection -0.0201 0.0028 
(0.024) (0.027) 
NegCFO*CFO*Inspection 0.4481*** 0.1954***
(0.043) (0.070) 
Big4 0.0621*** 0.0706*** 
(0.011) (0.014) 
NegCFO*Big4 -0.0126 -0.0058 
(0.019) (0.023) 
CFO*Big4 0.0994 -0.0665 
(0.117) (0.143) 
NegCFO*CFO*Big4 -0.2338 0.3500 
(0.180) (0.232) 
Inspection*Big4 -0.0023 0.0010 
(0.003) (0.003) 
NegCFO*Inspection*Big4 -0.0209*** -0.0012 
(0.006) (0.007) 
CFO*Inspection*Big4 0.0132 -0.0036 
(0.028) (0.030) 
NegCFO*CFO*Inspection*Big4 -0.2567*** 0.0331 
(0.065) (0.091) 
Constant -0.0749*** -0.1875***
(0.009) (0.015) 
Observations 159,150 90,364 
Control Variables and their 
interactions with NegCFO and CFO YES YES 
R-squared 0.280 0.263 
Industry/Year/Country FE YES YES 
Standard Errors Cluster CLIENT Cluster CLIENT 
Robust standard errors clustered at the client firm level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All 
variables are defined in Appendix 3B 
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3.4.2.3 Pre- and Post-treatment effects 
A major assumption of the difference-in-differences model is the parallel trends 
assumption which we test by including a contemporaneous inspection dummy (variable 
InspTreatDum coded as 1 in the year in which inspections commence) and its leads (following 
convention, we call the years after the inspection commencement year leads (Autor [2003]) 
and lags (the years before the inspection commencement year), instead of our Inspection 
variable as defined previously (Autor [2003]; Atanasov & Black [2016]). In Panel A of Table 
6, we present the results when regressing the contemporaneous inspection dummy and its leads 
and lags on our proxies of audit quality, following Autor [2003]. We find that, except for the 
regressions on audit quality measures |ATA| and , there are not significant anticipatory 
effects of inspections (the lag variables are insignificant), which provides some confidence that 
the parallel trends assumption holds. For the regressions on |ATA| and | |, we find a 
significant coefficient for the year prior to inspection commencement (InspTreatLag1). We 
further find a contemporaneous effect of inspection commencement only for |ATA| and | |. 
For the other measures (|TA|, |AWCA|, |DR|), we do find an effect of inspections only as of the 
first year after commencement. This could be the case because audit firms need time to 
incorporate the feedback of the initial inspection year in their audits. The significant lead 
dummies show that the effect of inspection commencement is maintained over the years, 
indicating a sustained benefit from inspections. For the small profit analyses, we find 
significant positive coefficients for all inspection dummies in the model, which is consistent 
with the absence of an effect of inspection on audit quality in the main models.  
Table 6, Panel B, shows the lead lag analysis with Big 4 interactions. In this analysis, 
we do not find any significant pre-treatment effects for either the main lagged effect or the 
interaction of the lagged effect and Big4. We find a significant effect of the interaction of Big 
4 and the contemporaneous inspection dummy in the first year after inspection commencement, 
but not for the main effect of the inspection dummy. This may indicate that in the first years of 
inspection commencement, especially Big 4 audit firms were affected or significantly reacted 
to the new regime. For some audit quality measures (|ATA| and |DR|), we find a consistent 
sustained effect in this model while the effect is less consistent for the other audit quality 
measures. As mentioned before, we did not expect to find results for the small profit analyses. 
Overall, we conclude from this section that there is little evidence of a significant 
anticipatory effect on inspection, and that especially the Big 4 audit firms were affected or 
reacted to the commencement of inspection directly after commencement. For the full sample, 
T
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we find evidence of a sustained effect of inspections after the commencement date, indicating 
a continuing benefit of inspections for improving audit quality. 
3.4.2.4 The effect of inspection regime characteristics on audit quality 
We analyze the inspection characteristics by interacting the characteristics with the 
Inspection variable for the 24 countries that commence inspections during the sample period 
and for which we have reliable information on inspection characteristics.123 The inspection 
characteristics are defined in Appendix 3B of this chapter and descriptive statistics are shown 
in Table 3, Panel A, for the client-year observations when inspections are in place 
(Inspection=1). Inspection reports are publicly disclosed for the majority of the sample 
(89.23% of observations; 21 of 24 countries), and most of the observations are from countries 
that disclose inspection reports on an aggregate level (78.18% of observations; 19 of the 21 
countries disclosing inspections publicly), as opposed to disclosing inspection reports at an 
individual audit firm basis (11.05% of observations; 2 of the 21 countries). 32.58% of all 
observations relate to 17 countries with inspection regimes where large audit firms are 
inspected in a cycle of less than 2 years and 67.42% of all observations relate to 7 countries 
with inspection regimes where the cycle of inspections is 2 years or more. Most commonly, 
observations relate to countries whose POBs have direct enforcement powers (58.11% of the 
observations; 19 countries), while few observations relate to countries whose POBs oversee 
the accounting profession’s enforcement powers (8.57%; 3 countries) and the remaining 
observations (33.31%) relate to 2 countries whose POBs do not have enforcement powers. 
Lastly, regarding type of oversight, 40.03% (18 countries at the end of the sample period) of 
observations are inspected directly by their respective POB, 37.68% (3 countries at the end of 
the sample period) are inspected by the accounting profession through oversight by the POB, 
and 22.292% (3 countries at the end of the sample period) are inspected by a mixed system. 
The TypeOversight variable is non-static because several POBs switch their type of oversight 
during our sample period.124 
We analyze whether the effect of Inspection varies with different inspection 
characteristics for the sample of countries that commenced inspections between 2004-2011. 
The results are shown in Table 7. In Table 7, Panel A, we find evidence that the effect of 
123 As discussed in footnote 65, from the inspection commencement sample with 27 countries, we exclude the 
Philippines, Romania and Russia for this analysis, due to uncertainty regarding the inspection characteristics.  
124 For this reason, TypeOversight is coded differently from the other inspection characteristics. TypeOversight is 
coded 0 for firm-year observations for which no inspections are in place, and 1, 2 or 3 for the firm-year 
observations for which inspections of a certain type of oversight are in place. All other inspection characteristics 
are coded as static variables since there is no variation over time and are coded at the country-level rather than 
client-year level. 
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inspection commencement on audit quality is higher for those countries whose POB publicly 
discloses inspection reports. The coefficient Inspection*InspDisc in Panel A of Table 7 is 
significant and negative for all measures of audit quality. The coefficient on Inspection turns 
insignificant or positively significant for all measures indicating that the effect of inspection 
commencement is driven by those countries that publicly disclose inspection results which may 
have important reputation effects for audit firms.125  
In Table 7, Panel B, we further show that the inspection disclosure effect is more 
pronounced for countries whose POBs disclose results at an aggregate level 
(Inspection*InspDiscType=1) for the inspection commencement sample.126 Further, we find 
that those countries that disclose inspection results individually per audit firm 
(InspDiscType=2) have consistently higher audit quality.   
Table 7, Panel C, shows that audit quality increases after inspection commencement 
(Inspection) regardless of inspection frequency for all measures of audit quality, except small 
profit 0-2%, but there is no evidence that this increase is driven by the inspection frequency 
(Inspection*InspFreq). However, we find that countries whose POBs choose for a higher 
inspection frequency have higher audit quality, compared to countries whose POBs choose a 
lower inspection frequency (negative coefficients for InspFreq), except in the abnormal total 
accrual analysis (Column (1)).  
Table 7, Panel D, shows that audit quality increases after inspection commencement 
(Inspection), except for the revenue measures (Columns (4) and (5)), but there is no consistent 
evidence that the effect of inspection commencement depends on enforcement ability of the 
POB (Inspection*Enforcement). The main effects for enforcement are positive and significant, 
indicating that measures of accrual and revenue management are higher in those countries 
where enforcement is through oversight of the accounting profession (Enforcement=1), and in 
those countries where POBs hold enforcement power (Enforcement=2), compared to countries 
where enforcement is not in the hands of the POBs.  
Table 7, Panel E, shows that compared to no inspections, audit quality is significantly 
higher after inspections are introduced when inspections are either conducted by POBs that 
oversee the inspection process of a national professional accountancy body 
125 We note, however, that only three countries (Austria, Greece and South Korea) choose not to disclose 
inspection results publicly in the inspection commencement sample, which may help explain the strong results for 
this analysis. 
126 We note, however, that only Sweden and the U.K. choose to disclose inspection results individually by audit 
firm in the inspection commencement sample, and a lack of observations for individual inspection disclosure may 
drive this result.  
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(TypeOversight=1), for all measures of audit quality except discretionary revenues, or by POBs 
with a direct inspection regime (TypeOversight=3), for all measures of audit quality except for 
both small profit meaures. The evidence from our analysis of the effect of inspections in a 
combined system (TypeOversight=2) on audit quality is limited127, with some evidence of a 
positive association with the likelihood of earnings management around the zero earnings 
threshold and the absolute value of abnormal working capital.  
Panel F of Table 7 shows the effect of inspection characteristics on timely loss 
recognition. Only TypeOversight significantly impacts the association between Inspection and 
timely loss recognition, and we find that timely loss recognition increases for inspection 
commencement when inspections are direct or organized under a combined system. 
We acknowledge that these analyses are cross-sectional in nature and potentially suffer 
from endogeneity concerns, since the choice of the inspection characteristics may be related to 
country-specific factors, such as the quality of institutions. Furthermore, we only analyze one 
inspection characteristic at a time instead of considering all inspection characteristics of a POB 
simultaneously due to multicollinearity of the inspection characteristic variables and the 
inclusion of country fixed effects in the model.128  
127 We note that only three countries (South Korea, Singapore and the U.K.) choose a combined system in the 
inspection commencement sample, with both Singapore and the U.K. commencing inspections in 2004. The 
absence of a significant effect may thus be explained by the lack of observations for a combined system. 
128 We abstain from combining inspection characteristics in an additive manner due to high subjectivity involved 
in making judgments about the importance of each characteristic and different numbers of nominal levels for each 
characteristic, or applying factor-type analyses (multiple correspondence analyses for nominal variables) since it 
simply partitions inspection regimes into clusters with similar characteristics but does not unveil whether regimes 
with similar characteristics should be better than others. 
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Table 7 
Inspection Characteristics129 
Panels A-E: Accrual Quality, Discretionary Revenue and Small Profit Analyses 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variables |ATA| |TA| |AWCA| |DR| | 
Small
Profit
0-1% 
Small 
Profit 
0-2% 
Pa
ne
l A
: 
In
sp
ec
tio
n 
D
is
cl
os
ur
e
Inspection 0.0013 0.0007 0.0020 0.0043*** 0.0017 0.1085* 0.1288*** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.059) (0.049) 
InspDisc 0.0038** 0.0098*** 0.0346*** 0.0038*** 0.0033* -0.2651*** -0.3484***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.082) (0.073)
Inspection*InspDisc -0.0056*** -0.0064*** -0.0060*** -0.0069*** -0.0078*** -0.2030*** -0.1835***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.060) (0.051) 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.188 0.182 0.089 0.102 0.220 0.205 0.267 
Pa
ne
l B
:  
In
sp
ec
tio
n 
D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
Ty
pe
 Inspection 0.0013 0.0005 -0.0038*** 0.0028*** 0.0011 0.1130* 0.1337*** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.059) (0.049) 
InspDiscType=1 0.0039** 0.0050** 0.0004 -0.0037*** -0.0061*** -0.2531*** -0.3351***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.082) (0.073) 
InspDiscType=2 -0.0065** 0.0009 -0.0144*** -0.0073*** -0.0081*** -0.1980 -0.3250***
0.0013 0.0005 -0.0038*** 0.0028*** 0.0011 0.1130* 0.1337***
Inspection -0.0056*** -0.0048*** -0.0006 -0.0051*** -0.0063*** -0.2088*** -0.1901***
*InspDiscType=1 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.060) (0.051) 
Inspection -0.0048* -0.0082** 0.0028 -0.0034* -0.0042 -0.0080 0.0290 
*InspDiscType=2 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.142) (0.118) 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.188 0.237 0.308 0.172 0.265 0.205 0.267 
Pa
ne
l C
: 
In
sp
ec
tio
n 
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Inspection -0.0031*** -0.0027*** -0.0039*** -0.0016*** -0.0046*** -0.0546* 0.0020 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.032) (0.027) 
InspFreq 0.0029 -0.0079** -0.0068* -0.0085*** -0.0239*** -0.2567*** -0.1865** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.099) (0.088) 
Inspection*InspFreq -0.0011 -0.0025* -0.0012 0.0004 0.0012 -0.0123 -0.0790* 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.047) (0.041)
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.187 0.237 0.308 0.171 0.265 0.205 0.267
Pa
ne
l D
: 
En
fo
rc
em
en
t 
Inspection -0.0053*** -0.0048*** -0.0046*** -0.0014 -0.0006 -0.3508*** -0.2559***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.053) (0.045)
Enforcement=1 0.0262*** 0.0334*** 0.0203*** 0.0150*** 0.0201*** -0.5379*** -0.6001***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.093) (0.079) 
Enforcement=2 0.0122*** 0.0109*** 0.0055** 0.0002 -0.0015 -0.9655*** -1.0737***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.077) (0.069) 
Inspection -0.0017 -0.0070*** -0.0013 -0.0005 -0.0051** 0.2086*** 0.0899 
*Enforcement=1 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.079) (0.067) 
Inspection 0.0026** 0.0027* 0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0037*** 0.3462*** 0.2878***
*Enforcement=2 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.054) (0.046) 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.188 0.237 0.308 0.171 0.265 0.206 0.267 
Pa
ne
l E
: 
Ty
pe
 O
ve
rs
ig
ht
 TypeOversight=1 -0.0061*** -0.0087*** -0.0063*** -0.0005 -0.0021* -0.2549*** -0.1749***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.044) (0.037) 
TypeOversight=2 0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0028* 0.0016* -0.0000 0.0501 0.0790* 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.057) (0.047) 
TypeOversight=3 -0.0035*** -0.0025*** -0.0041*** -0.0025*** -0.0059*** -0.0169 0.0057 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.033) (0.029) 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.188 0.237 0.308 0.172 0.265 0.206 0.267 
Fo
r 
al
l 
m
odObservations 88,565 88,565 88,565 88,565 88,565 88,550 88,550 
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
129 The inspection characteristics analysis is conducted on the subsample of countries that have an inspection system in place by the 
end of our sample period in 2012. Therefore, the number of observations decreases to 134,797 in this analysis. 
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Industry/Country 
/Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Interaction first stage 
regressors and FE YES YES 
Robust standard errors clustered at the client firm level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All variables are 
defined in Appendix 3B 
Table 7 
Inspection Characteristics (continued) 
Panel F: Timely Loss Recognition 
TA 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Inspection Characteristics: InspDisc 
InspDisc
Type InspFreq 
Enforce-
ment 
Type 
Oversight 
NegCFO*CFO 
-
0.3592*
* -0.3916** -0.5837*** -0.1600 -0.3504***
(0.164) (0.166) (0.123) (0.172) (0.112) 
NegCFO*CFO*Inspection 0.1002 0.0996 0.2464*** -0.1713 
(0.116) (0.117) (0.050) (0.113) 
NegCFO*CFO*InspectionCharacteristic=1 -0.0043 -0.0076 0.2922*** -0.1810 
(0.121) (0.122) (0.068) (0.145) 
NegCFO*CFO*InspectionCharacteristic=2 -0.0443 -0.2119* 
(0.209) (0.121) 
NegCFO*CFO*InspectionCharacteristic=3 
NegCFO*CFO*Inspection*InspectionCharacteristic=1 0.1295 0.1387 -0.0698 0.0001 0.0782 
(0.125) (0.126) (0.074) (0.153) (0.059) 
NegCFO*CFO*Inspection*InspectionCharacteristic=2 0.1220 0.3889*** 0.1391** 
(0.210) (0.124) (0.054) 
NegCFO*CFO*Inspection*InspectionCharacteristic=3 0.1937*** 
(0.049) 
Observations 88,565 88,565 88,565 88,565 88,565 
R-squared 0.257 0.258 0.261 0.261 0.259 
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry/Country/Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors clustered at the client firm level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All variables are 
defined in Appendix 3B 
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3.4.3 ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
3.4.3.1 U.S. cross-listed clients, PCAOB access to foreign audit firms, joint PCAOB 
inspection  
In additional analyses, we first consider the role of the U.S., and specifically the role of 
U.S. cross-listed observations and the international PCAOB reach. Prior literature shows that 
non-U.S. clients listed in the U.S. systematically differ from other non-U.S. clients, and these 
cross-listed firms are generally seen as having higher accounting quality (e.g. Lang et al. 
[2003]). To ensure that results are not driven by U.S. cross-listed clients, especially since the 
auditors of these clients are also subject to PCAOB registration and inspections (further 
discussed below), we control for U.S. cross-listed firms in our models. Our inferences remain 
unchanged for our main analysis and the interaction analysis.  
Prior literature also shows that audit quality of non-U.S. PCAOB-registered audit firms 
is positively affected by PCAOB inspection access (Lamoreaux [2016]), for both U.S. cross-
listed and through spill-over effects for national clients. To ensure that our findings of the effect 
of national POB inspections on audit quality are not driven by the PCAOB’s inspection access 
to non-U.S. audit firms, we code PCAOB access according to Fung et al. [2017]. We include 
the variable PCAOB_Access in our main analysis (while excluding the U.S. from the sample) 
and find results consistent with the results reported for the full sample, except that, for the 
absolute value of change in receivables, only the interaction between Inspection and Big4 is 
significant in the interaction model, but not the main effect of Inspection. We also interact 
PCAOB_Access with Big4 since larger audit firms are more likely to audit U.S. cross-listed 
companies and are therefore more likely to be inspected by the PCAOB. The inferences for the 
effect of local Inspection on audit quality remains unchanged for all audit quality proxies. We 
also interact PCAOB_Access with an indicator of clients’ U.S. cross-listing since those clients 
are those most directly affected by PCAOB access. We find that our inferences remain, except 
that for the absolute value of change in receivables the main effect of Inspection is insignificant 
in the interaction model.  
We further analyze whether the effect of inspections of POBs that conduct joint 
inspections with the PCAOB is larger than for other POBs. The PCAOB relies on the work of 
local inspectors if it deems these POBs to be of high quality (Krishnan et al. [2017]). When 
including the variable PCAOB_Joint (an indicator variable that is equal to 1 for Australia, 
Canada, South Korea, Norway, Singapore, and the U.K.), all inferences for the main effect of 
local Inspection remain unchanged for both the main analysis and the interaction analysis.  
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3.4.3.2 Cross-country differences in the effect of inspection commencement  
We also investigate whether the effect of Inspection depends on the regulatory quality 
of a country. We split the countries of the inspection commencement sample into quartiles130 
of the ten-year average score for Regulatory Quality, which is a proxy for a country’s general 
ability to implement sound policies and regulations that promote private sector development 
(Kaufmann et al. [2010]).131 We fail to find an effect of Inspection for the lowest quartile of 
Regulatory Quality132, but find a significant effect of Inspection when combining the upper 
three quartiles of Regulatory quality for all measures of audit quality. Thus, while we find an 
average positive effect of Inspection on audit quality, it does not hold for countries with low 
ex-ante regulatory quality.  
3.4.3.3 Other concurrent events  
In our main analysis, we control for the mandatory adoption of IFRS as a major 
concurrent event. Other concurrent changes are major reporting enforcement changes (such as 
public disclosure of errors and retrospectively restating financial statements) implemented 
around the same time as mandatory IFRS adoption that were aimed at improving financial 
market regulation (Christensen et al. [2013]). Christensen et al. [2013] show that these 
enforcement changes explain capital market effects around IFRS adoption but could also 
influence the extent of accrual and revenue management and conservative reporting. When 
controlling for these enforcement changes, in line with Christensen et al. [2013], our inferences 
for Inspection and Inspection*Big4 remain unchanged for all measures of audit quality, except 
that the main effect of Inspection in the Big 4 interaction model turns insignificant in the |ATA| 
and |DR| analysis.  
3.4.4 SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
3.4.4.1 Addressing concerns about dominant countries, and the hierarchical data  
structure 
In sensitivity analyses, we first address concerns that the number of observations per 
country largely differs and the unit of analysis is the inspection regime level, while the analysis 
is at the client level, which may overweight large countries in the analysis. We therefore first 
check whether the results are influenced by certain countries in our sample. Specifically, and 
as is common in international auditing research, certain countries represent a large portion of 
130 We do not find an effect for a median split of Regulatory Quality. 
131 We find the same results when using Rule of Law as a proxy for enforcement quality.  
132 This quartile includes the following countries: Bulgaria, Egypt, Greece, South Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey. 
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the sample. The U.S. and Japan jointly make up 31.1% of client-year observations for our full 
sample. The inferences from the main results when excluding the observations from the U.S. 
are consistent for all tests of Hypothesis 1 and for all tests of Hypothesis 2. We also find a 
significant main effect of Inspection for the discretionary revenue analysis for the test of 
Hypothesis 2. The inferences from the main results when excluding Japan are consistent for 
the accrual and revenue management models, except for the discretionary revenue model where 
the coefficient for Inspection is insignificant. The results for the timely loss recognition models 
are consistent with the results reported for the full model (for both the main effect of Inspection 
and the interaction effect between Inspection and Big 4). The coefficient of the main effect of 
Inspection, however, is positive and significant in the small profit models, indicating that 
inspections increase the incidence of small profits. When excluding Japan from the full sample 
our inferences are consistent with our main analyses, except that the interaction term between 
Big4 and Inspection is insignificant for the revenue management measures.  
As an additional approach to address the concern that the unit of analysis is the 
inspection regime level, while the analysis is at the client level, we use hierarchical linear 
modeling to take into account the hierarchical structure of the data. That is, observations are 
grouped, and the error terms may be correlated within countries. Using random intercepts, we 
find results that are fully consistent with the main models and find significant coefficients for 
Inspection in all but the small profit analyses.133 We also find significant interaction effects of 
Inspection and Big4 for all models, except for the small profit analyses and the main effect of 
Inspection for all models except the discretionary revenue model and the small profit analyses. 
We continue to find less timely loss recognition for clients of Big 4 audit firms that are subject 
to inspections compared to clients of non-Big 4 audit firms. 
3.4.4.2 Balanced panel analysis  
In the main analyses, we show that our results hold for the full sample and the sample 
of countries that commence inspections between 2004-2011. In this sensitivity analysis, we use 
a balanced panel (42.1% of all observations)134 to ensure that results are not driven by 
differences in sample composition throughout the years and to ensure that the same companies 
are included pre- and post-inspection commencement.135 We find significant negative 
coefficients for all accrual and revenue management measures, and a significant positive 
 
133 Due to computational issues we implement the total accrual model without the interaction terms between year 
and industry and the first-stage regressors. 
134 This includes all companies for which we have observations over all ten years in our sample. 
135 We note that the number of observations increases over the sample period (see Table 3, Panel B). 
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coefficient for the NegCFO*CFO*Inspection coefficient in the TLR regression, consistent 
with our expectations and the findings for the full and inspection commencement sample. 
Additionally, we find significant negative coefficients for both small profit analyses. The 
inferences for the test of Hypothesis 2 (the interaction between Big4 and Inspection) remain 
the same, and additionally we find significant negative coefficients for the interaction effect 
for both small profit analyses. In the TLR analysis, we find significantly more timely loss 
recognition for clients of audit firms that are subject to inspections, but we fail to find a 
significant difference for clients of Big 4 compared to non-Big 4 audit firms. The inferences 
from the analyses of the balanced sample are consistent with the inferences from the inspection 
commencement sample.  
3.4.4.3 Audit firm networks (Big 6 instead of Big 4) 
We further investigate whether the effect of inspections on audit quality holds for the 
Big 6 compared to the non-Big 6 audit firms.136 The Big 6 are considered global audit firm 
networks with significant shared knowledge and resources (e.g. Carson [2009]), which may 
thus benefit from inspections in a similar way as the Big 4. The inferences from the Big 6 
analyses are consistent with the inferences from the Big 4 analyses in the main model. In the 
interaction model, all interactions Big6*Inspection are significant, but the main effect for 
inspection turns insignificant for the abnormal total accrual and abnormal working capital 
accrual model.  
3.4.4.4 Coding of inspection start dates 
As explained in Section III, we collect the information on inspection commencement 
from public sources and we survey the POBs to confirm this information. We note that our 
coding of inspection commencement dates differs from the legislative inspection beginning 
date used by Lamoreaux [2016] in 18 cases. We code inspection start as the year in which the 
first inspections were undertaken after which inspections may impact audit quality. While we 
believe that our coding is more appropriate for the purpose of our study, investigating the effect 
of inspection commencement, we check the sensitivity of our results to Lamoreaux’s definition 
of inspection start, legislative inspection beginning date. We create a new variable, 
Inspection_Lamoreaux, where we replace all those inspection start dates that differ from our 
coding with the coding in Lamoreaux. All inferences remain unchanged in the main analysis, 
but the main effect of Inspection is insignificant in the interaction model, for all measures of 
 
136 The Big 6 are the Big 4 audit firms, plus Grant Thornton and BDO. 
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audit quality except for . This indicates that the effect of Inspection is driven by Big 4 
firms when coding according to legislative inspection beginning dates. 
We further identified cases where the coding of inspection commencement is 
ambiguous because some POBs conducted preparatory inspections before the commencement 
of the full inspection regime, and where a form of inspection regime had been in place, but not 
in the sense of inspections by POBs as defined in this study.137 All inferences remain 
unchanged for the main analyses, except that the main effect of Inspection turns insignificant 
in the interaction analysis (Inspection*Big4) for all measures of audit quality except for . 
3.4.4.5Client fixed effects 
We further analyze equations [1] and [2] using client and year fixed effects, as opposed 
to country, industry and year fixed effects, to control for client-specific time-invariant factors, 
following Daske et al. [2008] and Hail & Leuz [2009]. The main results for Inspection are 
consistent for the client fixed effects specification in all models, except that for the Big 4 
interaction model the main effect of Inspection becomes insignificant when using the revenue 
management measures of audit quality, while the interaction term Big 4*Inspection remains 
significant for all measures of audit quality.138  
3.4.4.6 Clustering standard errors at country level  
We cluster standard errors at client level in the main analyses. Since the variable of 
interest is at the country level and observations within a country should be simultaneously 
affected by the treatment, it can be argued that standard errors should be clustered at the country 
level affected (e.g. Bertrand, Duflo & Mullainathan, 2004). We discuss in footnote 72 our 
choice of clustering standard errors at the client level. Despite the justification in this footnote, 
we also run the analyses with standard errors clustered at country level and find, for both the 
full sample and the sample of inspection commencers, a significant effect of Inspection in the 
expected direction for all accrual management and TLR models, but not for the revenue 
management models. When interacting Inspection with Big4, we only find a significant result 
of the interaction effect for the accrual management measures in the full sample, and audit 
quality measures |ATA|, |DR| and Small Profit, as well as a significant main effect for |TA| in 
the inspection commencement sample. However, we caution that if the treatment of inspection 
 
137 Footnotes in Table 2 describe these coding differences. 
138 We do not apply client fixed effects for the small profit analyses due to the nonlinear estimation procedure of 
the probit model. The results hold for cases where we include either year fixed effects or industry-year fixed 
effects in addition to client fixed effects.  
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is not homogenous for all clients in one country, clustering at the country level may not be 
appropriate. 
3.5. Conclusions and Limitations 
One of the most profound recent international initiatives in audit regulation has been 
the move to independent public oversight of the auditing profession, replacing previous models 
of regulation. As the potential merits of public oversight are not uncontested, research on its 
effect on audit quality at the international level is warranted. To date, the literature on public 
oversight has mainly focused on the U.S., since it is one of the few countries where the public 
oversight body publicly discloses detailed inspection findings. The issue, however, is much 
broader than the U.S., and, except for a small number of studies examining individual countries 
other than the U.S., there is no comprehensive international study on the effect of commencing 
independent inspections through public oversight on audit quality.  
To this end, we use a large sample of non-financial companies located in 50 countries 
over the period 2003-2012, of which 27 countries commence inspections between 2004-2011. 
We observe that the level of accrual and revenue management significantly decreases and that 
there is more timely loss recognition for clients of audit firms that become or are subject to 
inspections, for both the full sample and the sample of inspection commencers. In addition, 
there is evidence that the effect of inspections is stronger for Big 4 audit firms than for non-
Big 4 audit firms for all audit quality measures, except for timely loss recognition We find little 
evidence of an anticipatory effect for these inspections and show that especially Big 4 firms 
were affected or responded in the initial years of inspection commencement, while the overall 
effect of inspection commencement is sustained over future years.  
Further, we provide evidence that the effect of inspection commencement on audit 
quality varies with different inspection characteristics, mainly with whether inspection results 
are disclosed publicly. Collectively, our results contribute to the emerging literature and debate 
on public oversight by providing insights from an international setting. This is important since 
results from studies on (international) PCAOB inspections may not be generalizable to an 
international setting, especially since the implementation of inspections and their 
characteristics vary by POBs. Our findings may prove useful for regulators in the further 
development, design and mutual recognition of public oversight systems. We caution, 
however, that we do not provide insights into the costs created by the commencement of public 
oversight internationally and therefore do not make policy recommendations based on our 
results.  
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One of the potential limitations of our study are endogeneity concerns. POBs and 
inspections were installed because of concerns about audit quality, and the timing and treatment 
of countries is likely not random. One of the major assumptions underlying our difference-in-
differences analysis is exogeneity and we acknowledge this as a potential limitation of our 
study. We also acknowledge that the estimated treatment effect may not be homogenous across 
countries since the quality of inspection regimes and POBs can differ and may depend on 
institutional features of a country (e.g. La Porta et al. [2006]). The other major assumption of 
the difference-in-differences method is parallel trends in dependent variables of treated and 
untreated firms. We attempt to address this using the lead lag regressions and show that there 
is little evidence of a pre-treatment trend. Relatedly, although inspections by POBs are the key 
strategy for audit quality improvements, we also cannot rule out that other common factors 
associated with the countries that have instigated active inspection regimes have contributed to 
audit quality. To deal with these concerns we have attempted to identify and control for other 
events that are likely to affect our proxies of audit quality, including IFRS adoption, PCAOB 
access and enforcement changes.  
A further limitation is that, although we undertake an analysis of a comprehensive 
portfolio of audit quality metrics, we are restricted to financial reporting quality metrics which 
are indirect measures of audit quality, specifically discretionary and working capital accruals, 
discretionary revenues, changes in accounts receivable, incidence of small profits and timely 
loss recognition. Other measures of audit quality are limited to certain companies (such as the 
appropriate use of going concern opinions, which are specific to loss-making companies) or 
are not available, or comparable, for an international study (such as financial statement 
restatements which are a common measure of audit quality for U.S. studies). 
Despite these inherent limitations, our study is a first major attempt at examining the 
impact of public oversight of the auditing profession in a large international setting. Future 
research may benefit from investigating the effect of public oversight on audit quality for 
specific national settings for which alternative and potentially more detailed and private data 
(e.g., audit adjustments) can be used, by further exploiting the different features of the 
organization and characteristics of public oversight as data become available, and by further 
extending the period of study.  
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Appendix 3A – Empirical models to calculate dependent variables 
|ATA| We estimate absolute abnormal accruals as the absolute value of residuals from the following 
regression: 
 
T , =  +
1
,
+ , , + ,
+ , +   +  
 
Where TAi,t is total accruals in year t (defined as the change in non-cash current assets minus 
change in current liabilities excluding current portion of long-term debt, minus depreciation 
and amortization) scaled by lagged total assets; ASSETSi,t-1 is a client’s total assets in year t-1; 
i,t is sales in year t less sales in year t-1, scaled by lagged total assets; i,t is accounts 
receivable in year t less accounts receivable in year t-1, scaled by lagged total assets; PPEi,t is 
net property, plant and equipment in year t, scaled by lagged total assets; and ROAi,t is net 
income before extraordinary items in year t, scaled by lagged total assets.  
It is standard practice to run this equation for each industry year in studies that investigate 
issues in a single country. However, using a sample of international data, we face data 
limitations regarding the number of observations within each country-industry-year. We 
therefore estimate this equation for each industry-year and include country fixed effects.  
To mitigate the impact of extreme observations for the calculation of expected accruals in this 
dataset, we exclude all observations for which any value of the variables in above equation are 
below the 1st or above the 99th percentile (Francis & Michas [2013]), for each country-year. 
|AWCA| In line with (Dechow et al. [1998]; DeFond & Park [2001]).  
 , = , (( , / , ) , )  
Where AWCA is abnormal working capital accruals in year t; WCi,t-1 and WCi,t are non-cash 
working capital in year t-1 and t, respectively where non-cash working capital is computed as 
the difference between (current assets minus cash and short-term investments) and (current 
liabilities minus short-term debt); and Si,t-1 and Si,t are sales in year t-1 and t, respectively. 
|DR| We estimate discretionary revenues as the absolute value of residuals from the following 
regression  
 , = + , +   +  [3] 
ARi,t is accounts receivable in year t less accounts receivable in year t-1 scaled by 
REVi,t is sales in year t less sales in year t-1 scaled by lagged total 
assets.  
Given the limited number of observations for each country-industry-year, we estimate this 
equation for each industry-year and include country fixed effects. For each country-year, we 
truncate the data at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
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Appendix 3B– Variable definitions139 
Dependent variables 
 
|ATA| Absolute value of abnormal accruals (absolute value of the residuals from the 
performance-adjusted modified Jones model measured as in Francis et al. [2013], see 
Appendix 3A). 
|TA| The absolute value of total accruals, calculated as net income before extraordinary 
items less cash flow from operations, scaled by lagged total assets. 
|AWCA| Absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals (DeFond & Park [2001], see 
Appendix3 A). 
|DR| Absolute value of discretionary revenues (residuals from a regression of changes in 
accounts receivables on changes in revenue based on McNichols & Stubben [2008], 
see Appendix 3A). 
 Absolute value of the change in accounts receivable, scaled by lagged total assets 
(dependent variable in the discretionary revenue model, see Appendix 3A) 
SmallProfit Indicator variable taking the value of 1 if a client reports small positive earnings 
(where small earnings are defined as ROA between 0 and 0.01 or 0 and 0.02), else 0. 
TA Total Accruals, calculated as net income before extraordinary items less cash flow 
from operations, scaled by lagged total assets. 
  
Variables of Interest 
Inspection Indicator variable taking the value of 1 when a company is domiciled in a country-
year where audit firms are subject to inspections by independent POBs, else 0. 
InspTreatDum Indicator variable taking the value of 1 in the year a country commences inspections 
of audit firms by a POB, else 0. 
InspTreatLead i  Indicator variable taking the value of 1 in the ith year after a country commenced 
inspections of audit firms by a POB, else 0. 
InspTreatLag i Indicator variable taking the value of 1 in the ith year before a country commenced 
inspections of audit firms by a POB, else 0. 
InspDisc Nominal static variable classifying whether inspection results are disclosed or not. It 
takes the value of 1 for countries in which the inspection reports are made publicly 
available, and 0 for countries in which the inspection reports are not publicly 
available. 
InspDiscType Nominal static variable classifying the type of inspection disclosure. It takes the value 
of 2 for countries in which reports are disclosed individually per audit firm, 1 for 
countries in which reports are disclosed in aggregate, and 0 for countries in which 
reports are not disclosed publicly.  
InspFreq Nominal static variable classifying the inspection frequency. It takes the value of 1 for 
countries in which large audit firms are inspected in a cycle of less than 2 years, and 0 
for countries using less frequent inspection cycles. 
Enforcement Nominal static variable classifying the type of enforcement ability. It takes the value 
of 2 for countries in which the POB has direct enforcement abilities, 1for countries in 
which enforcement is through oversight of the accounting profession, and 0 for 
countries in which the POB has no enforcement powers. 
TypeOversight Nominal non-static variable classifying the type of oversight system. It takes the value 
of 3 for client-year observations for which inspections are conducted by POBs with 
direct or primarily direct oversight, 2 for client-year observations for which 
inspections fall under a combination of a direct inspection regime and inspections 
through oversight, and 1 for client-year observations for which inspections are 
conducted by POBs through oversight of the profession, and 0 for client-year 
observations for which no inspections are in place. This variable is non-static since 
some POBs switch their oversight type over the sample years. 
  
 
 
139 For financial variables that are ratios, or calculated from ratios, both numerator and denominator are in local 
currency (consistent with Michas [2011]). Financial variables with natural logarithmic transformation (Size and 
Sales) are reported in US Dollars, for comparability purposes. 
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Control variables 
Big4 Indicator variable taking the value of 1 when a company is audited by a Big 4 audit 
firm, else 0. 
IFRS Indicator variable taking the value of 1 when a company is domiciled in a country and 
year with mandatory use of IFRS. 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets (in thousands of USD). 
CFO Cash flow from operating activities scaled by lagged total assets.  
Growth  Percentage change in sales. 
Loss Indicator variable taking the value of 1 when a company has a negative income before 
extraordinary items, else 0. 
MB Market value of equity to book value of equity. 
PPE Growth Percentage change in gross property plant and equipment. 
Leverage Ratio of long-term debt to lagged total assets. 
Sales Vol The standard deviation of a company’s sales from year t-2 through year t. 
CFO Vol The standard deviation of cash flow from operations from year t-2 through year t. 
Lagged TA Total Accruals in t-1, calculated as net income before extraordinary items less cash 
flow from operations, scaled by total assets in t-2. 
GDP annual growth Annual growth in GDP per country, retrieved from the World Bank. 
NegCFO Indicator variable taking the value of 1 when a client’s cash flow from operations is 
negative, else 0. 
Sales The natural logarithm of net sales. 
Rule of Law Is an annual country-level measure of the “the perceptions of the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as 
the likelihood of crime and violence” (Kaufmann et al. [2010], P. 4), retrieved from 
the World Bank. 
Regulatory Quality Is an annual country-level measure “capturing perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit 
and promote private sector development.” (Kaufmann et al. [2010], P. 4), retrieved 
form the World Bank 
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Chapter 4 – The effect of the interaction between litigation and 
regulatory risk on audit outcomes140 
 
 
Abstract: The purpose of this study is to investigate how auditor conservative reporting and 
audit fees are affected by litigation risk and how this litigation risk interacts with regulatory 
forces. While prior literature has explored the association between either litigation or regulatory 
risk and audit outcomes, it is unclear whether and how these risks jointly influence audit 
outcomes. To examine this research question, I investigate whether and how the effect of 
regulatory risk stemming from PCAOB inspections on audit quality varies with the legal and 
litigation environment in which the auditor operates, by exploiting differences in auditors’ 
liability exposure across U.S. state liability regimes. While both audit fees and the likelihood 
of a going concern opinion are higher for engagements for which the auditor faces higher 
litigation risk, I find that regulatory risk reinforces the impact of litigation on audit fees and 
auditor conservative reporting.  
 
 
  
 
140 I thank Ann Vanstraelen and Roger Simnett for their helpful comments on the paper. I also thank seminar 
participants at UNSW and the University of Antwerp, my discussant Jere Francis and participants at the EARNet 
PhD workshop 2017, participants and faculty at the Scandinavian Accounting Research Doctoral Consortium 
2018 in Oslo, faculty and participants at the EAA Doctoral Colloquium 2018 and AFAANZ Doctoral Symposium 
2018, my discussant Romain Oberon and participants at the Audit Quality Workshop in Maiori, my discussant 
Matt Ege and participants at the EARNet Symposium 2019 for their comments. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Auditor behavior is influenced by various incentives of which litigation and regulatory 
risks are generally considered to be instrumental (e.g. DeFond & Zhang [2014]; Knechel et al. 
[2013]). Litigation risk incentivizes auditors to provide high quality audits to avoid lawsuits 
and other financial penalties associated with audit failures. The litigation costs for auditors in 
involved in negligent audits can be substantial and even result in auditors being forced out of 
the market (Shu [2000]), which in turn can result in large losses in consumer surplus (Gerakos 
& Syverson [2015]). It has been estimated that even over ten years ago lawsuits cost audit firms 
about ten to fifteen percent of total revenue annually (CAQ [2008]). Litigation risk is thus an 
important consideration for audit firms, client firms and capital markets in general. Risks from 
regulation, such as from intervention of public oversight boards or securities enforcement 
agencies, pose a threat to auditors in terms of financial or criminal penalties and enforcement 
actions (e.g. the loss of the auditor’s license to practice). Both litigation and regulatory risk 
stem from the institutional environment in which auditors operate and provide a downside risk 
(Peecher et al. [2013]). Further, reputational losses stemming from litigation and regulatory 
risks can impair the auditors’ ability to attract and retain clients (DeFond & Zhang [2014]).  
Despite the importance of litigation and regulatory risk for audit firms, it is largely 
unclear how the various institutional factors that drive litigation and regulatory risk interact 
with each other to influence audit quality and audit fees (Francis [2011]).141 Therefore, this 
study explores how audit quality and audit fees are affected by the interaction between 
litigation risk stemming from third-party auditor liability based on common law and damage 
apportionment standards and regulatory risk stemming from PCAOB inspections. In the U.S., 
third-party auditor liability based on common law and damage apportionment standards vary 
considerably between states. Further, the introduction of regular PCAOB inspections of audit 
firms arguably increases audit firms’ regulatory risk by increasing the likelihood of detecting 
low audit quality and subsequent enforcement actions and sanctions (e.g. Gunny & Zhang 
[2013]; Aobdia [2019]). In this regard, prior research has documented an association between 
PCAOB inspections and outcomes and audit quality and audit fees (e.g. Carcello et al. [2011]; 
 
141 For example, Francis ([2011], P. 142) states that “we have barely scratched the surface in our understanding 
of the role of institutions […] for audit quality. For example, in the United States is the main institutional driver 
of audit quality the SEC, the PCAOB, or is it a legal system in which it is far easier to sue auditors than any other 
country in the world? Alternatively, are all of these institutions equally important?”. Further, DeFond and Zhang 
([2014], P. 279) mention that “[…] a major challenge [in understanding the effect of auditor incentives] is 
disentangling regulatory intervention from litigation and reputation risk.” Lastly, Minutti-Meza ([2014], P. 354) 
questions whether auditors are “more likely to increase fees in response to litigation, reputation, or regulatory 
costs?” 
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DeFond & Lennox [2017]; Gramling et al. [2011]; Acito et al. [2018]; Vanstraelen & Zou 
[2017]).  
Therefore, I exploit the variation in auditor litigation risk between U.S. states and 
investigate whether and how audit quality and audit fees vary across U.S. state liability regimes. 
I further examine whether the association between state liability regimes and audit quality and 
audit fees is affected by the introduction of PCAOB inspections and PCAOB inspection 
outcomes. 
Using a sample of U.S. client firms over the years 2001-2009, I find that the likelihood 
of a going concern opinion as a measure of audit quality and audit fees are higher for client 
engagements for which the auditor faces higher litigation risk. Further, I find that audit fees are 
higher after the publication of the first PCAOB inspection report and that the effect is larger 
for clients for which the auditor faces higher litigation risk from third parties and higher losses 
from damage apportionment standards. While I do not find evidence of a complementary effect 
of regulatory risk and litigation risk on the likelihood to issue going concern opinions, I do find 
evidence that these risks jointly affect conservative reporting of auditors for damage 
apportionment standards. Collectively, my findings suggest that litigation and regulatory risks 
are complements. 
Since it is difficult to disentangle the different risks that affect auditors (DeFond & 
Zhang [2014]), it is largely unclear what the main institutional drivers of audit quality and audit 
fees are (e.g. Francis [2011]; Minutti-Meza [2014]). Studying the relation between litigation 
and regulatory forces that affect audit firm behavior is therefore an important issue. By 
identifying a setting that allows me to explicitly consider how regulatory and litigation risk 
jointly affect auditor behavior, I contribute to the literature by showing that these risks jointly 
increase audit fees and conservative auditor reporting, measured as the likelihood of a Type I 
going concern reporting error. Further, I find a significant joint effect of regulatory and 
litigation risk only for damage apportionment litigation risk measures which measure the size 
of potential damages for audit firms, and for non-global audit firm networks (GAFN) that have 
less resources to cover potentially large litigation costs.  
The paper proceeds as follows: In section 4.2, I describe the background of the study 
and develop the hypotheses. Next, section 4.3 outlines the research design and sample 
selection. In section 4.4, I present and discuss the results of this study. I conclude and discuss 
limitations in section 4.5. 
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4.2 Background and hypotheses development 
Theory suggests that auditors can respond to litigation risk in several ways, including 
the provision of higher audit quality in order to increase the likelihood of detecting a material 
misstatement (Palmrose [1988]; Venkataraman et al. [2008]) or reporting more conservatively 
and thus avoiding litigation (e.g. Carcello & Palmrose [1994]; Kaplan & Williams [2013]; Lys 
& Watts [1994]), increasing audit fees by spending higher audit effort or by charging a risk 
premium and thus compensating for additional work or larger risk (e.g. Palmrose [1986]; 
Simunic & Stein [1996]; Bell et al. [2001]; Venkataraman et al. [2008]), or by not accepting or 
retaining clients with high litigation risk and therefore avoiding litigation (e.g. Pratt & Stice 
[1994]; Krishnan & Krishnan [1997]; Shu [2000]). 
Most prior empirical literature on auditor litigation risk assesses whether the litigation 
environment in which auditors operate affects audit quality, auditor reporting or audit fees by 
comparing these audit outcomes across different legal regimes at the country level, analyzes 
the impact of changes to litigation risk over time, or investigating differences in litigation risk 
at the client level.142 First, the international literature on litigation risk generally finds that audit 
quality is higher in countries with stronger legal systems and better investor protection, and 
that this effect is stronger for large auditors who face higher penalties from litigation (e.g. Choi 
& Wong [2007]; Francis, Khurana & Pereira [2003]; Francis & Wang [2008]; Guedhami & 
Pittman [2006]; Hwang & Chang [2010]). Further, in their studies on cross-country differences 
in litigation risk and audit pricing, Seetharaman et al. [2002] and Choi et al. [2009] document 
that audit fees are higher in countries with higher litigation risk, reflecting a risk premium. 
These studies, however, cannot easily disentangle whether these effects are due to differences 
in litigation risk or institutional environments across jurisdictions. 
Second, the literature on shifts in legal liability in the U.S. investigates changes in 
federal securities law.143 For example, Lee and Mande [2003] and Francis and Krishnan [2002] 
find that audit quality decreased after the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(PSLRA), which eliminated joint and several liability of auditors under federal securities law 
and thus significantly reduced litigation risk for auditors. Similarly, Geiger and Raghunandan 
[2001] and Geiger et al. [2006] find that the likelihood of the issuance of a going concern 
 
142 While I focus on auditor conservative reporting and audit fees in this study, I also briefly summarize studies 
on audit quality in this literature review, since going concern opinions can be seen as and are associated with 
measures of audit quality (e.g. DeFond & Zhang [2014]; Berglund [2019]). 
143 Federal securities law is based on the Securities Exchange Acts of 1933 (for IPOs) and 1934 (for secondary 
markets) and applies to buyers and sellers of securities and other third parties in case of gross negligence or fraud 
(Chung et al. [2010]). Federal securities law does not cover litigation under ordinary negligence.  
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opinion decreased after the PSLRA, indicating less conservative auditor reporting as federal 
litigation risk for auditors decreased. In line with this, Basu [1997] provides evidence that 
changes in conservatism of audited financial statements correspond to changes in statutory 
auditor liability regimes over time. Furthermore, a large amount of literature has investigated 
the consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) for audit quality and audit fees which 
increased auditor liability to third parties at the federal level.144 However, it is unclear whether 
it is the increase in auditor liability or other concurrent changes that SOX brought about, which 
affect audit quality (DeFond & Zhang [2014]). 
Lastly, prior literature investigates and finds that cross-sectional differences or changes 
in litigation risk at the client level affects audit quality, auditor reporting and audit fees. For 
example. a change in auditor litigation risk due to a client’s IPO (Venkataraman et al. [2008]), 
or differences in litigation risk for private versus public audit clients (Badertscher et al. 2014), 
affect audit quality and audit fees. Kaplan and Williams [2013] show that auditors report more 
conservatively when auditor’s client-specific litigation risk is higher. In line with expectations, 
the studies show that audit quality, auditor reporting conservatism, and audit fees are higher 
when auditors face higher litigation. 
More recently, the auditing literature has started to investigate litigation risk from 
auditors’ liability towards third parties that is based on tort law, which is part of common law. 
Auditor liability towards third-party non-clients for ordinary negligence is governed by 
common law, as opposed to gross negligence or fraud which is governed by federal securities 
law.145 Further, state law cases, including those initiated by third-parties, have been identified 
as the greatest source of litigation risk faced by audit firms in terms of number and size of 
lawsuits (e.g. Cook et al. [1992]; Center for Audit Quality [2008]; Donelson [2013]).146 Auditor 
litigation under federal securities law has been declining after the PSLRA of 1995 and after 
stricter application of the rules contained in the PSLRA in more recent years (Honigsberg et 
al. [2018]). This resulted in a more prominent role for litigation under common law (Donelson 
 
144 SOX increased auditor liability to third parties by expanding the definition of third parties and the scope of 
information that third parties can use when litigating against auditors (Chung et al. [2010]).  
145 Specifically, by Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (including Rule 10b-5) and Section 11 
of the Securities Act of 1933. There are important differences in lawsuits based on state vs. federa law. First, 
under state law, third parties must demonstrate reliance on financial statements or the audit report, while they do 
not have to demonstrate this under federal law. Second, under federal law, auditors can face large claims since 
individual lawsuits can be combined into class action lawsuits which is not possible under state law. (Kaplan & 
Williams [2013]). 
146 It should be noted that availability of data regarding actual number and size of lawsuits is limited and that many 
of these state liability cases are settled before they make it to the courts (Center for Audit Quality [2008]; Donelson 
[2013]). Nevertheless, it is estimated that number and size of these settlements and litigation cases are large and 
that these pose a real risk for the survival of audit firms (Donelson [2013]). 
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[2013]). There are substantial cross-sectional differences in liability regimes across U.S. states 
in terms of who constitutes a third-party that can hold the auditor liable for ordinary 
negligence,147 and in terms of apportionment of liability in case of multiple defendants148 
(Anantharman et al. [2016]). This allows the investigating of how cross-sectional differences 
in auditor litigation risk affect audit outcomes.  
Gaver et al. [2012] provide the first evidence that conservative financial reporting varies 
with auditor’s state-level legal liability to third parties in the property-casualty insurance 
industry. Specifically, in states with third-party liability based on restatement of torts or 
reasonable foreseeability (i.e. high liability regimes), understating of insurers’ loss reserves 
occurs less than in states with third-party liability based on privity (i.e. low liability regimes). 
Anantharaman et al. [2016] expand on Gaver et al. [2012] by examining whether the propensity 
of auditors to issue a going concern opinion to financially distressed clients in a broad sample 
of industries varies by different liability regimes. The authors consider both third-party liability 
regimes and liability apportionment rules. Anantharaman et al. [2016] find evidence that the 
likelihood of a going concern opinion is higher in high liability regimes than in low liability 
regimes. They further exploit changes to state liability standards and, using a difference-in-
differences approach, provide evidence that a decrease in liability in two states decreased the 
propensity of auditors to issue a going concern opinion in these treated compared to non-treated 
states. In summary, there is some evidence that litigation risk at the federal level and at the 
state level affects audit quality and reporting.  
As a first step and benchmark for this study, validating the findings in Anantharaman 
et al. [2016], I investigate whether and how auditor reporting differs across state liability 
regimes in the U.S. I also test for cross-sectional differences in audit fees across different 
liability regimes and expect that auditors charge higher fees to audit clients for which they face 
higher litigation risk, compared to audit clients for which they face lower litigation risk. This 
 
147 As described in Pacini et al. [2000a; 2000b], Gaver et al. [2012] and Anantharaman et al. [2016], four major 
approaches to determine third parties to whom the auditor is liable exist (in increasing order of strictness). First, 
the privity standard is most restrictive and requires a contractual relationship to exist between the auditor and the 
third-party. Second, the near-privity standard holds auditors liable towards a third-party who relied on its report. 
Third, the restatement of torts standard holds the audit firm liable to third parties belonging to a limited group for 
whom the auditor supplies information and suffers a loss by relying on this information, if the auditor fails to 
exercise reasonable care. Fourth, the reasonable foreseeability standard holds the auditor liable to all third parties 
who the auditor can reasonably foresee to use the audited statements for proper business purposes.  
148 Anantharaman et al. [2016] develop an index that indicates how damages are apportioned among multiple 
defendants, based on ATRA [2014]. The major distinctions are joint and several liability and proportionate 
liability, with other apportionment rules lying on a continuum. Joint and several liability means that the party 
suffering a loss can recover full damages from any defendant in case of multiple defendants. Proportionate liability 
means that third parties can only recover the proportionate share of damages from a defendant for which the 
defendant was responsible.  
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is based on the premise that auditors can adjust audit pricing for litigation risk to compensate 
for higher risk or for adjustments to audit effort to improve audit quality (e.g. Palmrose [1986]; 
Simunic & Stein [1994]).149  
Further, third parties can accuse auditors of negligent misreporting if they fail to issue 
a going concern opinion for financially distressed clients that subsequently go bankrupt 
(Carcello & Palmrose [1994]; Geiger & Rama [2006]; Mutchler [1984]; Thoman [1996]). To 
avoid litigation for failing to issue going concern opinions, auditors can report more 
conservatively as indicated by a higher likelihood of a going concern opinion, or a Type I error 
(the issuance of a going concern opinion to a client that does subsequently not go bankrupt). 
However, conservative auditor reporting is costly since an audit firm can lose clients and thus 
future quasi-rents after issuing an unwarranted going concern opinion (DeAngelo [1981]). 
Auditor behavior should thus depend on the ratio between expected litigation costs related to 
negligent misreporting and costs related to Type I errors (Carson et al. [2013]). Overall, I expect 
auditor reporting conservatism to be higher for audit clients for which auditors are exposed to 
higher litigation risk, compared to audit clients for which auditors are exposed to lower 
litigation risk.  
Audit fees and auditor reporting are two distinct ways of addressing litigation risk, since 
additional audit effort might not help relatively late during the audit process when the auditor 
makes his/her reporting decision, and is also unlikely to address litigation risk based on auditor 
reporting since the decision is based on assumptions about the future bankruptcy of a client 
(Kaplan & Williams [2013]). Hence, I look at both types of audit outcomes and formulate the 
first set of hypotheses as follows:150 
H1a: Auditors report more conservatively for clients for which the auditor faces higher 
litigation risk from third-parties and higher damage apportionment than for clients for 
which the auditors face lower litigation risk from these sources.  
H1b: Auditors charge higher fees to clients for which the auditor faces higher litigation 
risk from third-parties and higher damage apportionment than to clients for which the 
auditors face lower litigation risk from these sources.  
 
149 The prediction regarding the association between audit fees and litigation risk is the same for the effort and 
risk premium explanation. This paper does not intend to disentangle these explanations. 
150 Underlying these hypotheses is the assumption that auditors adjust their behavior based on the mere risk of 
litigation, not actual litigation. 
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As the focus of this study, I explore how litigation risk from third-party auditor liability 
and damage apportionment standards interact with regulatory risk from audit firms’ exposure 
to PCAOB inspections.  
As mentioned above, a major change in the institutional and regulatory environment of 
auditors was the introduction of SOX which increased federal litigation risk for auditors. With 
the establishment of the PCAOB, SOX also increased regulatory risk for auditors. The 
PCAOB’s responsibilities include, among others, the inspection of auditors of public entities, 
the disclosure of inspection results, including non-remediated quality control issues (PCAOB 
[2016]; SOX 104), and the power to discipline audit firms that violate auditing standards, 
professional standards or are in non-compliance with SOX and securities laws151 (PCAOB 
[2016]; SOX 105). The regular inspection process made regulatory intervention frequent and 
“represents a fundamental change in the risk dynamics of U.S. audit markets” (DeFond & 
Zhang [2014], P. 279), thus substantially increasing regulatory risk for audit firms. That is, the 
regular inspections of audit firms by the PCAOB increases the likelihood of detection of low 
audit quality and increases the likelihood of subsequent enforcement actions and sanctions. In 
general, PCAOB inspections are expected to provide auditors with an incentive to increase 
audit quality because of these regulatory concerns and potential subsequent reputational 
concerns (e.g. Gunny & Zhang [2013]; Aobdia [2019]). Prior literature finds evidence that 
PCAOB inspections positively impact auditor clients’ financial reporting quality (e.g. Aobdia 
[2019]; Carcello et al. [2011]; Fung et al. [2017]; Lamoreaux [2016]), auditor reporting (e.g. 
DeFond & Lennox [2017]; Gramling et al. [2011]; Lamoreaux [2016]) and audit fees (Acito et 
al. [2018]; Vanstraelen & Zou [2017]).  
While there is evidence that litigation risk at the federal and state level, and PCAOB 
inspections separately impact audit reporting conservatism and audit fees, it is not clear how 
these forces interact. In particular, there is limited evidence as to how third-party auditor 
liability, which varies across U.S. states, influences auditor conservative reporting and fees 
(Minutti-Meza [2014], and no evidence as to how these state liability regimes interact with 
forces that impose regulatory risk on auditors. However, the PCAOB does not operate 
independently, but acts within the general legal and litigation environment. In this regard, 
Kinney [2005] suggests that PCAOB inspection results could in theory expose firms to 
increased litigation risk. Furthermore, there is evidence that audit partners perceive PCAOB 
 
151 Examples of enforcement actions vary from less severe, such as censures and fines, to more severe, such as 
revocation of firm registration, or barring individual auditors from auditing public clients (PCAOB [2016]). 
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inspections to increase litigation risk (Houston & Stefaniak [2013]). Thus, changes in auditor 
exposure to regulatory intervention can arguably interact with the liability regimes in which 
the auditor operates. I propose that auditors take into account litigation risk when reacting to 
PCAOB inspections.  
On the one hand, if regulatory oversight is an alternative disciplining mechanism to a 
strong liability regime, regulatory and litigation risks would be substitutes (Ye & Simunic 
[2017]). This is because once effort or audit quality meets auditing standards, auditors might 
not have an additional incentive to provide an even higher level of effort or audit quality, or 
report more conservatively due to the costs of Type I errors. Furthermore, if auditors charge a 
sufficiently high audit fee to compensate for effort or risk to meet auditing standards, an 
increase in regulatory risk might not increase audit fees for auditors in high liability regimes, 
but the contrary may hold true for auditors in low liability regimes. In this regard, Fung et al. 
[2017] find that the introduction of PCAOB inspection of foreign auditors increases audit 
quality more in jurisdictions with low auditor liability regimes, which would suggest that 
regulatory risk and litigation risk are substitutes in an international setting. 
On the other hand, changes in audit quality or changes in audit fees after an increase in 
regulatory risk may be larger for auditors operating in high liability regimes. Regulatory 
oversight can improve auditors’ effectiveness in detecting material misstatements and their 
reporting accuracy regardless of the liability regime the auditor operates in and can thus 
improve audit value even in strong legal regimes (Ye & Simunic [2017]). Furthermore, auditors 
facing high risks from both litigation and regulation have an incentive to increase audit quality 
or report more conservatively to avoid high penalties from both risks and can incorporate a risk 
premium for both risks in their audit fees. These arguments would suggest that litigation and 
regulatory risk are complementary. 
I therefore formulate the following set of non-directional hypotheses to examine whether 
the effect of PCAOB inspections varies by state liability regimes: 
H2a: The auditor’s exposure to regulatory risk stemming from PCAOB inspections affects 
the association between litigation risk from third-parties and damage apportionment 
standards and auditor reporting. 
H2b: The auditor’s exposure to regulatory risk stemming from PCAOB inspections affects 
the association between litigation risk from third parties and damage apportionment 
standards and audit fees. 
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4.3 Research design and sample selection 
4.3.1 PROXIES FOR LITIGATION RISK AND REGULATORY RISK 
The main variables of interest are the various U.S. state liability regimes, as well as 
PCAOB inspections and their outcomes. As mentioned before, the proxies for state liability 
regimes are based on, and coded in line with Anantharaman et al. [2016]. State liability regimes 
are governed by third-party liability standards and damage apportionment standards, which 
measure different dimensions of litigation risk for auditors. First, third-party liability standards 
determine which parties can hold the auditor liable for ordinary negligence under common law 
and thus influence the likelihood of a lawsuit based on the number of parties that can sue an 
auditor. As described in Pacini et al. [2000a; 2000b], Gaver et al. [2012] and Anantharaman et 
al. [2016], these include the privity standard which requires a contractual relationship to exist 
between the auditor and the third-party; the near-privity standard which holds auditors liable 
towards a third-party that relied on their report; the restatement of torts standard which holds 
the audit firm liable to third parties belonging to a limited group to whom the auditor supplies 
information and that suffers a loss by relying on this information if the auditor fails to exercise 
reasonable care; and the reasonable foreseeability standard which holds the auditor liable to all 
third parties who the auditor can reasonably foresee will use the audited statements for proper 
business purposes. Based on who constitutes a third-party in case of a lawsuit, litigation risk 
for the auditor is lowest in states where privity standards prevail, is higher in states with near-
privity and restatement of torts standards and is highest in cases where the reasonable 
foreseeability standard applies.  
Second, damage apportionment standards determine the size of a potential payout for 
auditors if a lawsuit is successful. Damages can be apportioned among multiple defendants in 
the case of a lawsuit against an auditor in two main ways: first, third parties suffering a loss 
can only recover the proportionate share of damages from a defendant for which the defendant 
was responsible (proportionate liability); and second, third-parties can recover full damages 
from any defendant in case of multiple defendants (joint and several liability) (Anantharaman 
et al. [2016]; ATRA [2014]). Certain states also use a modified (less strict) joint and several 
liability standard. Since damage apportionment standards influence the size of a lawsuit against 
an auditor, they represent a different dimension of litigation risk for auditors compared to third-
party liability standards. Hence the results of both proxies might not necessarily be aligned. 
Appendix 4A of this chapter provides the description of the prevalent third-party 
liability and damage apportionment standards and their coding according to Anantharaman et 
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al. [2016] for each U.S. state until 2009.152 Third-party liability standards are measured as a 
continuous variable ranging from 1 to 9 with higher values indicating higher third-party 
liability (TPLIndex), as well as a dummy variable indicating high (restatement of torts or 
reasonable foreseeability reflected in a coding of third-party liability standards of four or 
higher) versus low liability standards (privity or near-privity, coded less than four) 
(TPLDummy) (see footnote 147 for descriptions; Gaver et al. [2012]; Anantharaman et al. 
[2016]). Liability-sharing standards are coded on a nominal scale (as joint and several liability, 
modified joint and several liability, and proportionate liability) (JSLIndex), as well as a dummy 
variable indicating highest (joint and several liability reflected in a coding of damage 
apportionment standards of one) vs lower (all others, coded less than one) liability sharing 
regimes (JSLDummy) (see footnote 148 for descriptions; Anantharaman et al. [2016]; ATRA 
[2014]).  
To match state liability regimes to a certain client-year observation, I follow the 
procedure in Anantharaman et al. [2016]. Specifically, I assign the state law with the most 
significant relationship relating to a lawsuit or the parties of a lawsuit to an observation 
(American Law Institute [1971]). The most significant relationship can be the place of 
incorporation or place of business, the place where the injury or conduct occurred or the place 
where the relationship between the parties is located. Following Anantharaman et al. [2016], 
the state law that would apply in a third-party lawsuit against the auditor is thus identified as 
the one with the highest score of either the client’s state of incorporation or the state where the 
client’s headquarters are located, or the audit firm’s location (state of local office or head 
office). This approach cannot capture all state laws that might apply in the case of a lawsuit 
since, for example, the place where the relationship between parties is located (e.g. the 
plaintiff’s location) is only known in the case of a lawsuit. However, the auditor does not know 
ex-ante where the third-party plaintiff may be located and therefore the proposed assignment 
of liability regimes to states likely reflects the expectation of the auditor regarding litigation 
risk from third parties and liability sharing. I retrieve the information on client’s state of 
incorporation and state of headquarters from the Notre Dame Software Repository for 
Accounting and Finance153, the state of the audit office in which the engagement auditor is 
 
152 The measures are only updated until 2009 in Anantharaman et al. [2016]. Hence, I choose 2009 as the end of 
my sample period.  
153 This repository provides information contained in the header section of all 10-K filings on SEC EDGAR, 
including information on client firm’s state of incorporation and state of headquarter, see http://sraf.nd.edu 
(Loughran & McDonald [2016]). 
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located from Audit Analytics and the state of the audit firm’s head office is manually collected 
from PCAOB inspection reports and audit firm’s websites. 
To proxy for regulatory risk, I identify first-time PCAOB inspection report release dates 
and PCAOB inspection outcomes from the PCAOB website for all audit firms in the sample. I 
assume that regulatory risk is affected when PCAOB inspections are disclosed since external 
stakeholders only know that an audit firm has been inspected once the report is made public.154 
The PCAOB started inspecting Big 4 audit firms with one-time limited inspections in 2003. In 
2004, it started with full annual inspections for all annually inspected audit firms, i.e. firms 
with more than 100 issuer clients. Audit firms with less than 100 issuer clients are inspected 
triennially and these inspections were phased in over three years. Hence, PCAOB inspection 
report disclosure dates are staggered over time for different audit firms and can affect clients 
of different audit firms at different points in time, depending on their fiscal year end. I use this 
staggered introduction to identify changes in regulatory risk for different audit firms and 
clients. I thus code the variable PostInsp equal to 1 if the annual report of clients falls in the 
period after the first inspection report release date, and 0 otherwise.  
4.3.2 EMPIRICAL MODELS 
The general empirical model to investigate hypothesis 1 is the following: 
, = + , + ,
+ ,      +  
(1) 
Where Outcome is either the likelihood of a first-time going concern opinion for 
financially-distressed clients (GCFirst) and the likelihood of a first-time Type I reporting error 
(TypeI) as a measure of auditor conservative reporting, or audit fees (AUFees).155 As mentioned 
before, audit firms can respond to risks in multiple ways, two of which are increasing audit 
fees or reporting more conservatively. I therefore use audit fees as a dependent variable and 
choose the likelihood of a first-time going concern opinion and Type I error as a measure of 
conservative auditor reporting since a large number of third-party lawsuits are related to 
bankruptcy cases and auditor reporting measures directly reflect auditor behavior 
(Anantharaman et al. [2016]).  
 
154 An underlying assumption is that audit firms do not react to PCAOB inspections early by changing their 
behavior in terms of auditor reporting or charging different audit fees. 
155 Audit fees can be used as a proxy for audit quality (DeFond & Zhang [2014]). However, it is difficult to 
disentangle whether the association between litigation risk and audit fees reflects additional audit effort leading 
to higher audit quality or a risk premium and thus an audit pricing issue. Therefore, in this paper, I focus on audit 
quality and audit fees as separate issues. 
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LiabilityRegime is one of the four separate measures of liability regimes: TPLIndex, a 
continuous measure for third-party liability standards: TPLDummy, a dummy variable 
indicating high and low third-party liability standards; JSLIndex, a nominal measure for 
damage apportionment standards; and JSLDummy, a dummy variable indicating high and low 
third-party liability standards. In additional analyses, I further use the dummy variables 
TPLHigh&JSLHigh, indicating combined high third-party liability and high damage 
apportionment standards, which I compare to all other combinations of TPL and JSL as the 
baseline. Following the first set of hypotheses, I expect a higher likelihood of a first-time going 
concern opinion for financially distressed clients and higher audit fees for clients in states with 
higher third-party liability and damage apportionment standards. I therefore expect a positive 
coefficient . 
To investigate hypothesis 2, I use the following model adapted from Carcello et al. 
[2011]: 
, = + , + ,  
+  , ,  + ,
+ ,      +  
(2) 
Where Outcome and LiabilityRegime are described above. PostInsp is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 for client-year observations in the years after their auditor received a 
PCAOB inspection report, but before the next report is released. The coefficient  of the 
interaction term between LiabilityRegime and PostInsp allows analyzing whether and how the 
effect of PCAOB inspections varies with state liability regimes. A positive coefficient would 
indicate that litigation and regulatory risk reinforce each other (i.e. a complementary effect), 
while a negative coefficient would indicate the opposite (i.e. a substitution effect).  
In line with prior work, I restrict the going concern model to financially-distressed 
clients only, which are those clients with negative net income or negative cash flow. I include 
the following control variables in the going concern model, based on prior research (e.g. 
Anantharaman et al. [2016]; Reynolds & Franics [2000]). I control for the probability of 
bankruptcy using the Altman Z-Score (Altman); the incidence of losses in the current (Loss) 
and prior year (LagLoss); leverage of the client (Leverage) and change in leverage 
(ChLeverage) which are proxies for the closeness to violation of debt covenants; liquidity of 
the client (CashRatio); future equity issuance of the client (FutEquityIssu) and future debt 
issuance of the client (FutDebtIssu); the size of the client (LnTA); the type of the auditor (Big4); 
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the change in auditor by controlling for whether the audit is a first year audit (FirstYrAudit) 
and the length of the report lag between fiscal year end and auditor opinion date indicating 
complexity of the audit (ReportLag).  
Based on prior research (Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Choi et al., 2010; and Ball et al., 2012), 
I include the following control variables in the audit fee model: client size measured as total 
assets (LnTA); the type of auditor (Big4); client firm leverage (Leverage), the incidence of 
losses in the current year (Loss), return on assets (ROA) and the current ratio (CurrRatio) as 
proxies for client-specific risk; the market to book ratio (MtoB) as a measure of the asset base; 
indicators of client restructuring (Restructure), client’s involvement in an M&A transaction 
(MandA), the presence of special items (SpecItem), the payment of foreign taxes (TaxForeign), 
and a change in debt or equity financing (Financing) as measures of client complexity; an 
indicator of whether the fiscal year end is in December (DecYearEnd) as a measure for 
auditor’s busyness; and lastly indicators of a going concern opinion (GoingConcern) and 
internal control material weakness (ICMW) opinion to account for the auditor’s additional work 
related to these opinions. 
I include industry (based on 2-digit SIC codes) and year fixed effects in all models and 
cluster the standard errors at client firm level.156 In the audit fee analyses, I also include audit 
firm fixed effects .157 All variables are defined in Appendix 4B of this chapter.  
4.3.3 SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTION 
The sample selection process is shown in Table 1. The initial sample includes all client-
year observations from the Compustat-Audit Analytics universe from 2001 until 2009. I only 
include client-year observations until the year 2009 since the indices for the third-party liability 
and damage apportionment standards, based on prior research (Anantharaman et al. [2016]), 
are available only until that year.  
I delete all observations pertaining to the financial industries (SIC-codes 6000-6999), 
and all observations pertaining to foreign auditors and those engagements for which the liability 
regimes cannot be measured (i.e. those observations lacking information on client headquarter 
and state of incorporation and auditor headquarter and office). I drop observations with missing 
dependent variables and missing independent variables. This results in a sample for the audit 
 
156 In sensitivity analyses for the audit fee model, I include year and client firm fixed effects to control for 
unobserved time-invariant characteristics that might be associated with audit fees. This does not change the 
inferences of the results.  
157 Since I do not observe the issuance of going concern opinions for a large number of audit firms, as well as a 
large number of client firms in my dataset, I do not include audit firm or client firm fixed effects in the going 
concern analyses. 
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fee analysis of 33,563 client-year observations. In the going concern analysis, I restrict the 
sample to financially-distressed client firms, which are defined as firms with negative operating 
cash flow or negative net income in a specific year, and eliminate all observations pertaining 
to  industries for which there are no first-time going concern opinion during the sample period 
resulting in 14,595 client-year observations. For the Type I error analysis, I further drop 
observations for which information on bankruptcy or liquidation in year t+1 is not available on 
Compustat, resulting in a sample of 13,252 observations. 
 
TABLE 1 
Sample selection  
Initial sample from Compustat-Audit Analytics Merge (2001-2009) 68,384 
Delete financial industries (SIC-code 6000-6999) (18,104) 
Delete observations if information for liability standard definition is 
missing and client-year observations pertaining to foreign auditors 
(9,630) 
 40,650 
Delete observations for missing dependent variables (347) 
Delete observations for missing control variables (6,740) 
Sample for the audit fee analysis 33,563 
  
Delete observations for missing control variables for the going concern 
model 
(2,565) 
Restrict to financially-distressed firms (16,301) 
Exclude industries without a first-time going concern opinion (102) 
Financially-distressed subsample for the going concern analysis 14,595 
Exclude observations with missing information on bankruptcy or 
liquidation in year t+1 
(1,343) 
Financially-distressed subsample for the Type I error analysis 13,252 
  
 
Table 2, Panel A, provides information on the composition of the audit fee sample by 
state for the variables which are used to assign the liability regimes: client incorporation, client 
headquarters, audit office and audit firm headquarters, respectively. Most commonly, client-
year headquarters are in California and Texas. Most client-years are incorporated in Delaware, 
which is well-documented due to the favorable conditions that incorporation in Delaware 
provides to companies. Most audit firms that audit the client-years in the sample are 
headquartered in New York158, followed by Illinois. Most frequently, audit offices that audit 
client-years in this sample are located in California, followed by New York and Texas. These 
 
158 All Big 4 audit firms are headquartered in New York which explains the composition of the sample in terms 
of auditor headquarter by client-year. 
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numbers correspond relatively well to the state of client firm headquarters, however, some 
companies choose out-of-headquarter-state auditors. Overall, there is variation in all state 
locations that determine assignment of a client engagement-year to a liability index. 
4.4. Results 
4.4.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 2, Panel B, shows the frequency distribution of client-year observations of the five 
proxies of liability regime (TPLIndex, TPLDummy, JSLIndex, JSLDummy and the combined  
 
TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Sample composition by state (audit fee sample) 
State of client firm 
headquarter 
State of client firm 
incorporation 
State of auditor 
engagement office 
State of auditor 
headquarter 
State   Frequency State   Frequency State   Frequency State   Frequency 
CA 18.69% DE 62.86% CA 18.32% NY 73.54% 
TX 10.03% CA 3.50% NY 9.74% IL 8.19% 
NY 8.01% NV 2.93% TX 9.56% CA 3.03% 
MA 5.60% NY 2.89% MA 6.08% NJ 2.13% 
NJ 4.71% MN 2.20% PA 4.54% CO 1.91% 
PA 4.36% OH 1.98% FL 4.50% TX 1.87% 
All 
others 48.6%  23.08%  48.56%  10.48% 
 
measures) for the audit fee sample. Most observations (73.01%) fall under a restatement of 
torts third-party liability regime, followed by near privity (14.6%) and reasonable foreseeability 
(12.01%), while very few observations fall under a privity regime (0.39%). In terms of damage 
apportionment, most observations fall under a full joint and several liability regime (91.48%), 
and few observations (4.89%) fall under a modified version or a proportionate damage 
apportionment standard (3.63%). These descriptive statistics reflect the findings in 
Anantharaman et al. [2016]. The descriptives further show that 52.17 percent (44.33 percent) 
of client-year observations are in the post inspection period (i.e. in the period after the 
publication of the first PCAOB inspection report of their auditor (PostInsp=1)) in the audit fee 
sample (in the going concern sample).   
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics (continued) 
Panel B: Frequency distribution across liability regimes (audit fee sample) 
TPLIndex  TPLDummy 
Privity (1-2) 0.39% TPLDummy=0 14.98% 
Near Privity (2.5-3.5) 14.59% TPLDummy=1 85.02% 
Restatement of Torts (4-7) 73.01%   
Reasonable Foreseeability (7.5-9) 12.01%   
JSLIndex  JSLDummy 
Proportionate Liability 3.63% JSLDummy=0 8.52% 
Modified JSL 4.89% JSLDummy=1 91.48% 
Full JSL 91.48%   
All variables are defined in Appendix 4B 
Table 2, Panel C, provides descriptive statistics for all dependent and independent 
variables for the going concern sample. Seven percent of client-year observations receive a 
first-time going concern opinion from their auditor. The client firms in the subsample are in 
financial distress as indicated by a high negative mean Altman Z-Score (Altman), a high 
percentage of loss firms (Loss) and previous year loss firms (LagLoss) and negative ROA and 
operating cash flow (CFO). Companies have average Leverage of 47%, and a large percentage 
issue equity (FutEquityIssu) or debt (FutDebtIssu) in year t+1. Furthermore, 54% of the 
observations are audited by a Big4 audit firm, 14% are first-year audits (FirstYrAudit) and the 
report lag (ReportLag) is 73 days on average. This reflects the descriptives in Anantharaman 
et al. [2016]. 
TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics (continued) 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics for the going concern analysis sample 
Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev Min 25th percentile 75th percentile Max 
GCFirst 14,595 0.07 0 0.25 0 0 0 1 
Altman 14,595 -8.71 1.21 55.42 -522.44 -2.64 3.37 57.96 
Loss 14,595 0.92 1 0.28 0 1 1 1 
LagLoss 14,595 0.73 1 0.44 0 0 1 1 
ROA 14,595 -0.79 -0.17 2.45 -20.45 -0.52 -0.04 0.37 
CFO 14,595 -0.30 -0.04 0.91 -6.96 -0.26 0.04 0.36 
Leverage 14,595 0.47 0.17 1.21 0 0.01 0.44 10.19 
ChLeverage 14,595 0.07 0 0.62 -2.28 -0.02 0.07 4.13 
CashRatio 14,595 0.27 0.16 0.27 0 0.04 0.44 0.97 
FutEquityIssu 14,595 0.76 1 0.43 0 1 1 1 
FutDebtIssu 14,595 0.44 0 0.50 0 0 1 1 
LnTA 14,595 4.00 4.06 2.39 -2.90 2.51 5.56 10.74 
Big4 14,595 0.54 1 0.50 0 0 1 1 
FirstYrAudit 14,595 0.14 0 0.35 0 0 0 1 
ReportLag 14,595 73.49 73 33.39 20 56 87 244 
All variables are defined in Appendix 4B 
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Table 2, Panel D, provides descriptive statistics for the audit fee subsample. The 
average audit fee is $1.19mn (average lnAUFee of 12.92). The proxies for client-specific risk 
indicate that 44% of firms are loss-making firms (Loss), have a negative average ROA of -0.34 
and have Leverage of 33%. The average total assets are $2,073 mn (lnTA of 5.09). Big4 firms 
audit 66% of the observations, while  11% of the observations relate to first-year audits 
(FirstYrAudit). The average market to book ratio (MtoB) is 2.53 and the average current ratio 
(CurrRatio) is 0.52. In terms of client complexity, almost all client-year observations incur 
restructuring expenses (Restructure), 35% of client-year observations are involved in a M&A 
transaction (MandA), 51% pay foreign taxes (TaxForeign), 43% increase their outstanding debt 
or shares significantly (Financing) and 63% of client-year observations report special items in 
their financial statements. December financial year end (DecYearEnd) comprise 65% of client-
year observations, 11% receive a going concern opinion (GoingConcern) from their auditor 
and 34% receive an internal control material weakness opinion (ICMW) from their auditor. 
 
TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics (continued) 
Panel D: Descriptive Statistics for the audit fee sample 
Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev Min 25th percentile 75th percentile Max 
AUFee 33,563 12.92 12.91 1.47 9.28 11.84 13.96 16.46 
Loss 33,563 0.44 0 0.50 0 0 1 1 
ROA 33,563 -0.34 0.01 1.76 -20.45 -0.15 0.06 0.37 
Leverage 33,563 0.33 0.17 0.87 0.00 0.01 0.36 10.19 
LnTA 33,563 5.09 5.17 2.46 -2.90 3.49 6.77 10.74 
Big4 33,563 0.66 1 0.47 0 0 1 1 
FirstYrAudit 33,563 0.11 0 0.31 0 0 0 1 
ReportLag 33,563 66.69 65 29.17 20 51 77 244 
MtoB 33,563 2.53 1.84 8.54 -50.15 0.96 3.38 57.64 
CurrRatio 33,563 0.52 0.52 0.26 0.03 0.32 0.73 1 
Restructure 33,563 1.00 1 0.01 0 1 1 1 
MandA 33,563 0.35 0 0.48 0 0 1 1 
TaxForeign 33,563 0.51 1 0.50 0 0 1 1 
Financing 33,563 0.43 0 0.50 0 0 1 1 
SpecItem 33,563 0.63 1 0.48 0 0 1 1 
DecYearEnd 33,563 0.65 1 0.48 0 0 1 1 
GoingConcern 33,563 0.11 0 0.31 0 0 0 1 
ICMW 33,563 0.34 0 0.47 0 0 1 1 
All variables are defined in Appendix 4B 
 
4.4.2 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES 
4.4.2.1 Auditor Conservative Reporting 
In Table 3, Panels A and B, I report the results of equation (1) and (2) for the going 
concern model for all proxies of LiabilityRegime (TPLIndex, TPLDummy, JSLIndex and 
JSLDummy), the post-inspection (PostInsp) indicator as a measure of regulatory risk, and the 
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interaction between LiabilityRegime and PostInsp. In line with Anantharaman et al. [2016], I 
find that the likelihood of a first-time going concern opinion is higher for audit engagements 
for which the auditor faces higher litigation risk. Using probit analysis, I find that the likelihood 
of the auditor issuing a first-time going concern opinion is significantly higher when the auditor 
faces higher litigation risk for an audit engagement as measured by TPLDummy (Columns (4)) 
(p<0.01), JSLIndex (Columns (7)) (one-tailed p<0.1) and JSLDummy (Columns (10)) (p<0.05), 
which provides support for H1a. I do not find a significant difference in first-time going 
concern reporting likelihood after the publication of PCAOB inspection reports, compared to 
before the publication (PostInsp). When investigating the interaction between PostInsp and 
LiabilityRegime and its association with the likelihood of a first-time going concern opinion, I 
fail to find a significant effect as reported in Table 3. Most control variables are significant in 
the expected directions, with positive coefficients for variables indicating financial distress and 
negative coefficients for variables indicating positive operating performance.  
 In Table 3, Panel B, I find that auditors have a significantly higher likelihood of a Type 
I error (p<0.05) when auditing clients for which they face higher litigation risk for all measures 
of litigation risk, indicating that auditors report conservatively when facing high litigation risk, 
which further supports H1a. Further, the interaction effects between JSLDummy and JSLIndex 
and PostInsp (Columns (9) and (12)) are significantly positive (1% and 5%, respectively). 
Specifically, the Wald test indicates that the joint significance of the interaction term and the 
PostInsp main effect is significant at the 5% level ( =9.09; p-value=0.0106) for JSLIndex 
and at the 5% level ( =6.37; p-value=0.0414) for JSLDummy. This provides support for H2a. 
This provides evidence that litigation risk and regulatory risk reinforce auditor 
conservative reporting as measured by an increased likelihood of a Type I error. This finding, 
however, holds only for the damage apportionment litigation risk measures which are a proxy 
of the potential size of the auditor payouts in case of litigation, rather than the mere risk of 
litigation based on the potential number of parties that could sue the auditor. Hence, these 
results indicate that auditors report more conservatively when there is high regulatory risk and 
high litigation risk in form of large potential payouts. 
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I then further explore what drives the above result, that litigation risk and regulatory 
risk reinforce each other, but only when litigation risk is measured using damage 
apportionment liability regimes. On the one hand, the size of potential payouts is likely to 
matter more for small audit firms than large audit firms that are generally regarded to have 
deeper pockets that can more easily cover litigation costs. In addition, small audit firms are 
more likely to be named as co-defendants in lawsuits that allege financial reporting failure than 
large audit firms, putting smaller audit firms at higher risk of litigation (Lennox & Li [2019]). 
On the other hand, large audit firms with deeper pockets can have large amounts of wealth at 
risk in any one engagement (Dye [1993]; Franis & Krishnan [1999]; Geiger et al. [2006]; 
Lennox [2003]; Raghunandan & Rama [1999]; Shu [2000]). Further, large audit firms are 
generally also subject to more regulatory scrutiny than their small counterparts (Myers, 
Schmidt & Wilkins [2014]). For example, they face more frequent inspections by the PCAOB, 
and larger reputation concerns when inspections are deficient (e.g. Gunny & Zhang [2013]; 
Aobdia [2019]). It is thus an empirical question as to whether the above finding holds for small 
and large audit firms. Descriptive statistics show that all client-year observations of large audit 
firms (Big 4) are subject to strict third-party liability (TPLDummy-1) and joint and several 
liability regimes (JSLDummy=1). Hence, I cannot test whether large and small audit firms 
respond differently to incentives from regulatory and litigation risks by reporting more 
conservatively, when splitting on Big 4. I thus analyze whether the association between Type 
I error rates and the interaction between litigation and regulatory risk holds in the subsamples 
of GAFN and non-GAFN (i.e. Big 6 and non-Big 6 auditors). For the non-GAFN subsample, I 
find results that are largely consistent with the Type I error results in the full sample. As shown 
in Table 3, Panel C, I find that the main effect of liability regime is significant for all measures 
of liability regime, except TPLIndex. I further find that the interaction effect between PostInsp 
and JSLIndex and JSLDummy is significantly positive and jointly significant with the main 
effect of PostInsp. In the GAFN sample, I do not find a significant interaction effect between 
PostInsp and measures of liability regimes (untabulated, for brevity). 
Overall, these findings show that litigation risk and regulatory risk reinforce auditor 
conservative reporting as measured by an increased likelihood of a Type I error, but only for 
litigation risk measured as damage apportionment and for non-GAFN clients that have less 
resources to cover large litigation costs. 
4.4.2.2 Audit Fees  
Using OLS regressions, I analyze whether litigation risk, regulatory risk and the 
interaction of these risks are associated with audit fees. As shown in Table 4, I find that audit 
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fees are significantly higher (p<0.05) for stricter third-party liability standards when using 
TPLIndex, (Columns (1)-(3)) and TPLDummy (Columns (4)-(6)) as a measure for third-party 
litigation risk and for more expansive damage apportionment standards using JSLIndex 
(Columns (7)-(9)) and JSLDummy (Columns (10)-(12)). Overall, this provides evidence that 
there is variation in audit fees from third-party litigation risk, providing support for H1b, and 
shows that audit fees are one channel through which audit firms manage litigation risk (e.g. 
Palmrose [1986]; Simunic & Stein [1996]; Venkataraman et al. [2008]). As mentioned in 
footnote 149, I do not intend to disentangle whether this is due to higher auditor effort or a risk 
premium that is charged for engagements for which auditors face higher litigation risk. I further 
find a strong indication that audit fees increase after PCAOB inspections in most models, as 
reflected in the significant positive coefficient PostInsp. This reflects the findings in Acito et 
al. [2018] and Vanstraelen and Zou [2017].  
I find significantly positive coefficients (p<0.01) for the interaction between 
LiabilityRegime and PostInsp for all models, except when measuring litigation risk using 
TPLIndex (Columns (1)-(2)). This is a strong indication that the reaction to regulatory risk 
measured as the introduction of PCAOB inspections is higher when the auditor faces higher 
litigations risk for an audit client. This provides support for H2b and specifically for the 
suggestion that the effects of litigation and regulation risks on audit fees are complementary. 
Most control variables are significant in the expected directions, with positive coefficients for 
variables measuring client-specific risk, for variables measuring client complexity and for 
variables indicating increased audit effort. As is expected in audit fee regressions, the R-square 
is high and between 83.3 and 84.9 percent for the different models.  
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4.4.2 ADDITIONAL AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
4.4.2.1 Combined measure 
As a comprehensive measure of litigation risk, I also construct a combined measure of 
third-party and damage apportionment standards. I create an indicator variable 
TPLHigh&JSLHigh which equals one if both TPLDummy  and JSLDummy are equal to one, and 
zero otherwise. This indicator variable is included in the regression analyses and compared to 
the baseline of engagements subject to all other combinations of third-party liability and 
damage apportionment standards (untabulated for brevity).159 Descriptive statistics show that 
75.19 percent (78.17 percent) of client-year observations are subject to a strict third-party and 
damage apportionment regime (TPLHigh&JSLHigh) in the going concern (audit fee) sample.  
Using this combined measure, I find results consistent with the first-time going concern 
analysis. Only the liability regime measure (TPLHigh&JSLHigh) is significantly positive 
(p<0.05), but not the interaction effect with PostInsp. In the Type I error analysis, I find that 
both the main effect of TPLHigh&JSLHigh (p<0.01) and the interaction effect with PostInsp 
(p<0.1) are significantly positive, indicating that litigation and regulatory risk jointly increase 
auditor reporting conservatism. I further find that audit fees are significantly higher (p<0.01) 
for engagements subject to strict third-party liability and damage apportionment standards 
(TPLHigh&JSLHigh) compared to other engagements. I further find a significant positive 
interaction effect between PostInsp and TPLHigh&JSLHigh (p<0.01) in the audit fee analysis, 
indicating that regulatory risk and litigation risk jointly increase audit fees. 
4.4.2.2 Weighting of observations 
To account for differences in the number of observations between different liability 
regimes in my sample, I use weighted regression analyses by equally weighting liability 
regimes, rather than weighting client observations (Choi & Wong [2007]). Using weighted 
regression, where weights are defined as the inverse of the number of observations per legal 
regime (for each measure of legal regime TPLIndex, TPLDummy, JSLIndex and JSLDummy), 
my inferences in all samples remain the same.  
159 I choose to only code the high-high combination of TPL and JSL regimes. When coding other combinations 
(High TPL/Low JSL and LowTPL/High JSL), the baseline (LowTPL/Low JSL) only constitutes 1.66% of 
observations in the audit fee sample, and would thus not be a good comparison group.  
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4.5. Conclusions and Limitations 
This study sheds light on whether and how litigation risk and the interaction between 
litigation and regulatory risk affects auditor conservative reporting and audit fees. Specifically, 
this study investigates the interplay between litigation risk stemming from third-party auditor 
liability which varies substantially across U.S. states, and regulatory risk stemming from 
PCAOB inspections. 
Using a financially-distressed sample of client-year observations for which auditors’ 
third-party liability and damage apportionment standards differ across U.S. states, I find 
evidence that auditors are more likely to issue going concern opinions for engagements for 
which they face higher litigation risk. While I do not find evidence of a significant interaction 
effect of litigation and regulatory risk on the likelihood of going concern opinions, I do find 
evidence that these risks jointly increase auditor conservatism reflected in a higher likelihood 
of a Type I error for damage apportionment litigation risk measures. This indicates that auditors 
only react to high joint regulatory and litigation risk when potential payouts are high in case of 
litigation. This result in turn is driven by non-GAFN which have less resources available to 
cover large litigation payouts. I also find that audit fees are higher when auditors face higher 
litigation risk from auditing a certain client. More importantly, I find a positive and significant 
coefficient for the interaction between regulatory and litigation risk in the audit fee analysis, 
which further supports their complementary nature 
I contribute to the literature by investigating the relation between litigation and 
regulatory risks and how these risks jointly influence auditor behavior. This provides insights 
into how various institutional forces interact to influence auditor conservative reporting and 
audit fees. Collectively, I find evidence suggesting that the effect of litigation and regulatory 
risk are complementary in the U.S. setting. 
This paper is subject to several limitations. First, I investigate only specific sources of 
litigation and regulatory risk that can affect audit firms which assumes that other risks that 
affect audit quality and audit fees remain constant. Second, I only provide cross-sectional 
evidence on the impact of litigation risk on audit quality and fees since there are no exogenous 
changes in liability regime in U.S. states during the time period under investigation (2001-
2009). While a changes analysis could strengthen the identification of the analyses, the number 
of changes in assignment of a certain liability regime to an engagement based on changes in 
company locations and audit firm locations are very limited which makes analyzing changes 
in liability regime difficult. Third, I assume that regulatory risk affecting audit firms changes 
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once PCAOB inspection reports are released. This assumes that audit firms do not react to 
PCAOB inspections prior to the release of reports to the public.  
This study can be extended in multiple ways. First, future research can investigate the 
association between audit outcomes and other sources of litigation and regulatory risks, thus 
adding to the limited knowledge about how different auditor incentives interact. This is of 
interest since this study finds that litigation and regulatory risk are complementary, while for 
example Fung et al. [2017] find that PCOAB inspections and the litigation environment in an 
international setting are substitutes. Future studies could for example consider changes in 
federal litigation risk (Honigsberg et al. 2018) and the interaction with regulatory risk. Further, 
this study can also be seen as exploring the contextual settings under which PCAOB 
inspections are more or less effective. While this study investigates the effect of PCOAB 
inspections in different litigation environments, future research could consider whether 
different audit firm offices or auditors of clients in certain geographical regions react differently 
to PCAOB inspection commencement.  
  
Chapter 4 
150 
 
Appendices Chapter 4 
 
Appendix 4A: Description and coding of auditor liability regimes across U.S. states 
State 
Third-Party 
Liability 
Standard (1993-
2004) (Gaver et 
al, 2012) 
Third-Party Liability 
Index 
(Anantharaman et al., 
2016; Gaver et al., 
2012; Pacini et al., 
2000b) 
Joint-and-Several 
Liability Standard 
(2001-2009) 
(ATRA, 2014) 
Joint-and-Several 
Liability Index 
(Anantharaman et 
al., 2016) 
Alabama 
Near Privity 
(1993) 
Restatement 
(typical view) 
(1994-2004) 
3 (1993) 
5 (1994-2004) 
Full joint-and-
several liability 1 
Alaska Restatement (restrictive view) 4 
Proportionate 
Liability 0 
Arizona 
Restatement 
(typical view) 
(1993-2004) 
5 Proportionate Liability 0 
Arkansas 
Near Privity 
(1993-1994)  
Privity (1995-
2004) 
3 (1993-1994) 
1.5 (1995-2004) 
Modified joint-and-
several liability 
(2003-2009) 
Full joint-and-
several liability 
(2001-2002) 
0.5 (2003-2009) 
1 (2001-2002) 
California Restatement (restrictive view) 4 
Full joint-and-
several liability 1 
Colorado Restatement (typical view) 5 
Proportionate 
Liability 0 
Connecticut 
Near Privity 
(1993-1997) 
Near Privity 
(1998-2004) 
2.5 (1993-1997) 
3.5 (1998-2004) 
Full joint-and-
several liability 1 
Delaware Restatement (typical view) 5 
Full joint-and-
several liability 1 
District of 
Columbia Privity 2 
Full joint-and-
several liability 1 
Florida Restatement (typical view) 5 
Proportionate 
Liability (2006-
2009) Modified 
joint-and-several 
liability (2001-
2005) 
0 (2006-2009) 0.5 
(2001-2005) 
Georgia Restatement (typical view) 5 
Proportionate 
Liability (2005-
2009) Modified 
joint-and-several 
liability (2001-
2004) 
0 (2005-2009) 0.5 
(2001-2004) 
Hawaii Restatement (typical view) 5 
Full joint-and-
several liability 1 
Idaho Near Privity 2.5 Proportionate Liability 0 
Illinois Near Privity 3.5 Full joint-and-several liability 1 
Indiana Near Privity 2.5 Proportionate Liability 0 
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Iowa Restatement (typical view) 5 
Modified joint-and-
several liability 0.5 
Kansas Near Privity 2.5 Proportionate Liability 0 
Kentucky Restatement (typical view) 5 
Proportionate 
Liability 0 
Louisiana Restatement (typical view) 5 
Proportionate 
Liability 0 
Maine Restatement (typical view) 5 
Full joint-and-
several liability 1 
Maryland Near Privity 2.5 Full joint-and-several liability 1 
Massachusetts Restatement (restrictive view) 4 
Proportionate 
Liability 0 
Michigan 
Restatement 
(typical view) 
(1993-1995) 
Restatement 
(restrictive view) 
(1996-2004) 
5 (1993-1995)  
4 (1996-2004) 
Proportionate 
Liability 0 
Minnesota Restatement (expansive view) 7 
Modified joint-and-
several liability 0.5 
Mississippi Reasonable Foreseeability 7.5 
Proportionate 
Liability (2004-
2009)  
Modified joint-and-
several liability 
(2001-2003) 
0 (2004-2009) 
0.5(2001-2003) 
Missouri Restatement (typical view) 5 
Modified joint-and-
several liability 0.5 
Montana Near Privity 3 Modified joint-and-several liability 0.5 
Nebraska Privity 2 Full joint-and-several liability 1 
Nevada Restatement (typical view) 5 
Proportionate 
Liability 0 
New 
Hampshire 
Restatement 
(typical view) 5 
Modified joint-and-
several liability 0.5 
New Jersey 
Reasonable 
Foreseeability 
(1993-1994) 
Near Privity 
(1995-2004) 
9 (1993-1994) 
2.5 (1995-2004) 
Modified joint-and-
several liability 0.5 
New Mexico Restatement (typical view) 5 
Proportionate 
Liability 0 
New York Near Privity 2.5 Full joint-and-several liability 1 
North Carolina Restatement (typical view) 5 
Full joint-and-
several liability 1 
North Dakota Restatement (typical view) 5 
Proportionate 
Liability 0 
Ohio Restatement (restrictive view) 4.5 
Full joint-and-
several liability 
(2001-2002) 
Modified joint-and-
several liability 
(2003-2009) 
1 (2001-2002) 0.5 
(2003-2009) 
Oklahoma Restatement (typical view) 5 
Modified joint-and-
several liability 0.5 
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Oregon Restatement (typical view) 5 
Modified joint-and-
several liability 0.5 
Pennsylvania Privity 1 
Modified joint-and-
several liability 
(2002-2004) 
Full joint-and-
several liability 
(2001) (2005-2009) 
0.5 (2002-2004) 
1 (2001) (2005-2009) 
Rhode Island Restatement (typical view) 5 
Proportionate 
Liability 0 
South Carolina Restatement (typical view) 5 
Full joint-and-
several liability 
(2001-2004) 
Modified joint-and-
several liability 
(2005-2009) 
1 (2001-2004) 0.5 
(2005-2009) 
South Dakota Restatement (typical view) 5 
Modified joint-and-
several liability 0.5 
Tennessee Restatement (typical view) 5 
Proportionate 
Liability 0 
Texas Reasonable Foreseeability 7.5 
Modified joint-and-
several liability 0.5 
Utah Near Privity 2.5 Proportionate Liability 0 
Vermont Restatement (typical view) 5 
Proportionate 
Liability 0 
Virginia Privity 1 Full joint-and-several liability 1 
Washington 
Restatement 
(typical view) 
(1993-1997) 
Restatement 
(typical view) 
(1998-2004) 
5 (1993-1997) 
6 (1998-2004) 
Full joint-and-
several liability 1 
West Virginia Restatement (typical view) 5 
Modified joint-and-
several liability 0.5 
Wisconsin Reasonable Foreseeability 7.5 
Modified joint-and-
several liability 0.5 
Wyoming 
Restatement 
(typical view) 
(1993-1994)  
Near Privity 
(1995-2004) 
5 (1993-1994) 3 (1995-
2004) 
Proportionate 
Liability 0 
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Appendix 4B: Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
Variable Definition Data Source 
Variables of Interest and dependent variables 
TPLIndex Is an index measuring the extent to which auditors can be 
held liable for negligence by third-party non-clients, with 
scale form 1 (indicating the least strict standard) to 9 
(indicating the strictest standard). The coding foreach state is 
shown in Appendix 4A. 
Anantharaman et 
al. (2016); Gaver 
et al. (2012); 
Pacini et al. 
(2000b).  
TPLDummy Is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the third-party liability 
standards restatement or reasonable foreseeability applies 
(TPLIndex>=4), and 0 in case the standards of privity or near-
privity apply.  
JSLIndex Is an index measuring the damage apportionment rule in case 
of a lawsuits against the auditor and is set to 0 in case of 
proportionate liability, 0.5 in case of modified joint-and-
several liability (JSL), and 1 in case of full JSL. The coding 
for each state is shown in Appendix 4A. 
Anantharaman et 
al. (2016); ATRA 
(2014). 
JSLDummy Is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the damage 
apportionment rule is full JSL (JSLIndex=1), and 0 otherwise.  
TPLHigh&JSLHigh, Is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the third-party liability 
standards restatement or reasonable foreseeability apply 
(TPLIndex>=4) and the damage apportionment rule is full 
JSL (JSLIndex=1), 0 otherwise. 
Anantharaman et 
al. (2016) 
PostInsp Is an indicator variable equal to 1 for client-year observations 
in the years after their auditor received a PCAOB inspection 
reports, but before the next report is released. 
PCAOB 
GCFirst Is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the auditor issues a first-
time going concern opinion to the client in year t, and 0 
otherwise. 
Audit Analytics 
TypeI Is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the auditor issues a first-
time type I error to the client in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
Audit Analytics; 
Compustat 
AUFee Is the natural logarithm of total audit fees. Audit Analytics 
 
Control variables – going concern model 
Altman Altman’s Z-Score representing the client’s risk of bankruptcy 
in fiscal year t, calculated following Altman (1968) as: 
Altman = A x 3.3 + B x 0.99 + C x 0.6 + D x 1.2 + E x 1.4 
Where, A=operating efficiency (EBIT/AT); B=total asset 
turnover (SALE/AT); C=leverage ratio 
(CSHO*PRCC_F/LT); D=asset liquidity (WCAP/AT); 
E=earnings power (RE/AT). 
Compustat 
Loss An indicator variable equal to 1 if income before 
extraordinary items (IB) is negative in year t, and 0 otherwise.  
Compustat 
LagLoss An indicator variable equal to 1 if income before 
extraordinary items (IB) is negative in year t-1, and 0 
otherwise.  
Compustat 
ROA Return on Assets, defined as income before extraordinary 
items (IB) in year t/total assets (AT). 
Compustat 
CFO Is cash flow from operations in year t (OANCF), scaled by 
total assets (AT). 
Compustat 
Leverage Is the leverage ratio calculated as long-term debt 
(DLC+DLTT) in year t, scaled by total assets (AT). 
Compustat 
ChLeverage Is the change in leverage ratio (Leverage) from year t-1 to t. Compustat 
CashRatio Is the cash ratio calculated as cash and short-term equivalents 
(CHE) in year t, scaled by total assets (AT). 
Compustat 
FutEquityIssu Is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the client issues equity 
(SSTK) in year t+1, and 0 otherwise. 
Compustat 
FutDebtIssu Is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the client issues long-
term debt (DLTIS) in t+1, and 0 otherwise. 
Compustat 
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LnTA Is the natural logarithm of total assets (AT) in year t. Compustat 
Big4 Is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the client is audited by a 
Big 4 audit firm in year t, and 0 otherwise.  
Audit Analytics 
FirstYrAudit Is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the client is audited by a 
new audit firm in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
Audit Analytics 
ReportLag Is the audit report lag, measured as the difference in the 
number of days between the client’s fiscal year end-date in 
year t and the auditor’s opinion date in year t.  
Audit Analytics 
 
Control variables – audit fee model (omitted if defined above) 
MtoB Is the market to book value in year t, calculated as the market 
value (CSHO*PRCC_F), scaled by total common equity 
(CEQ). 
Compustat 
Restructure Is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the client is restructuring 
in year t, identified as non-zero discontinued operations (DO) 
or restructuring expenses (RCP), and 0 otherwise. 
Compustat 
MandA Is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the client is involved in 
an M&A transaction in year t, identified as positive 
acquisition cash flows (AQC), and 0 otherwise. 
Compustat 
CurrRatio Is the current ratio in year t, calculated as current assets 
(ACT) scaled by total assets (AT). 
Compustat 
DecYearEnd Is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the client’s fiscal year 
ends in December (FYR=12) in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
Compustat 
TaxForeign Is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the client pays foreign 
income taxes (TXFO) in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
Compustat 
Financing Is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the percentage increase in 
long-term debt (DLTT) in year t is at least 20% or the number 
of common shares outstanding (CSHO) in year t increases by 
10%, and 0 otherwise. 
Compustat 
SpecItem Is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the client reports special 
items (SPI) in year t., and 0 otherwise. 
Compustat 
GoingConcern Is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the client receives a 
going concern opinion from their auditor in year t, and 0 
otherwise. 
Audit Analytics 
ICMW Is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the client receives an 
internal control material weakness report from their auditor in 
year t, and 0 otherwise. 
Audit Analytics 
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5.1 Summary of main findings 
Multiple different engagement-specific, audit firm-specific and contextual factors, as 
well as incentives, affect auditors’ supply of audit quality and other audit outcomes (IAASB 
[2014]). In this dissertation I focus on engagement-specific and contextual factors, including 
inputs to the audit, auditor incentives, and the institutional environment. In the three studies of 
this dissertation, I examine how audit outcomes are associated with the extent of component 
auditor involvement in group audits, the commencement of public oversight worldwide, as well 
as the interaction between regulatory and litigation risk. 
In the first study (Chapter 2), I investigate the determinants of component (network 
and/or unaffiliated) auditor involvement in MNE group audits, and the association between 
the involvement and audit quality and fees. To explore this question, I make use of the 
Australian disclosures of audit fees paid to component (network and/or unaffiliated) and 
principal auditors in annual reports of listed companies. I find that principal auditor 
characteristics, and MNE complexity and internationalization are associated with likelihood 
and extent of involvement of component auditors. I further find that likelihood of network 
(unaffiliated) component auditors is positively (negatively) associated with Big 4 and large 
non-Big 4 principal auditors, and that size, and degree of internationalization of MNEs are 
only associated with network component auditors. I then find that component auditor 
involvement is negatively associated with audit quality and positively associated with audit 
fees, regardless of type of component auditor. Lastly, while I find that unaffiliated component 
auditor involvement decreased after the revision of the group audit standard ISA 600, audit 
quality or audit fees did not change in response.  
In the second study (Chapter 3), I investigate the association between audit quality and 
the commencement of national inspections of public oversight bodies worldwide. To examine 
this question, I use a large international sample of publicly listed companies audited by audit 
firms that are subject to inspections of national public oversight boards of 50 countries. Using 
a difference-in-differences design exploiting the staggered adoption of inspections 
internationally, I find that audit quality increases after inspection commencement. I further find 
that the increase in audit quality after inspection commencement is higher for large (Big 4) 
auditors, compared to small (non-Big 4) auditors. Since different public oversight boards were 
designed with different working approaches to inspections, disclosure of inspection results and 
enforcement ability, I document these differences. Based on these descriptives, I find that the 
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effect of inspection commencement on audit quality is conditional on public oversight boards 
disclosing inspection results.  
In the third study of this dissertation (Chapter 4), I investigate how two auditor 
incentives, litigation and regulatory risk, are jointly associated with auditor conservative 
reporting behavior and audit pricing. I measure differences in litigation risk for auditors across 
different U.S. states, and regulatory risk as the start of PCAOB inspections for the different 
audit firms. I exploit the U.S. setting which features variation in auditor litigation risk across 
different U.S. states, both in terms of third-party and damage apportionment standards which 
capture different dimensions of litigation risk. Further, regulatory risk increased during the 
sample period 2001-2009 with the introduction of public oversight over the audit profession, 
and specifically the introduction of inspections of audit firms at different time periods. Using 
these empirical proxies for litigation and regulatory risk, I find evidence these risks jointly 
increase audit fees, and conservative auditor reporting. Further, this effect is attributed to non-
global audit firm networks (non-GAFN). This suggests that litigation and regulatory risks 
reinforce each other, rather than acting as substitutes.  
5.2 Contribution and implications 
Overall, the three chapters of this dissertation contribute to the body of knowledge 
about engagement-specific and contextual factors that influence audit outcomes. The research 
questions and settings that I examine in this dissertation are timely and of concern to the audit 
profession, regulators and standard-setters, and the public at large. The contribution of each 
study is discussed in the respective chapters in detail. I reiterate the important points here.  
The first study (Chapter 2) is a very timely topic since regulators, standard-setters and 
practitioners worldwide are concerned with the level of audit quality of multinational group 
audits (e.g., IFIAR [2018], PCAOB [2016], [2017], IAASB [2015a], [2015b], [2019]). These 
audits are of particular concern when component auditors, especially foreign or unaffiliated, 
are involved. While this is clearly a topic of concern, there is to date only scant empirical 
research on group audits, primarily due to data constraints. This study is one of the first studies 
that documents audit quality and fee consequences of group audits. This is particularly 
interesting for regulators and standard-setters who are under pressure to address this issue. Our 
study shows that despite the IAASB’s attempt to increase the work of the principal auditor with 
the revision of ISA 600, audit quality problems remain even though the involvement of 
unaffiliated (but not network) auditors decreased. These results can be informative for the 
PCAOB and IAASB as they aim to revise their group audit standards (see footnotes 11 and 12 
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of this dissertation for current initiatives of these standard-setting bodies). This study, based on 
public disclosures of component auditor involvement, also shows that users of group financial 
statements in settings outside Australia might benefit from more public disclosure on 
component auditor involvement. 
Study two (Chapter 3), is the first comprehensive investigation into the effect of 
inspection commencement in settings outside the U.S., where PCAOB inspections have been 
investigated widely. I collect descriptives on the design of public oversight boards that show 
vast differences. Since public oversight boards have varying working approaches, inspection 
disclosure decisions and enforcement ability, it is unclear whether the U.S. findings can be 
extrapolated to other settings. This study generalizes the findings of the various U.S. studies 
that audit firm inspections by independent public oversight boards improve audit quality, 
however, it is contingent on inspection disclosure decisions of public oversight boards. These 
findings and descriptives can be useful for regulators that have ongoing discussions about 
mutual recognition of public oversight across countries, as well as for the (re)design of public 
oversight boards to increase their effectiveness in safeguarding the public interest. This study 
is also of interest to investors who can benefit from understanding the effectiveness of different 
public oversight designs. 
In the third study (Chapter 4), I investigate the interaction between two auditor 
incentives (litigation and regulatory risk) and the association with audit outcomes. While the 
literature has investigated various different auditor incentives separately, there is little 
knowledge about how different risks interact, and which contextual factors or institutions 
determine auditor behavior and outcomes (Francis [2011]; Minutti-Meza [2014]). I find that 
litigation and regulatory risks reinforce each other and affect auditor reporting conservatism 
and audit fees jointly. However, increased conservatism, rather than improved audit quality, 
and higher audit fees, which are not necessarily reflective of higher audit effort, are not socially 
desirable. While more research is needed, this finding should be of interest to investors, 
regulators and society. Further, this study can be seen as exploring the settings (i.e. litigation 
environment) under which PCAOB inspections are more or less effective. This should further 
be of interest to regulators and investors.  
5.3 Limitations and future research 
As with any study, this dissertation is subject to certain limitations, which are also discussed 
in each of the separate studies. In this section, I briefly discuss the common limitations of each 
study, and how these limitations give rise to future research opportunities. 
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First, all three studies rely on empirical proxies for various theoretical constructs which are 
inherently difficult to measure or can be noisy. First and foremost, the measures of audit quality 
used in study one and two (earnings and revenue management and timely loss recognition), 
only capture certain aspects of audit quality (DeFond and Zhang [2014]). However, in the 
international settings in which these two studies are conducted, other measures are either not 
available or are not comparable across settings. Both studies use a number of different measures 
to account for the fact that there is likely some measurement error in each one of these 
measures. Furthermore, the measure of auditor conservatism in study three is restricted to 
financially distressed firms only.  
Second, while the research design of each study has been carefully constructed, 
isolating the effect of the variables of interest on audit outcomes is challenging. In each study, 
I attempt to rule out confounding effects in different ways. In study one, I address this by 
investigating changes in component auditor involvement and address selection bias using a 
Heckman model. In study two, I apply a difference-in-differences analysis exploiting the 
staggered commencement of inspections. In study three, I identify changes in regulatory risk 
through the introduction of inspections. However, I can only identify cross-sectional 
differences in litigation risk which poses a research design challenge. 
Third, for each study, I choose a specific setting that allows me to investigate the 
research question. For example, in study one, I focus on the Australian setting that allows me 
to observe component auditor disclosures. In study three, I focus on the US setting where 
differences in state liability regimes can be observed, while abstracting away from other 
litigation risks. For these two studies, generalizability of results to other settings and 
institutional environments can be questioned. In study two, I use the international setting to 
investigate the effect of commencement of inspections worldwide, including the effect of 
differences in inspection regimes. While I find an overall effect of inspection commencement 
on audit quality, the effect is subject to, for example, differences in inspection characteristics. 
Hence, the findings might not fully generalize to all settings.  
Future research can address these different limitations as more data become available. 
For example, as data on group audits become available in other settings, such as is the case in 
the U.S. with component auditor identification available on the PCAOB’s Form AP since 2017, 
more research can be conducted on the relationship between group audits and audit quality. 
These other settings might also allow the use of different audit quality measures when 
investigating the relation between group audits and audit quality. Further, while the second 
study generalizes the finding that inspections increase audit quality to a large international 
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sample, we only find that this holds for public oversight boards with certain characteristics. 
Future research can further investigate the effects of the different oversight regimes in different 
jurisdictions (country-by-country). In this way, the studies could also take into account the 
results of inspections, if this is public knowledge, rather than the effect of inspection 
commencement. Further, study three can be extended by considering the interaction between 
different auditor incentives, other than litigation and regulatory risk, or by considering other 
sources of litigation and regulatory risks and how these affect audit outcomes. 
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Valorization Addendum 
A functioning capital market is the basis of efficient allocation of resources, economic 
growth, and ultimately a prosperous society. High-quality and reliable financial information 
that investors have confidence in is the backbone of functioning capital markets. Auditing is 
vital for enhancing the quality and credibility of financial statements and for building 
confidence of users of financial information. Auditing is thus underlying the functioning of 
capital markets. However, the value of auditing is derived from its quality, since only a quality 
audit can enhance financial statement quality and build credibility in capital markets. Audit 
quality is thus vital for the functioning of capital markets. Audit quality is influenced by 
engagement-specific circumstances and the context in which audits take place.  
This dissertation investigates whether and how different institutional and engagement-
specific factors affect audit quality and audit outcomes. Broadly, investigating the effect of 
these factors on audit quality and other outcomes is of interest to users of audited financial 
statements, the audit profession, regulators, standard-setters and the public. All three studies of 
this dissertation address topics that are of current and continued interest to all stakeholders. The 
valorization opportunities for each chapter are addressed in the following paragraphs.  
The first study of this dissertation (Chapter 2) investigates the audit quality of group 
audits of MNEs. Given the important role that MNEs play for the world economy and their 
worldwide reach, audit quality is of high importance for those companies and users of their 
financial information. Audit failures of group audits of MNEs have wide reaching 
consequences for investors and the audited companies. Examples of these major international 
failures are Parmalat, Royal Ahold, Satyam Corporation, and, more recently, BT. Furthermore, 
both regulators and standard-setters are concerned about the quality of group audits, based on 
inspection results of risk-based samples that have identified various shortcomings in group 
audits, particularly those involving component auditors and foreign component auditors (e.g., 
Doty [2011], [2017], IFIAR [2018]). The first chapter empirically documents audit quality and 
audit fee consequences for group audits of MNEs. The study shows that audit quality problems 
are prevalent in group audits involving component auditors, regardless of whether the 
component auditor is part of the network of the principal auditor or unaffiliated. The study 
further shows that even though standard-setters have revised the group auditing standard ISA 
600, audit quality problems in group audits remain. The insights from this large-scale study are 
therefore of interest to standard-setters in their endeavor to improve audit quality. In particular, 
standard-setters that are currently revising the group audit standard (both the PCAOB and the 
174 
IAASB have current projects on their group audit standards) can benefit from the insights of 
this study. Users of group financial statements should be aware of audit quality problems 
prevalent in group audits. Further, if disclosure about involvement of component auditors is 
available (e.g. through Form AP in the U.S., or in annual reports of Australian listed 
companies), investors would be able to use this information to evaluate audit quality of group 
financial statements. Regulators can thus use the insights from this study when inspecting 
group audits and evaluating their quality, and for evaluating the need for disclosures about 
involvement of component auditors in group audits which users of group financial statements 
can benefit from. Audit practitioners can use the insights of this study to address group audit 
quality problems when component auditors are involved, regardless of the type of component 
auditor (network or unaffiliated).  
The second study of this dissertation (Chapter 3) investigates one of the most profound 
changes in audit regulation in the last decades, the installment of public oversight of audit firms, 
replacing a system of self-regulation of the audit profession. Public oversight of audit firms, 
including regular inspection systems, was installed to counter the loss of confidence of 
investors in audit quality and capital markets following a number of high-profile scandals, e.g. 
Enron. While the US has been frontrunner in this development, public oversight boards were 
installed in many other jurisdictions worldwide. However, national public oversight boards 
have developed different characteristics in the design of inspection systems related to their 
work approach, disclosures of inspection results and enforcement ability. The second study 
describes these differences in inspection systems and evaluates changes in audit quality after 
commencement of inspections. The study finds evidence of audit quality improvements after 
commencement of inspections but shows that these improvements depend on disclosure of 
inspection results. These descriptives and results are of interest to public oversight boards and 
other regulators that have ongoing discussions about mutual recognition of public oversight 
across countries. Further, the results are interesting for the (re)design of public oversight boards 
to increase their effectiveness in safeguarding the public interest. For example, many EU 
countries have redesigned or established new public oversight boards recently. This study is 
also of interest to investors who can benefit from understanding the effectiveness of different 
public oversight designs for safeguarding audit quality.  
The third study of this dissertation (Chapter 4) investigates the relation between 
litigation and regulatory risks and how these risks jointly influence auditor behavior. This 
provides insights into how various institutional forces interact to influence auditor conservative 
reporting and audit fees. This study finds evidence suggesting that the effect of litigation and 
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regulatory risk are complementary in the U.S. setting. This study is of interest to regulators 
who should be aware that any regulation, such as inspections, imposed on audit firms will not 
exist in isolation but might have different effects in different contexts such as in different 
litigation environments. Given the empirical setting, this study also explores the settings under 
which PCAOB inspections are more or less effective which is of further interest to regulators. 
This study should also be of interest to investors and the public who want to evaluate the 
potential effectiveness of audit regulation in different contexts and litigation environments. 
Investors and the public should be aware that joint risk from litigation and regulation can 
increase auditor reporting conservatism, rather than improve audit quality, and increase audit 
fees, which might not be reflective of higher audit effort. This result is not socially desirable.  
Overall, the findings of this dissertation shed light on engagement-specific and 
contextual factors that influence audit outcomes. The different research questions in this 
dissertation are of concern to regulators, standard-setters, practitioners and the public at large 
and are timely topics that are under current or continued discussion. 
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